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Abstract
In an increasingly interdependent world, the scope and effectiveness o f states’ 
authority are being contested. A key question is posed: to what extent does the state 
remain fundamental in the provision o f institutional mechanisms through which 
individuals constitute themselves as morally motivated agents and interact with otherness 
in a self-assured and meaningful way?
A critical review o f the contemporary literature o f justice finds no satisfactory 
answers to this question. By assuming universal rationality and the state’s instrumental 
role in individuals’ moral formation, cosmopolitans derive far-reaching international just 
principles that will preserve individuals’ integrity and regulate their interactions. They 
fail, however, to recognize that states influence the way individuals interpret and identify 
with the values underlying these principles, condemning them to unfeasibility. 
Communitarians and theorists of nationality understand individuals’ ethical formation to 
be conditional on their common sense of belonging. By doing so, they end by 
constructing undesirable international principles that restrain individuals’ exercise o f 
critical thinking and links to the outside world.
A neo-Hegelian framework, which does not disentangle individuals’ development 
o f independently thinking capacities from the construction o f a historically situated 
system o f rights, is in a better position to answer the question. Its success however 
depends on a deeper comprehension o f a state’s ability to provide the sought-after 
mechanisms at two levels. First, citizens must not only mutually recognize each other as 
equally valid sources o f independent claims but must also make use o f similar basic 
values and motivational skills to fairly interact with non-compatriots, exchanging 
viewpoints in the construction o f their distinct personalities. Second, the states 
increasingly need to agree on forms o f regulation (international principles o f justice) that, 
though based on the mutual recognition and support o f their self-determining ethical 
capacities, do not alienate the inputs from other actors o f the international society (e.g. 
international civil society and states contesting ethical values). The incorporation and
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interaction o f  these two levels is the way to establish the legitimacy and applicability o f 
international just principles.
The originality o f this thesis resides in the development o f a new interpretation 
of familiar Neo-Hegelian arguments to address the overlooked issue o f the sources o f 
ethical motivation underpinning regulation in an increasingly interdependent world.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Impasses in the Theorization of International Morality
This thesis is concerned with the current state o f the debate in international 
political theory, in particular the possibility of norms o f international justice. There have 
been efforts, as shown most recently by the analyses o f Singer, Beitz and Frost, to attach 
a far-reaching moral dimension to international relations as part o f the revival o f a 
normative thinking that defends a liberal universalistic agenda aiming at the construction 
o f more inclusive and just principles o f international order.1 But the implied need for 
these analyses to recognize far-reaching principles of international justice that are able to 
preserve individuals’ integrity and regulate their interactions in an increasingly 
interdependent world has still to be addressed in relation to two interconnected questions. 
First, how are moral agents actually constituted through their relationship with a bounded 
political community? Second, how do they come to interpret and identify with the values 
underlying these principles? In these terms, it is essential to understand in what ways the 
state remains fundamental in the provision of institutional mechanisms through which 
individuals can develop themselves as morally motivated agents and interact with 
otherness in a self-assured and meaningful way.
The issue that I am addressing is a broad one, more so when one considers the 
fact that an international environment is marked by differences in approaches on the good 
life that are remarkably stronger than the ones present in a multicultural national 
environment. But I intend to narrow it by showing precisely where it is located in the 
present debate o f international political theory and what are the implications o f raising it 
in this context. There is some agreement among contemporary authors, such as the ones 
referred to above, that issues related to international morality are perceived as a marginal
1 M. Cohen, “Moral Skepticism and International Morality” in Charles B eitz & alii, International Ethics 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 03-50 and Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: 
Global civil society and the society o f  democratic states (London, Routledge, 2002) pp. 17-39.
concern in the current framework o f theories that dominate the study o f international 
relations.2 That happens mainly because these theories tend to construct their arguments 
around the fact that the international environment has a different dynamic than a national 
one, characterized by sovereign communities (states) that can never in principle be 
subjected to a final authority. In stressing the political communities’ ultimate 
independence, these theories tend to answer either in a skeptical or in a legal-rationalist 
way to the question o f whether moral standards can be applied to international relations.
Skepticism is illustrated by the realist tradition and its further neo-realist 
development. For this tradition, what defines international relations is the power-relation 
among states.3 This assertion is based on four basic assumptions.4 First, sovereign states 
are the main units o f an international system. Second, domestic policy is a separate 
concern from foreign policy. Given the lack o f a final authority in the international 
environment, the standards o f behavior applied in this environment differ from the ones 
that define behavior within a national unity. That leads to an understanding o f the 
statesman as someone who is guided by a different notion o f morality, one that 
safeguards national interest from external threat. In international relations (hereafter 
abbreviated as IR), it could lead him to take actions that are considered unacceptable 
from a national perspective. Third, international politics is a struggle for power in an 
anarchic society. Therefore, the best way to preserve or pursue the. national interest is to 
prevent others from having too much power. Fourth, the notion o f power is linked to the 
idea o f capabilities (economic, military and technological resources) and the differences 
present in terms o f possession and use of these capabilities among states. As a general 
rule, a balance between great powers, that means the states considered the most powerful 
ones in terms o f capabilities, must be added to the system to allow order to prevail.5
2 Peter Singer, “Famine, A ffluence and Morality” in Charles B eitz & alii, International Ethics ; Charles 
B eitz, “Justice and International Relations”, Ibid.: Mervyn_Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global civil 
society and the society o f  democratic states.
3For Morgenthau, international politics is defined fundamentally as a struggle for power. H. J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Am ong Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (N ew  York, McGraw-Hill, 1985) 
pp. 25-26.
4 In this qualification o f  a realist approach, I am basically making use o f  Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff s 
understanding o f  a realist approach. J. Dougherty & R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories o f  International 
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (N ew  York, HarperCollins Publishers, 1990) pp. 81-83.
5 Further developm ents o f  this approach, associated to what is called a neo-realist tradition, have com e to 
offer a more coherent and structured theoretical framework to the above assumptions. In this sense, it is
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What is important here is the way this skeptical view understands international 
relations as being part o f a differentiated and nebulous sphere o f morality. There is a 
clear differentiation between national and international morality derived from the diverse 
roles the political community is supposed to perform. At a national level, the political 
community is responsible for preserving individuals’ rights by being a mediator and 
enforcer o f rules. At the international level, its only concern is the pursuit o f national 
interests making use o f the capabilities available to achieve that. That concern opens the 
way to a flexible understanding o f what are to be considered moral or legitimate attitudes 
in this last sphere. In its best interpretation, international morality will be seen as a by­
product o f the national interests that drive the prevailing arrangements among great 
powers; at its worst there is no international morality.
In contrast to skepticism, there is what I call a legalist-rational approach to moral 
issues in the international domain. That is mainly illustrated by the dominance of a 
jurisprudential thinking founded on rationalist presuppositions. In line with Martin 
Wight’s argument for a rational tradition, one can say that this approach sees law as being 
the foundation o f society. It is the effectiveness of a set o f norms backed by sanctions 
that make social interactions possible or stable. In other words, the well-functioning of a 
society is dependent on the existence of a sovereign legislature that has in the state its 
enforcement agency. But it is important to point out that the spirit o f law is given prior to 
any social arrangement and can easily be grasped by reason through observation and 
sense-experience o f such interactions.6
Following this reasoning, there is a lack o f a superior entity responsible for 
providing law-abiding behavior at the international level. Nonetheless, this realization 
does not imply that the realist is right to describe a political community’s interaction as 
dominated by a power relation. Political communities are considered members of an 
international system that, though missing a clear enforcement mechanism, is still guided,
worth pointing to the work o f  structuralists such as Waltz. According to him, an analysis o f  the power 
structure o f  the anarchic society is related to the understanding o f  how the units differently juxtaposed and 
combined can com e to produce different outcomes. And concerning this, the need to rely on whatever 
means or arrangements they can generate to ensure survival and enhance security will greatly determine 
what the state components can actually do. K. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading Mass, 
Addison W esley Publishing Company, 1979).
6Martin W ight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (London, Leicester University Press, 1996) pp. 
38-39.
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if not by explicit consent, by the tacit acceptance of common principles. As Wight 
observes, interactions among communities are guided by custom and elastic principles 
founded on the settlement o f disputes by diplomatic arbitration.7
It is however essential to point out that the analysis o f moral issues from this 
perspective still suffers from double standards. Although guided by custom and 
principles founded on issues raised in diplomatic arbitration, interactions between 
communities are still fundamentally dependent on their discretionary power. The final 
instance o f appeal is still the state with its perception of national interests and concerns.
However gradually, I think these two predominant perspectives on morality in 
relation to international politics are being challenged. There seems to be a natural 
demand for understanding morality not in terms o f a double standard but as an integral 
whole that has similar implications for both the national and international spheres. In 
part that happens because of the need to address the fundamental needs o f individuals and 
the constitution o f communities in an increasingly interdependent world. While the 
individual is pushed to look for a sense o f identity in a more complex environment 
marked by technological transformations, the state faces difficulties in grasping its role in 
a milieu where the scope and effectiveness of its authority is contested.
In a rapidly changing world, there is a need to understand the centrality o f 
international just principles (such as human rights principles) for securing individuals’ 
integrity while at the same time leaving them enough space to explore new possibilities 
o f interactions. More importantly, there is a need to ask a different sort of normative 
question with profound consequences for the understanding o f international relations. 
What is required is not simply to evaluate the ends and legitimate means participants in 
international relations can adopt for pursuing their own ends. It is necessary to 
understand the perspective o f the ethical relations among these participants, particularly 
between the individual and the political community o f which she or he is a member, and 
its implications for the construction o f an international order.8
7 Ibid. p. 39.
8 I here agree with Cochran on what should be the aims o f  normative questions in international relations 
theory nowadays. See M. Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.03.
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The debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians illustrates this search for 
a better understanding o f the ethical components o f the relations between individuals and 
their political communities as well among the units of an international system. But the 
debate between these two perspectives is far from being fully adequate. Let me quickly 
point to the basic shortcomings o f these two views. By assuming universal rationality 
and the state’s instrumental role in individuals’ moral formation, the cosmopolitan 
approach is able to defend the idea that international society can be conceived, as Wight 
describes it, as “a civitas maxima”, the domestic politics of the universal “civitas”.9 In 
these terms, this society can address concerns and interests o f individuals living 
worldwide independently o f the social attachments they have to specific political 
communities. They can also formulate far-reaching international just principles on the 
basis o f these concerns and interests.
In the contemporary debate on global justice, this view is illustrated by 
cosmopolitans such as Beitz and Pogge. Both authors try to expand the implications of a 
Rawlsian approach, as described in the definition o f the original position in A Theory o f  
Justice, by arguing that the elements defining a moral person (related to his capacity to 
form and follow an idea o f the good as well as to have a sense o f justice) can be 
potentially found in individuals all over the globe. That happens because individuals are 
by definition to be regarded as self-originating sources o f valid claims given their 
universal reasoning capacities and their equal status. Moreover, they can increasingly be 
seen as participants o f an interdependent economic process that tends to reinforce this 
equal standing by homogenizing general values and behavior.10 As a consequence, there 
should be a clear and far-reaching defense at the international level o f the essential values 
(freedom and equality) that allow individuals to function as moral agents. 11 This
9 For Wight, the international relations will be conceived as the dom estic politics o f  the universal “civitas”. 
Martin W ight., International Theory: The Three Traditions, p. 41.
10 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979).
11 Pogge makes specific the argument for a value-based order, in which political communities accept 
morally rather than only prudentially the continued existence o f  one another and the values central to their 
constitution. Follow ing this reasoning, he w ill argue for reasonable pluralism to be applied to the 
international sphere. Three conditions have nonetheless to be fulfilled: 1) parties are convinced that there 
ought to be a fair schem e for the distribution o f  benefits and burdens among all parties; 2) that parties can 
identify and perhaps extend som e comm on values; 3) that each is w illing to modify their values to som e 
extent. Thomas Pogge, R ealizing Rawls (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989) pp. 228-229.
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cosmopolitan defense encompasses a comprehensive notion o f international human 
rights, involving an equal standing for both the first and second generation rights.12
There is no question that the cosmopolitan approach leads to an ethical 
understanding o f international relations, one based on encompassing common ethical 
values rather than merely on prudential rationality as suggested, for example, by 
Gauthier.13 But this understanding suffers from an underlying weakness. As individuals 
are already regarded as well-defined moral agents and the political community is 
relegated to a mere instrumental role in the formulation and the pursuit o f this ethical 
order, the formation o f moral personalities and consequently how one becomes motivated 
to act at the international level are not up for question here.14 This is problematic because 
it leads us to doubt the usefulness o f the theoretical exercise proposed by cosmopolitans. 
Such an exercise can be easily portrayed either as centered more in aspirations than in 
what can actually be attained in practice or as an uncritical defense of, if not the 
imposition, o f values that characterize liberal societies. By uncritical defense, I mean that 
there is a lack o f sufficient reasons to explain why values such as freedom and equality 
are to be perceived as fundamental in human development as well as how they can 
actually be realized given the historical constraints facing moral agents.
On the opposite side o f the debate, there are the communitarians. They 
emphasize the fundamental importance of the community in the formation o f moral 
personalities. According to these theories, it is within historically specific communities 
that meaningful relationships among individuals are made possible through the attribution 
o f social roles by which they can guide their behavior and ultimately provide meaning to 
their actions. In this sense, the community is to be regarded as the ultimate source o f 
value in moral thinking. And in assuming this function, it has the right to take 
autonomous actions to keep social cohesion and the uniqueness o f a cultural environment 
that provides distinctiveness to its members. What is implied by these actions will vary 
depending on the way the membership o f a community is to be defined, most frequently
12 First generation rights include basic political and civil rights w hile the second generation refers to socio­
econom ic rights.
13 David Gauthier, Morals bv Agreement. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986).
14 Cochran points to the same problem. M. Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A 
Pragmatic Approach, p. 50.
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in terms o f the need to share a common political culture, as shown by Miller, or a 
national consciousness, as defended by Tamir.15
Although the communitarian approach calls attention to individuals’ actual need 
to have socio-historical references to develop himself as an active moral agent, it 
overstresses the role o f the community in defining these references. Consequently, it puts 
inconvenient obstacles to the construction o f a far-reaching international moral order. 
Walzer illustrates the point in his defense o f complex equality, where he argues that 
different issues should be treated by different distributive spheres within political 
communities, but justice is primarily to be seen as an internal (national) concern.16 This 
understanding does not prevent communities making a common effort to construct moral 
principles at the international level. But it puts a significant constraint on the content o f 
the principles and their scope o f application. The content o f these principles would be 
rather thin, centered in the mutual recognition o f particular just schemes and the 
acceptance o f common presuppositions present in the various systems o f rights. And the 
communities would maintain most of their discretionary power in interpreting and 
applying these shared norms.17
I think a valid way out o f the difficulties found in the debate between 
cosmopolitans and communitarians is offered by neo-Hegelian interpretations of the 
ethical role exercised by the political community. Contemporary proponents o f a neo- 
Hegelian interpretation include, for example, Habermas on the continent as well as 
Charvet and Frost in Britain. These theories are based on the reconciliation o f the social 
(as a historically situated construction that influences individuals’ identity) and the 
individual (as independent thinker) dimensions through the understanding o f individuals’ 
participation in a series o f juxtaposed practices -  family, civil society, states, the system 
o f states. In this understanding, the individual’s participation as a citizen o f a bounded 
political community, which allows her to consider others as equally valid sources o f
15 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997); Y. Tamir, “Reconstructing the 
Landscape o f  Imagination” in Simon Caney, D. George & Peter Jones (eds.), National Rights. International 
Obligations (Oxford, W estview  Press, 1996).
16 Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A D efence o f  Pluralism and Equality (United States o f  America, 
B asic Books, 1983).
17 M ichael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (London, University o f  Notre 
Dam e Press, 1994).
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independent claims and to learn how to reciprocate commitments, is fundamental to their 
constitution as a self-understanding active moral agent. The success o f this participation 
is nonetheless dependent on the State being able to recognize and maintain individuals’ 
abilities to form and apply independent judgments over the good, and maintaining a 
system o f rights that can be influenced from these independent judgm ents.18 And it is also 
dependent on the state being recognized by other states at the international level as 
having the ability to carry on these ethical functions in a self-determining way.
In different ways, these three authors bring insights to the further development o f 
an ethical approach and I will be referring to some of these insights when constructing 
my own interpretation o f the approach. But Frost’s analysis is o f particular interest here 
because by specifically focusing on the international dimension it can be used to better 
situate the points I will be raising in this thesis. For Frost, no proper understanding o f 
international relations is possible nowadays without comprehending the place o f 
individuals’ human rights in two foundational practices, international civil society (where 
individuals see each other as human rights holders -  civilian rights) and democratic states 
in the system o f democratic and democratizing states (rights o f citizenship). While 
within the first practice individuals see each other as participants irrespective of being 
located in a particular community and therefore are able to freely discuss the social 
arrangements they live by, within the second one they present themselves as rights- 
holders o f a particular state, backed therefore by a clearly defined authority.19
His basic concern is to understand the architecture o f these practices and how 
they relate to each other. The shortcomings o f individuals’ enjoyment of their 
participation in the civil society, including alienation, competition, inequality in 
economic-social rights as well as lack o f authority, is much compensated by their 
political participation in a state. It is the state that is able to provide the necessary 
institutional mechanisms through which individuals effectively learn to mutually
It should be clear that there is no denial o f  individuals’ critical assessment o f  the diverse practices they 
participate in. O ne’s self-understanding can only develop so far as one can become master o f  the social 
roles one performs, learning to critically assess them and identify with them. In this sense, there is no 
division between an idea o f  a person that is personally chosen and one that is socially constructed. They 
are both integral parts o f  the individual’s development. See Allen W ood, H egel’s Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 197.
19 Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global civil society and the society o f  democratic states, pp. 
40-47.
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recognize each other as valid sources o f independent claims, empowering them to claim 
and respect rights in an international civil society.20 But the state is only able to perform 
this function when it is understood as a relationship o f mutual recognition with other ones 
-  in which citizens of other states recognize me as one who together with my compatriots 
is able to autonomously govern myself in terms o f constitutionally prescribed rules. The 
ethical standing due to a citizen at this level ends by putting procedural constraints on 
how citizens or their representatives must conduct international politics.
Despite generally agreeing with the analysis o f Frost, I think there is still a gap to 
be bridged between stating the centrality of international human rights and paving the 
way, even if through reasonable arguments, to the effective recognition by different 
participants o f an international society of the importance o f abiding by these principles 
nowadays. The way I propose to bridge this gap is to reassess states’ ability to perform 
their ethical role in individuals’ constitution in face o f the challenges and opportunities 
imposed by an increasingly interdependent environment. It is to present arguments to 
justify states as the most fitted entity capable o f providing for institutional mechanisms 
(both at national and international spheres) through which individuals can constitute 
themselves as motivated moral agents and deal with otherness in a meaningful way in this 
changing environment.
Let me explain. By morally motivated agents, I am not referring merely to an 
individuals’ ability to claim (to have a conception o f the good and defend it) and respect 
rights (to act upon and apply principles agreed) as proposed by Frost but to their actual 
ability to come to identify with the values (equal freedom) that sustain them. 
Identification here means to become critically aware o f the way these values give sense 
and become directly applicable to the construction o f my personality and to the way I 
interact with otherness (compatriots and non-compatriots) so as to grasp the components 
of this identity. By the state’s provision of institutional mechanisms, I mean the state’s 
ability to provide for the exercise o f mutual recognition taking place among its citizens in 
the actual construction o f a historically situated system o f rights, which is foundational in 
the constitution o f these morally motivated agents. It also refers to the state’s ability to 
guarantee that this exercise o f mutual recognition becomes meaningful for its citizens in a
20 Ibid., p. 58.
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context where they tend to intensify their links with groups of a dynamic international 
society and citizens from other states.
On one hand, this state’s ability to provide for institutional mechanisms refers to 
the implementation of constitutionally defined democratic procedures guaranteeing that 
the exercise o f mutual recognition among citizens be widespread while not alienating the 
inputs coming from an increasingly interdependent world. In these terms, it also refers to 
the possibility o f creating a debate among citizens to define to what extent the 
inclusiveness o f the claims o f non-compatriots does not put at risk the ethical exercise 
implied in the construction o f a distinctive systems o f rights. On the other hand, it 
increasingly depends on a deeper understanding o f states’ interactions in terms of their 
ethical need to mutually recognize this self-determining capacity in this context and to 
use this recognition so as to construct more workable international just principles.
This deeper understanding o f states’ interactions involves above all a better 
appreciation o f the place o f diversity in international relations. If individuals’ essential 
moral capacity for rational thinking is universally given, its elaboration in a set o f 
particular ethical principles o f conduct is contingent on space and time. It is dependent on 
individuals’ participation in the actual construction o f a state’ structure (a system o f 
rights). The plurality o f states at a time, when qualified in terms o f states’ ability to 
recognize each other in their distinct self-determining capacities (each being considered a 
unique ethical locus to their citizens’ moral development) while being open to the claims 
o f each other and to inputs o f an international civil society, provides for a broad spectrum 
of experiments through which it is possible to have a clear grasp o f the common 
conditions necessary for individuals’ moral development. It renders possible a cross- 
examination and re-evaluation of states’ historically contingent presuppositions on 
fundamental individual rights and from then on to derive common conclusions that 
underpin the robustness o f international just principles, their legitimacy and enforceable 
power.
Following this reasoning, international society is continuous with national 
structures in their moral relevance to the individual. Increasingly so if the diversity o f 
states implied in this conception of society is not taken to be a mere fact o f international 
relations, linked to how individuals holding different citizenship do things differently or
17
come with different interpretations o f positive and negative rights, which should be 
recognized in theoretical analysis.21 It is considered the very means through which an 
enlightened comprehension o f the regulatory mechanisms necessary to interactions 
among morally fit individuals living in an increasingly interdependent world can be 
obtained.
2. Method of Analysis
The thesis is a conceptual and theoretical analysis based on three interconnected 
sets o f claims. First, the state is an ethical unit fundamental in developing individuals’ 
self-awareness as active moral agents. Second, sovereign states are to relate to each other 
vis-a-vis the potential role they are to perform in these individuals’ moral development. 
Finally, the understanding of states’ interactions on the basis o f their self-determining 
capacity to perform their ethical role paves the way to the formulation o f viable 
international principles o f justice.
In order to be able to make these claims, I construct my own interpretation o f a 
Neo-Hegelian approach considering the notions o f desirability and feasibility. By 
desirability, I mean that the structure o f the arguments I present could stand up by itself, 
being rationally coherent and achieving a degree o f cohesiveness among concepts used. I 
also mean that some normative desirability could be deduced from the analysis. In other 
words, my analysis is able to take into consideration a society’s overall intuitions on the 
subject o f justice, in this case liberal societies where this analysis begins and from where 
fundamental elements to the realization o f an ethical state can be found, and is clearly 
able to assess the current needs o f this society.22 Moreover, it is eventually able to 
extrapolate these considerations to the relation of states in an international society 
without alienating non-liberal societies as well as other actors o f an international society.
21 According to Frost, “the w hole notion o f  individuals having citizenship rights which entitle them in 
setting up states, choosing governments for them and holding their governments to account, is premised 
upon the knowledge that not all citizens think alike.” Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global 
civil society and the society o f  democratic states, p. 118.
22 In this particular point, I am making reference to R aw ls’ method o f  reflective equilibrium . See John 
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 48-51.
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By feasibility, I mean that my theoretical analysis should have a strong ground in reality. 
What I propose is based on observation (empirical evidence), more particularly 
associated with the development o f an increasingly interdependent world. Finally, this 
analysis could eventually motivate actual individuals to take actions on the basis of its 
normative requirements.
In comparison particularly with the analysis o f universalists (cosmopolitans) and 
particularists (communitarians and theorists of nationalism), my interpretation o f a Neo- 
Hegelian approach is best positioned to offer this balance between desirability and 
feasibility because it builds a coherent argument on the rationality o f an ethical state, 
whose basic features can be seen as acceptable and realizable to a significant degree, in 
the world today. The argument on the rationality o f a state implies the reconciliation 
between individuality and political community through individuals’ political participation 
in common decisions defining a historically situated system o f rights. The state is at the 
same time an instrument in the development o f individuals’ self-consciousness and an 
agent in the formation of a common identity supporting this exercise of self- 
consciousness and leading to morally motivated actions. Though being an ideal 
construction, this argument on the rationality o f an ethical state refers to institutional 
elements constitutive of political communities nowadays. In great part, this ideal 
construction refers to the values o f freedom and equality and institutional elements, such 
as democratic procedures and the rule o f law, which characterize liberal societies 
nowadays.
But it is worth pointing out that this ideal construction is not circumscribed in 
terms o f reference and applicability to liberal societies. It is assumed that to fully realize 
themselves as ethical unities, the states have to comprehend themselves in a relation o f 
mutual recognition with other states so as to test and contest their temporally and 
spatially contingent interpretations o f the morally foundational principles embedded in 
their system o f rights. In a context of socio-economic interdependence, it becomes 
increasingly necessary for liberal states to be able to openly exchange viewpoints with 
other liberal states that interpret in different ways the values o f freedom and equality as 
well as with non-liberal ones that question the extent of the significance o f these values in 
the formulation o f principles o f justice. Openness has here to be comprehended as the
19
different manners that could be possibly envisaged, including from the formal 
incorporation o f inputs from an international civil society in the actual process of 
defining international just principles to the development among states’ representatives of 
a moral sensibility that tries to overcome the limitations imposed by a historically 
contingent notion o f reasonableness used during this process, so that states can better 
grasp each others’ particular interpretations of moral principles. It is this openness that 
allows states, specially liberal ones assuming a leading role in current discussions of 
international morality, to discover their limitations qua ethical units and to use this 
discovery to agree on a common ground for regulatory principles (international principles 
o f justice) that effectively guarantee the moral integrity o f their citizens worldwide.
My embrace o f a Neo-Hegelian framework and its development in the 
directions here suggested will necessarily lead to a series o f charges, to which I want here 
to reply. The first charge is that the link made between ethical states and actual states 
leads to the endorsement o f a “status quo”. According to the above reasoning, there is no 
backing o f states just because they are currently available structures. The backing o f 
states is based on the acknowledgement, founded by reasonable argument, that present 
states possess a rational structure that, to a significant degree, benefit individuals’ moral 
development.23
The second charge is that the state acquires an absolute status in the analysis, 
presenting itself as the end o f a teleogically historical process. This charge can be 
certainly dismissed when taking into account the following particularities of a notion of 
an ethical state. First, it should be remembered that the state is not an end in itself. It is 
an agent that helps individuals to develop their most elementary moral capacities 
(independent thinking) in their interactions qua political agents, who think together about 
the construction o f a system o f rights that lead them to enjoy freedom fully. Second, the 
notion o f  an ethical state is historically dependent since its realization is temporally and 
spatially defined. Hence, states in modem history embody partial, and therefore fallible, 
views on the fundamentals o f an ethical process and should be recognized as such in my
23M. Hardimon, H egel’s Social Philosophy: The Project o f  Reconciliation (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) pp. 25-26.
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analysis. 24 It is the qualified recognition o f this diversity derived from historical 
contingency that could eventually pave the way to the construction o f more thoughtful, 
legitimate and viable international just principles.
Second, it should be clear that what my analysis affirms is the continuing ethical 
significance o f states in providing for an environment where individuals can morally 
flourish. There is no alternative institutional arrangement, considered in the present 
analysis o f theories o f justice, which can perform in so comprehensive, coherent and 
enforceable manner the ethical function here suggested. That does not mean to say that 
states cannot or will not be replaced by other kind o f institutional arrangements in the 
future. That is a matter o f speculation that much depends on the evolution o f a historical 
process and not the object o f analysis here.
This last point leads me to consider a third charge brought against the use o f a 
Neo-Hegelian framework, which has two sorts o f implications. The possible critiques o f 
this theoretical framework seem always to be internal to a state structure. Thus, it is first 
quite unlikely to determine whether critique is effective in terms o f making institutional 
changes possible.25 It is possible to answer this kind o f criticism by underlining the fact 
that my analysis refers to the terms by which the state could be recognized as the ethical 
locus o f individuals’ moral development and how these terms could lead to a better 
comprehension o f an international society and its foundational principles. Although 
referring to historical developments, these terms form part o f an ideal construction. 
Present states’ structures certainly fail to be fully identified with these terms. That is why 
there should be a place for criticisms and reforms o f states’ structures in my theoretical 
scheme. This space is filled by the conception o f institutional mechanisms both at the 
national and international levels that make possible individuals (either as citizens o f a 
state participating in political decisions or as representatives o f a state deliberating about 
principles o f international justice) to develop a certain openness to otherness. They are 
able to exchange viewpoints on the basis of reasonable claims and a moral sensibility so 
as to evaluate the ethical foundations o f the spatially and temporally situated system o f
24 In this view , every system o f  ethical life is transitory and conditioned by the extent to which spirit has 
reached self-know ledge in that time and place, being challenged by another more comprehensive and 
developed view . A llen W ood, H egel’s Ethical Thought, p. 220.
25 M. Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, p. 107.
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rights they form part o f and to constitute a common ground for the construction o f more 
inclusive and legitimate international just principles.
Second, it is said that a neo-Hegelian framework ends by imposing constraints on 
the emergence o f new ethical discourses and practices.26 It does not allow a questioning 
of its foundations that could lead to new forms of thinking or institutional practices. In 
my interpretation o f a Neo-Hegelian framework, it is essential to have this kind o f 
questioning and to make way for new forms of thinking and institutional practices that 
are part o f an increasingly interdependent world. It is by envisaging ways o f 
incorporating the inputs brought by new forms of discourse coming from a lively 
international civil society and societies that question the liberal values on the basis o f 
different conceptions o f the ethical state that it is possible to construct more legitimate 
and enforceable international regulatory principles.
3. Outline of the Argument
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part critically reviews the 
contemporary literature on international justice from a normative perspective. This 
review is centered on the debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians. With the 
aim o f having a broader understanding of this debate with regard to a functioning moral 
agent, I address it in terms o f universalistic and particularistic claims. That allows me to 
deal more effectively with the arguments o f both communitarians and nationalists on the 
issue under the same particularistic perspective.
Chapter one discusses Rawls’ legacy for the contemporary debates about justice. 
As it is broadly agreed, Rawls lays the foundation of the contemporary debate on justice 
with his influential book A Theory o f  Justice. While cosmopolitans tend to enlarge the 
scope o f the Rawlsian individualistic premises to construct a universalistic approach, 
communitarians and nationalists are inclined to contest them, calling attention to the 
constitutive role played by community in the development o f a functioning moral agent. 
Arguing from his own viewpoint, Rawls subsequently rejects some of these 
interpretations and incorporates others in a series o f articles on Kantian constructivism
26 M. Hardimon, H eee l’s Social Philosophy: The Project o f  Reconciliation, pp.80-81.
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and such books as Political Liberalism  and The Law o f  Peoples. I argue that in these 
different attempts at re-thinking his own framework Rawls paves the way for a Neo- 
Hegelian interpretation o f the ethical role the state should necessarily play in individuals’ 
moral formation. I further argue that the exploration o f this Neo-Hegelian interpretation 
can eventually lead to a more comprehensive understanding o f the terms o f interactions 
among states at the international level.
Chapter two explores the universalistic claims as proposed by cosmopolitans such 
as Beitz, Pogge and Barry. I argue that these authors have the merit o f underlining 
universal rationality as the fundamental element defining a moral agent. They, however, 
fail to acknowledge that the actual realization o f this capacity is made through 
individuals’ participation in historically situated political structures (systems o f rights), 
which play not merely an instrumental but also a constitutive role in the formation of a 
motivated moral agent. In so doing, they overlook the fact that, however valid, the liberal 
view underlying their formulation o f egalitarian principles o f justice is still historically 
limited and can only be identified as a guide to moral behavior by a small parcel o f the 
world population nowadays. To attain broader legitimacy and effectiveness, dominant 
liberal interpretations o f international principles of justice have to be continuously re­
assessed in view o f their greater exposure to values and practices underlying different 
systems o f rights in an increasingly interdependent context. It is the possibility o f openly 
exchanging views with a broader range o f states so as to have a better grasp of their 
ethical role in individuals’ moral development that paves the way to principles o f 
international justice, characterized by its universal ground and appeal.
Chapter three explores the particularistic claims in the works of communitarians, 
such as MacIntyre and Walzer, and o f nationalists, such as Miller and Tamir. I argue that 
these authors duly highlight the constitutive ethical role played by historically situated 
political communities in the formation o f motivated moral agents. These authors 
however fail to sufficiently preserve citizens’ ability to engage in independent critical 
thinking by emphasising the idea that citizens’ moral formation is conditional on their 
common sense o f belonging. The discretionary power the political community eventually 
exerts in the construction of a too subjectively defined collectivity leads to a restrained 
perception o f the ethical role the political community should have in individuals’ moral
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formation in an increasingly interdependent context, where the status o f this community 
is being continuously challenged. More particularly, the formulation o f international 
principles o f justice is above all understood as a way for political communities to 
acknowledge common institutional practices and values so as to preserve the exercise o f 
their sovereign capacities in the moral formation o f their citizens. It is not derived from 
an open exchange o f viewpoints among political communities aiming at a universal 
agreement on the fundamentals o f their citizens’ moral development, which could lead 
them to interact with compatriots as well as with non-compatriots in a morally 
meaningful way today.
In the second part o f the thesis, I present my own version o f a Neo-Hegelian 
approach. The latter aims both at considering the formation o f more active thinking and 
motivated moral agents in their rapports with political communities’ institutional 
structures, as well as at understanding the formulation o f international principles o f 
justice from the perspective of these rapports. It is worth pointing out that in the 
formulation o f this version I analyse and incorporate similar arguments as those defended 
by Habermas, Charvet and Frost on the ethical role played by the state. To a certain 
extent, I directly benefit from the ideas defended by these authors, endorsing some of the 
points developed by their analysis. In many ways, however, the ideas are further 
articulated and lead to novel conclusions that have not previously been drawn.
Chapter four summarises the distinctions between a universalistic and 
particularistic interpretation o f individuals’ moral formation through their relation with 
historically situated political communities as well as the weaknesses o f these views. It 
also presents my understanding o f moral agency by underlining a neo-Hegelian 
conception o f individuals’ self-understanding through their participation in a 
juxtaposition o f social practices. In doing so, I try to show how my understanding can 
possibly deal with the shortcomings o f the two first characterisations. Though all three 
versions o f moral agency subscribe to an ethical understanding o f the relationship 
between individual and political community, I will distinguish them respectively as 
functionalist, constitutive and ethical views for the clarity o f the argument.
Chapter five characterises the international society as one in which the states 
emerge by necessity as the fundamental actors because, first, they effectively support,
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through the provision o f legitimate and enforceable institutional mechanisms, an ethical 
process bom out of individuals’ relation with each other qua citizens determining a 
historically situated system o f rights. Second, the relations among states as self­
determining ethical entities, who are equally open to each others’ claim, make possible a 
cross-examination o f ethical experiments across space and over time. Such a cross- 
examination paves the way to the robustness of international principles o f justice. In this 
distinctive interpretation of a neo-Hegelian framework, I argue that ethical processes are 
characterised by openness and dynamism derived from their historical attributes and the 
inter-stated and multicultural dialogues that naturally emerge in a society o f  states.
In this interpretation, ethical states are ideal constructs that are necessarily 
embedded in a historical context o f interdependence and subject to its challenges. One o f 
states’ main challenges in dealing with this context is to understand the significance o f 
clashes between developed societies and non-developed ones as well as between liberal 
and non-liberal ones, so as to actually achieve the construction o f more workable 
international just principles. Furthermore, I elaborate on how to proceed in view o f such 
an ethical goal, emphasising the inevitable understanding that the actual formulation o f 
principles is an exercise in which state representatives have, for the sake o f their states’ 
ethical realisation, to openly exchange viewpoints on their particular interpretations o f a 
system o f rights on the basis o f a revitalised notion o f reasonableness. As I postulate, the 
key in this notion o f reasonableness is the parties’ exercise o f moral sensibility. Clashes 
derived from states’ differences in levels o f development or value systems would then 
represent a unique opportunity to re-assess the limits o f a historically constructed notion 
o f reasonableness that currently shapes the debate on international practices and 
institutions.
Chapter six analyses the main principles o f international justice, projecting the 
central thesis o f chapter five at the institutional level of international society. I argue that 
the self-determination o f its members is the founding principle o f international society. 
That is so because the most basic demand ethical states can make towards each other is 
related to their right to be recognised in their distinctive capacity o f being the collective 
vehicle o f moral self-consciousness to their citizens and to openly relate to each other in 
this capacity so as to fully grasp the moral foundation o f the ethical role they are
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supposed to perform. In the present historical context, there are, however, many 
constraints on the fulfilment o f this principle o f self-determination, ranging from many 
states’ inability to provide for the basic rights o f its citizens to some states’ unwillingness 
to relate to each other in an autonomous way. Given that the international community as 
a whole has an intrinsic interest in upholding this principle to secure the ethical role its 
members are supposed to perform in the formation of a fit moral agent, I further argue for 
complementary principles o f justice - associated with the international duties of 
assistance and intervention. A defence o f these duties is further accompanied by an 
illustrative analysis o f the positions held by members o f the international community in 
the Iraq war as well as by a brief consideration of the institutional mechanisms this 
international society requires in order to render these, duties legitimate and effective.
Finally, I draw some conclusions from the arguments defended in the thesis.
The originality o f the thesis lies in a re-interpretation o f a Neo-Hegelian 
framework in which states are temporally and spatially situated historical construct that 
encapsulate in their systems o f rights different ethical interpretations o f the fundamentals 
o f moral living. In its turn, the society o f states becomes, when properly qualified, the 
locus where distinct ethical interpretations o f fundamental individuals rights can be 
exchanged, assessed and subject to truly universal grounding. Such a qualification is 
based on states’ need to interact in a dynamic and open way, making use of a notion of 
reasonableness coupled with the exercise of moral sensibility in the actual formulation of 
international principles. It is eventually this qualification that provides support for more 
legitimate and effective international principles in an increasingly interdependent world.
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CHAPTER 1; Rawls* s Legacy to the Debate
The contemporary debate on International Justice is largerly defined around the 
diverse interpretations o f and questions about Rawls’ influential book A Theory o f  Justice 
and his replies to criticism in the articles related to Kantian constructivism as well as his 
later books Political Liberalism  and The Law o f  Peoples.21 Broadly speaking, I would 
say two perspectives have assumed prominence in this debate, universalism and 
particularism. Their basic distinction can be outlined by the contrasting analysis they 
offer to the hypothetical situation (Original Position- OP) that Rawls constructs to discuss 
the basic principles o f justice that should govern a society. For universalists, such as 
Beitz and Pogge, there is nothing specifically in the characterization o f the parties and the 
circumstances they are subjected to that constitute a constraint on thinking about terms o f 
justice worldwide.28 Individuals share an intrinsic common capacity to reason about 
moral issues that make their social, cultural and economic differences (particularities o f 
space and time) irrelevant to the construction o f basic international principles o f justice. 
Principles o f justice do assume in this perspective a universal form, being universally 
justified by individuals living all over the globe. It also assumes a cosmopolitan scope o f 
application, valid for each and every individual independent o f the context they find 
themselves in.29
27John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice : John Rawls, Political Liberalism. (N ew  York, Columbia University 
Press, 1996) and John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples. (London, Harvard University Press, 1999). Concerning 
the articles working with the idea o f  Kantian Constructivism, see John Rawls, “The Basic Structure as 
Subject” in American Political Quarterly. Vol. 14, N o.2 , April 1977; John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism  
in Moral Theory”, The Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. LXXVII, NO. 9, September 1980; John Rawls., “The 
Basic Liberties and Their Priorities”, The Tanner Lectures on Human V alues. Delivered at the University 
o f  M ichigan, April 10, 1981.
28Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations and Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls .
29 In terms o f  a more comprehensive discussion about the form and scope o f  o f  universalists see Onora 
O ’N eill. Faces o f  Hunger: An Essay on Poverty. Justice and Developm ent (London, George Allen and 
Unwin, 1983), chapter 3 and Onora O ’N eill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  
Practical Reasoning (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapters 2, 3 and 4. She develops 
arguments on the focus and scope o f  practical reasoning so as to support universality.
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For particularism, represented by communitarians such as Taylor and Sandel, the 
Rawlsian construction o f an OP in order to derive just principles seems misplaced.30 By 
focusing on procedures, it wrongly portrays the individual as a self who exists prior to his 
ends. Individuals cannot reason without having as a reference the social environment in 
which they grow up, which helps define who they are and what they want. It is in a 
social context that things and actions gain meaning and significance. The individuals’ 
moral judgments will therefore be strongly influenced by the way the community forms 
and defends values that define social roles. To talk about justice is to talk about the 
importance o f these values and to what extent they contribute to the maintenance of a 
specific social structure.31 As the primacy o f the community over the individual becomes 
evident here, international just principles tend to assume a thin universal form, mainly 
related to the common set o f values grounding the different social systems. They also 
tend to have a restricted scope o f application given the fact that general principles should 
be considered against communities’ particular claims on the need to keep social unity.
From a Rawlsian perspective, the particularists’ criticisms call due attention back 
to the role exercised by community in the formation of a moral agent but their claims are 
quite overemphasized. In many ways, they misread the main concern behind the 
construction o f an OP. In the first set o f replies, Rawls attempts not only to reiterate the 
social dimension present in A Theory o f  Justice but also to qualify his enterprise, 
supposing a much more limited scope (modern democracies such as USA) while
30 I w ill look more closely at the implications o f  these criticisms at the international level in the works o f  
communitarians like Walzer and McIntyre as w ell as nationalists such as M iller and Tamir in chapter 3.
31 There are different interpretations o f  practical reasoning. For the universalists, an individuals’ distinctive 
characteristic involves the capacity for critical reflection. They are able, to som e extent, to put a distance 
between them selves and the community, that means, to evaluate in a critical way the standards and values 
that are established and maintained by the society. Although the social environment, where autonomy is 
praised in a smaller or larger sense, is important to the developm ent o f  these individuals’ capacity, it is 
never conceived as a determinant or an active element. It is only instrumental to individuals’ realisation o f  
their inner capacities. The moral agent is primarily the individual, understood in his universal nature. The 
particularists criticise this perspective on the basis that practical reasoning is grounded in the values and 
goods that are specified by the community. Reasoning is an activity that can only be apprehended by living 
in a particular context that gives you the standards to evaluate actions. The individual’s capacity for 
reflection is framed by the environment he lives in. In other words, the embedded character o f  the 
individual takes precedence over his capacity for reasoning. Given this assumption, the notion o f  moral 
agent tends to assume an ambiguous character. W hile the individual could still be seen as the focus o f  
morality, his attitudes and thoughts are determined by the values defended by the community. Since this 
determinant role is assumed to be unquestionable, the community could be regarded as a kind o f  “moral 
entity” in international relations.
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preserving the analysis’ moral reach. Based on the notion o f Kantian constructivism, he 
implicitly admits that though individuals are partially embedded selves, they supposedly 
can, if not transcend the restraints imposed by the historical context they live in, exercise 
their autonomous capacity for thinking by questioning these same constraints when 
confronting their own embeddedness with other embedded selves. As a consequence o f 
this supposition on the individuals’ intrinsic ability to exercise their autonomous thinking 
capacities, Rawls leaves open the way to the construction o f far-reaching just principles.32
The kind o f response outlined by Rawls signals the possibility o f understanding in 
a more harmonized way the relationship between individual and community in the 
deliberation o f just principles. In the following pages, I try to explore this view by 
arguing that some elements o f his explanation o f Kantian constructivism as well as some 
ideas contained in A Theory o f  Justice and in his later books could ground an ethical 
interpretation o f the role exercised by the community in the constitution o f a thinking 
moral agent capable o f legitimising and actively supporting more encompassing 
international principles o f justice. I admit that from the reading o f Political Liberalism  
and further on o f The Law o f  Peoples, Rawls is not willing to embark on this kind of 
interpretation full heartedly. I would say he opts for a more constricted understanding o f 
the purpose o f the agreement under OP. His analysis emphasises a politically situated 
notion o f the individual that implies but does not carefully explore the notion o f a moral 
agent and the general social conditions necessary to his development. By doing that, it 
leads to an impoverished understanding o f the possibilities o f an international just 
agreement.
Particularly, my aim in the present chapter is to trace the diffused ethical role that 
could be assigned to the community in Rawls’ thoughts, articulating the challenges 
presented by particularists and universalists as well as Rawls’ replies to these challenges. 
In doing so, I intend to introduce some of the main points that will lead to the 
construction o f my own ethical version o f an international agreement on just principles, 
developed in the second half o f the thesis. The chapter will be divided into four parts. 
First, I analyse the construction of the OP as proposed by Rawls and further look for how
32 W hile the stress on abstraction leads to philosophy, the emphasis given to the understanding o f  situated 
issues in detriment to the formulation o f  more general theories, leads to political science.
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universalists will tend to explore this framework to their advantage. Second, I discuss the 
problems facing Rawls’ enterprise taking into account the particularist critique as well as 
his answers to the particularists’ challenge. Third, I look for the possibilities of assigning 
an ethical dimension to Rawls’ enterprise and the limits o f doing so. Finally, I present 
some conclusive remarks on the subject.
1.1) The Construction of the Original Position (OP) and the Path to Universalism
As it is well known, the OP is a hypothetical situation in which the abstract 
representation o f the parties (individuals) and the circumstances surrounding them serves 
to the building up o f a desirable criterion for the establishment o f principles o f justice. It 
can be regarded basically as a philosophical construction responsible for helping to 
rethink the basic structure o f society, the ensemble of rights and duties that individuals 
have in relation to each other as well as the distribution o f economic advantages that 
sustains the framework o f rights and duties.
In the OP’s construction, Rawls uses the method o f “reflective equilibrium”, a 
dynamic exercise involving both common sense and theoretical presuppositions. The 
exercise is supposed to reflect an ongoing struggle to find the best possible balance 
between individuals’ considered judgements about justice derived from our moral 
intuitions and theoretical premises and reasonable philosophical explanations that could 
be possibly offered for these common beliefs.33 In this sense, it involves the ability to go 
back and forward between the observation o f shared moral convictions present in a social 
milieu and the possibilities o f explaining these convictions, giving them not only 
coherence but making them intelligible and defensible to a wide audience. Individuals 
could eventually both access the reasons why some maxims could guide actions and form
33 Concerning the conception o f  “reflective equilibrium”, see Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p.2. It is worth 
noting that there is here a supposition that premises will not only tend to expose in a concise and logical 
way the pre-judgements that already make part o f  a specific context instead o f  acting as an instrument that 
actually serves to evaluate the various possibilities o f  justice without being determined by historically 
contingent factors. Taking into account Fisk’s terminology, they will assume an important analytical 
function but w ill fail in realising its distinctive critical potentiality. See M. Fisk,, “History and Reason in 
R aw ls’ Moral Theory” in Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on RawlsM  Theory o f  
Justice . (Oxford, Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited 1983), pp. 54-55. A good explanation o f  this method 
is also offered by Thomas Scanlon, “The Aim s and Authority o f  Moral Theory”, Oxford Journal o f  Legal 
Studies. V ol. 12, N o. 01, 1992, p. 02.
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good reasons to apply them in practice despite all the constraints they face in their day to 
day life.
It should be reiterated here that though Rawls makes use o f observation as part of 
his method, he is fundamentally working with a hypothetical situation that does not exist 
and, most probably, will never exist in practical terms. It is a construction involving 
abstract characterisations of the parties of an agreement and the circumstances they face 
so as to help determine how far or how near we are from “our highest expectations” in 
terms o f justice. It works out just principles that would characterise a well-ordered 
society under favourable circumstances. It therefore presupposes that compliance is not 
an issue since principles will be applied to a society effectively regulated by a public 
conception o f justice and where its members recognise themselves as full moral 
persons34.
The way Rawls makes use o f the reflective equilibrium  method becomes clear in 
the incorporation o f the notions o f rationality and reasonableness in the construction of 
the parties and the constraints they face in the OP. Rationality and reasonableness are to 
be regarded as intrinsically interconnected and essential to delineate the nature o f the 
moral agent, particularly the background elements that make part o f his practical 
reasoning in the definition o f principles o f justice35. Broadly speaking, the parties are to 
be understood as rational in the following way. They should be seen as self-interested 
parties, ready to advance their own different interests and viewpoints. They are able not 
only to define their good but also to take effective means to ends with a clear 
understanding o f their unified expectations and objective probabilities to attain their 
goals. This perception of a self-interested individual leads to a particular interpretation of 
the individual’s autonomy. Human beings are seen as free choosers in the sense that they 
can set goals for themselves without being required to apply any prior or antecedent 
principle o f right and justice36 Public order is to be derived from a perception of their
34 This point is important because it should be clear that I am not interested here in the issue o f  political 
stability in Rawls, linked to the implementation o f  principles o f  justice in less favourable conditions, which 
w ill be a subject developed in the second and, mainly, in the third part o f  A Theory o f  Justice. M y aim is to 
analyse the general presuppositions that lead to the construction o f  principles o f  justice.
35 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, The Journal o f  Philosophy. V ol. LXXVII, No. 
9, September 1980, p. 532.
36 John Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and their Priority”, The Tanner Lectures on Human V alues. Delivered 
at the University o f  M ichigan, April 10, 1981, p. 21.
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common basic necessities and the understanding that it is an effective means to attain 
their different goals.
In order to be able to establish a sustainable agreement in the long term, 
individuals’ rational character has nonetheless to be constrained. Such a need basically 
derives from the fact that an agreement with no imposed restrictions on the rationality o f 
its parties will be seen merely as mutually advantageous by someone who, lacking 
absolute and unchallenged power, settles for a consensus. This perception would bring 
fundamental problems to the existence of an agreement. First, in a context where there is 
a lack o f equal powers among individuals, justice will end up being the arbitrary 
imposition o f the interests o f the most powerful part - measured by their ability to make 
use o f the greatest amount of resources at their disposal37. Second, even if an agreement 
could be reached among equally situated parties, there would always be the problem of 
the fragility o f compliance given the instrumentality o f the agreement. Taking into 
account the Hobbesian dilemma, an agreement will not be sustained, or reach stability, if 
individuals regard it as a mere instrument to pursue their narrow interests because there 
will always be incentives to override it.38 39
To limit the effects of self-interested rationality in individual’s practical 
reasoning, Rawls introduces some new concepts in his analysis. First, he argues for 
individuals’ mutual disinterest, they are not interested in each other’s interests and are not 
motivated by envy. They are basically striving for absolute gains, rejecting any 
competitive relationship based on comparative advantage. Second, and more importantly 
from a moral viewpoint, Rawls introduces the notion o f sociability and its effects in the 
formation o f human personality. He assumes that individuals are co-operative agents in 
the following terms. They have the ability to associate with each other and they need 
social contact to develop some essential human capacities, such as to speak and to think,
37 In relation to the negative effects o f  an unequal distribution o f  power among contractors, see Will 
K ym licka, “The Social Contract Tradition” in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1994), p. 190.
38 A good interpretation o f  Hobbes argument and its potential failure is developed by Jean Hampton., 
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).
39 The free-riding problem can, som eone would plausibly defend, be partly solved by the reinstatement o f  a 
hegem onic power. This solution, however, can reinforce the notion o f  fragility in terms o f  the volatility o f  
the terms o f  the agreement. Once the balance o f  power changes, the principles can be radically reshaped in 
terms o f  the new standards established by the most powerful one.
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and to obtain the benefits of economic efficiency. They also derive satisfaction from the 
presence and the realisation o f other individuals’ excellences, seen here as compatible 
with the pursuit o f their own particular goods. In this sense, they share a sense of being 
part o f a common enterprise that is valued for itself40. Besides that, individuals should be 
seen as continuing persons, able to form meaningful ties with the members of the next 
generations41. They care about the future lives o f other members o f society and should 
choose just principles taking into account their possible effects and the inconveniences on 
the development o f these persons.
It is clear that the notion o f sociability introduced by Rawls hints at the notion o f a 
moral person that takes into account others as sources o f valid claims but it is still 
insufficiently spelt out to curb the effects of a self-interested rationality in moral issues. 
That happens because the characterisation o f sociability as suggested here by Rawls 
seems to imply reciprocity in the sense that one cares about another person’s project 
because one wants to be respected when pursuing one’s own activities and because the 
other person’s projects can contribute to the overall success o f one’s enterprise or 
society’s enterprise. But it does not necessarily spell out the idea that we should care 
about all individuals in equal terms or that we perceive the intrinsic value of their 
existence, independently o f any consideration about the attainment o f our own good. 
Even the supposition o f intergenerational links does not seem to add too much to the 
formation of a moral character in which individuals’ equal exercise o f autonomy becomes 
essential. There would always be the possibility that individuals disregard the fact that 
persons outside their closest social circle, for example defined by family ties, could have 
similar rights to pursue their claims.
A more encompassing attempt to deal with the undesired effects o f rationality on 
the agreement formation is given by Rawls when introducing the veil o f  ignorance, the 
conditions attached to the contract and the further attribution to the individual o f a formal 
sense o f justice. In spite o f having a general (theoretical) knowledge about the social and 
political organisation o f humankind under the veil, individuals have no specific
40 A s Rawls says " ... human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their common institutions 
and activities as good in them selves. We need one another as partners in ways o f  life that are engaged in 
for their own sake and the success and enjoyments o f  others are necessary for and compatible to our own  
good”., John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 522.
41 Ibid, p. 206.
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information about which society they belong to -  its level of civilisation or economic 
development. They also have no knowledge about their place in society, their socio­
economic status, the generation they belong to or their natural skills and deficiencies42. 
This poor level o f particular or situated knowledge equally imputed to individuals tends 
to introduce a condition o f fairness among the contractors, eliminating the possibility that 
they take biased decisions in the choice of principles. Deprived o f advancing their goods 
with a full knowledge about who they actually are and how they will fare in society, 
individuals are obliged to  consider all the possibilities, inclusively taking into account as 
valid the claims o f the worst off in society
Although the veil makes irrelevant the particularities that give individuals their 
sense o f identity (who they really are) and meaning to their actions, Rawls preserves 
some possibility o f diversity among them by assuming that they in principle have 
different levels o f desire concerning primary goods. These goods concern rights, 
liberties, opportunities and powers, income and welfare that will ultimately enable them 
to realise their actual interests when they get to know their full identity.43 In what 
concerns the just principles, each individual will attach less or more importance to the 
pursuit o f these goods. This understanding of differentiation has been however harshly 
criticised by both communitarians and cosmopolitans as I will demonstrate further on, 
mainly because it tends to disregard the issue o f individuals’ identity. Something more 
should be said about individuals’ inner capacities, beliefs and attachments otherwise the 
requirements imposed by the veil could be regarded as too demanding, or even idealistic, 
considering the fact that individuals are obliged to abide by a contract without knowing 
anything about its direct implications for their life.44
In terms of circumstantial devices, the quest for fairness is further on reinforced 
by the conditions attached to the contract itself. Principles o f justice should apply to the
42 Ibid.. p. 137.
43 For a more detailed explanation o f  primary goods, Ibid.. chapter 3.
44 In a radical perspective the lack o f  differentiation leads to the implication that the decision concerning 
just principles can be made from the viewpoint o f  a unique rational individual and, consequently, the 
contract can be seen as a redundant device. Thomas Scanlon., “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” in 
Amartya Sen & B. W illiams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1982), p. 125. The same kind o f  argument is put forward by Barry when considering Hart’s criticisms o f  
Rawlsian theoretical approach. See also Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p. 58.
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basic structure o f society and, therefore, should be chosen taking into account: 1) its 
generality (it expresses general properties and relations); 2) universality (it must hold for 
everyone in virtue o f their being moral persons); 3) finality (it should be seen as the final 
court o f appeal in practical reasoning) and order (they must impose an ordering in 
conflict claims); 4) publicity (everyone accepts and knows that the others likewise accept 
the same principles, and this knowledge in turn is publicly recognised).45
Given that the attachment o f fairness to mere circumstantial devices will probably 
constitute a problem after agreement is reached, Rawls attributes a sense of justice to the 
parties. Each party knows that it can understand and act in accordance with principles of 
justice that regulate a well-ordered society once they are chosen. Moreover, each one can 
suppose that the other members o f society will tend to adopt the same kind o f attitude46. 
The implications of this argument are clear. Given the fact that the principles of justice 
represent fair terms o f social co-operation, the author is implicitly assuming that 
individuals are able to act on a moral basis, which puts restrictions on their persecution of 
narrow interests based on rational considerations. Individuals are not only characterised 
by their rationality but also by their tendency to act morally -  admitting the worth of 
human beings as the source of valid claims.
The generalisation implied in the description o f the parties (individuals’ ability to 
rationally form and pursue a goal as well as their sense o f justice) and the circumstances 
surrounding them serve a specific purpose in Rawls’ scheme. It paves the way for a 
conception o f procedural justice. What is just is determined by a fair procedure and not 
by any independent criterion that defines what the right outcome is. The correctness of a 
distribution o f rights and economic benefits is grounded on the justice o f the structure of 
co-operation, derived from the claims o f rational individuals fairly situated47. A broad 
implication o f such an argument is that individuals form a consensus about the
45 It is worth noting that the publicity aspect is not merely a formal or simple external condition. It is 
expanded in order to involve the supposition o f  general beliefs in the light o f  which common principles are 
accepted -  it involves justification. People should reason in the light o f  these common beliefs (theory o f  
human nature and o f  social institutions generally) that are present in a well-ordered society. By the same 
token, the universality condition can be interpreted as a pre-disposition to see individuals as having a moral 
capacity that is dependent on the idea o f  the veil and on an assumption about the essence o f  human nature, 
emphasising the equal worth o f  individuals.
46  John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 337.
4 7Chandran Kukathas & Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1990), pp. 66-67.
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procedures that are to regulate the relationship among individuals and legitimate political 
decisions. Although individuals can have different opinions concerning the desirability 
or validity o f particular outcomes (public policies), they cannot dispute their authoritative 
character. This implication embodies a particular understanding of the formation o f 
individual’s good. Individuals can have different opinions or conceptions o f what is the 
good life. However, the perception about their particular good should be in consonance 
with a broader conception o f themselves -  to see each other as free and equal so they can 
establish and sustain fair public relations.
The unity o f individuals’ practical reasoning, determined by the subordination of 
rationality to the conditions o f reasonableness, will finally lead them to follow a 
maximim strategy48 and agree on two principles. The first principle underlines the 
absolute priority o f personal liberties. The second one states the priority o f justice 
(deprivation) over efficiency. It includes equality o f opportunity and the insurance that 
social and economic inequalities are arranged to offer the greatest possible benefits to the 
worst-off in society.
I would say that Rawls’ understanding of universality is closely related to the way 
his procedural deliberation is set. At first glance, the generality of the features provided 
by him in terms o f the parties’ nature and the circumstances surrounding the deliberation 
could lead to a quite universalizable view on principles o f justice. Individuals’ social 
dimension is here to be perceived as an added variable, clearly supporting a notion o f 
reasonableness but not determining the outcome o f the contract. But in a closer look it 
has to be said that much o f what is to be perceived as reasonable by him is still grounded 
on moral convictions about how best to develop the human essence, which individuals 
share as part o f a specific social whole. Following this perspective, the limits to the 
universality o f international principles are related to the perception that intelligibility is 
not necessarily universally given. Universality maybe has to be constructed through
This strategy is characterised by choice under conditions o f  uncertainty. Individuals w ill tend to choose  
an option that maxim ises their gains w hile minimising their losses. The assumption that an individual is 
necessarily risk-averse has been much criticised by other authors, mainly because this assumption is not 
presupposed under the conditions imposed by the veil. The author expressly admits that individuals have 
no judgem ents about risks. A more detailed discussion about this issue and its implications, Brian Barry, 
The Liberal Theory o f  Justice: A Critical Examination o f  the Principal Doctrines in A Theory o f  Justice  by 
John Rawls (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 116.
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dialogue between parts that either share the same values sustaining the conception o f 
reasonableness -  freedom and equality - or are willing to share these values since they 
understand the comparative advantages (reasons why) o f the employment o f these 
conceptions.
Considering these limitations, international justice will be seen mainly as an issue 
o f compliance for Rawls, related to no ideal theory. His second OP, in which the 
representatives o f individuals (peoples), who see themselves as free and equal deliberate 
about international principles, translates to a broader sphere the principles already 
delineated in the first OP. Societies that live under unfavourable conditions, not 
disposing o f the historical, social and economic means to constitute themselves as a well- 
ordered regime are supposed to receive positive incentives (duty o f assistance) from other 
societies to become full members o f the Law o f Peoples. And societies considered 
outlaw states because they refuse a priori to comply with reasonable principles have to be 
convinced o f the values o f freedom and equality to human beings’ existence by means o f 
co-operative efforts, even if they consider these efforts a question o f modus vivendi at 
first.49
Universalists who have directly engaged in a dialogue with Rawls have tried to 
some extent to reinforce the individualistic approach seen in the Rawlsian scheme by 
attributing an instrumental role to the community in the formation o f individuals. For 
them, there is no need to go on to a second OP. It could be argued that though society is 
significant in the development o f individuals’ reasoning abilities and their sense o f 
identity, it is not o f ultimate moral relevance. In moral matters, the focus tends to be on 
individuals’ potential universal rationality and their ability to argue on reasonable 
grounds, which are a priori considered to be potentially present worldwide (the world 
taken as a social co-operation scheme) and to be centred on values that are the most 
propitious for the flourishing o f thinking agents.
Behind this defence, there is a supposition that it is the individual who is the 
predominant moral agent in the formation o f international principles of justice, despite its 
links with specific communal obligations or attachments. The individual is taken to be 
prior to the community in the sense that political communities should have their existence
49 John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (London, Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 05.
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justified in terms o f the will and the perceived needs o f their members. The individual 
can easily disentangle himself from his communal links, or specific contexts in which he 
lives, and identify with values and beliefs that are not only created in a global dynamics 
but also taken to be representative of the best way available to realise his human nature.
Currently, this interpretation o f Rawls’ scheme is exemplified by authors such as 
Beitz and Pogge who visualise the possibility o f applying the conditions of OP at the 
world level. As I will show in chapter 2, they will defend the idea that the information 
concerning political, economic and social matters would be so generic under the veil that 
they cannot be attached to any specific social milieu. Following this reasoning national 
identity can be understood as a further contingency that should not influence the choice 
o f just principles50. When thinking international principles o f justice, we should be 
putting the individuals’ identity in a global scale as more important than their national or 
particular attachments seen here as a subordinated item or an issue o f second-order 
concern.
This way o f reading the conditions expressed by Rawls in the OP is further 
complemented by a defence o f the idea that economic and financial interdependence in 
the world today are so widespread that it enables us to think about individuals as 
generally part o f a common politically organised social milieu where freedom and 
equality are preserved and valued. In this perspective, the individual is not morally 
bounded by any specific communal links. His essential identity is expressed in the 
dominant values existing at a global level and is accessible by a form o f reasoning that 
suffers no determinant constraints from the fact that he is also a member o f a particular 
political community. As Beitz proclaims: “ ...if  evidence o f global economic and 
political interdependence shows the existence o f a global scheme o f social cooperation, 
we should not view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance.”51
Before proceeding to the next section, it is worth noting that the contemporary 
claims o f universalists have gone beyond the direct extrapolation o f Rawls’s claims on 
the first OP to the international sphere. An illustration is provided in chapter 2 with
50 Pogge makes explicit use o f  this argument to advance his claims about global justice. Thomas Pogge , 
Realizing Rawls, p. 247.
51 Charles Beitz, “Justice and International Relations” in Charles B eitz & alii, eds., International Ethics, p. 
298.
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Barry’s attempt to overcome what is to be perceived as two o f the main weaknesses o f 
the Rawlsian basic framework, the construction o f the parties’ identity and their moral 
motivation, by relying on Scanlonian premises. For him, international principles are to 
be based on the outcome o f an ideal situation where individuals, who know who they are 
and where they come from, are willing to argue on the basis that no one could reasonably 
reject. To some extent, he will be able to take the claims of universalists one step further 
by re-emphasizing the commitment to far-reaching just principles while making some 
concessions to the particular attachments individuals have to their social milieu.52
1.2) Problems facing the OP’s Construction; the Particularist Critique and Rawls’ 
Counter-argument
The particularists’ critique is focused mainly on the notion of the individual that 
Rawls’ conception o f procedural justice sustains. For them, no matter how Rawls makes 
use o f theoretical devices {the veil o f  ignorance) to reinforce the idea o f impartiality, his 
scheme is still based on a rather specific understanding o f individuals’ nature and how 
they should act in the public sphere. It defends a vision o f individuals as equally valid 
sources o f independent claims that are formed in liberal democratic societies. And in this 
respect, it should be acknowledged that the community plays a constitutive role as the 
entity capable o f sustaining the specific kind o f environment where such individuals can 
flourish, helping them not only to exercise their reasoning capacities by providing a 
reliable environment where they can interact but also to delineate the limits o f this 
exercise by offering them a sense o f belonging (common identity). Moral thinking is 
therefore closely linked to individuals’ common experiences and, more importantly, the 
social meanings that are attached to these experiences in a specific socio-political milieu.
52 I com e back to this point in chapter 3, where I discuss Barry’s framework in the second part.
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Sandel and Taylor exemplify the point.53 For Sandel, Rawls’ OP presupposes a 
capacity individuals do not have: the capacity to choose or construct moral principles 
without self-knowledge or, indeed, without the necessary moral experience that is 
dependent on the existence o f a community. Sandel calls attention to the fact that it is 
incoherent to presuppose that individuals can choose principles before knowing their 
identities. In order to do so, we have to admit that individuals are natural choosers o f 
their ends and disregard the fact that what they choose much depends on what kind o f 
social milieu they grow up in. The social milieu, with the specification o f what roles 
individuals should perform and what kind o f interaction makes sense in the performance 
of these roles, provides in fact the meaning to their choices and offers them the moral 
experience necessary to deliberate on public issues.
Considering this point, individuals are to be seen as intrinsically constituted by 
their community’s values that can only be acknowledged and not in fact chosen in the 
deliberation o f just principles. That is so because the emphasis on moral practices that 
strongly presuppose intersubjective conceptions of the self (social roles) and values leads 
to the identification o f the aim o f moral reasoning as self-understanding rather than 
critical judgement. In this case, individual’s ability to reflect or to take decisions on 
moral issues could never be completely guaranteed outside the limits imposed by the 
community itself.54
Taylor expresses similar kinds o f communitarian concern from a somewhat 
differentiated perspective, accusing the liberals o f not taking seriously the issue o f social 
intersubjectivity (human sociability) encompassed on the definition o f individuals’ 
choices and their motivation to act. For him, liberals, such as Rawls, wrongly portray 
an atomistic view o f the individual when emphasising the priority o f individuals’ right 
over society. They conceive individuals as being by nature free and holders of particular
53In the discussion o f  the arguments constructed by Taylor and Sandel, my main intention is to clarify the 
arguments presented by Rawls but subjected to my interpretation. In this sense, this discussion does not 
aim to be a detailed analysis o f  the implications o f  the theoretical premises defended by these authors. A 
good overview  o f  the main communitarian criticisms is presented by W ill Kym licka, “Liberalism and 
Communitarianism”, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. 18, N o. 2, June 1988 and A. Buchanan, 
"Assessing the Communitarian Critique o f  Liberalism", Ethics 99, July 1989.
54 See M ichael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered S e lf ’ in Shlomo Avineri & 
Avner de-Shalit„ Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 12. 
For a more detailed criticism o f  the Rawlsian theoretical premises, see Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the 
Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1998), chapter 2, pp. 16-19.
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rights, most importantly the right to live and dispose o f their properties. All kind o f 
political obligation should therefore be seen as derivative and conditional, dependent on 
the absolute observance o f individuals’ natural rights. But this reasoning disregards the 
fact that “to have a right” is to present a moral claim against the interference o f other 
persons that affects the manifestation o f my capacities, such as the ability to choose or to 
lead a rational way o f life. And these capacities can only be developed when considering 
the existence o f a communal environment, able to establish the standards by which 
individuals can evaluate their choices.55
The determinant role played by the community in the definition o f who we are 
and what kind o f decisions we can valuably take, tends to lead to a restrained view o f 
universality. The following implications can be imputed to this view: 1) the terms o f 
interaction among societies to establish agreement should be restricted as societies are 
sovereign entities that have broad capacity for defining individuals’ sense o f identity 
through assignment o f social roles; 2) any consensus has to give way to the priority 
attached to the construction o f communal identities. Thin principles o f international 
justice, governed largely by what is common practice among the communities, seem the 
most likely result in the face o f these issues. Even if more encompassing principles could 
eventually be agreed on, they would be subjected to communities’ right to preserve the 
specific values, and the eventual interpretations of them, on which social cohesion rests.56
Taking the perspective o f TJ, Rawls can answer some o f the particularists’ attack 
by re-emphasising the reason why he wants to go through an OP construction to think 
about an agreement. It seems that his intention is not to deny individuals’ social 
dimension and their capacity to influence the set o f choices available. In fact, he seems 
to underline this point all through his analysis either when setting the circumstantial 
conditions o f the OP or characterising the parties. When setting the circumstantial 
conditions, he presupposes that individuals have a general knowledge o f the beliefs
55Charles Taylor, “Atom ism ” in Shlom o Avineri & Avner de-Shalit, Communitarianism and Individualism, 
p. 29.
56The characterisation o f  the particularists’ claims made above is very general and som etim es can be 
regarded as closer at a stereotype o f  the perspective. I intend to look closer to the particularist claims in 
chapter 4 where I analyse how the communitarian claims o f  W alzer and McIntyre as w ell as the 
nationalistic presuppositions o f  M iller and Tamir affect the developm ent o f  moral agents’ reflective 
capacities and their exercise in the construction o f  principles o f  justice.
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prevailing in a public culture o f a well-ordered society.57 When characterizing the 
parties, he presupposes that individuals’ sense o f justice is constructed as participant of a 
well-ordered society, where the equal claims o f independent agents are seriously 
considered. The main point for Rawls is that he wants to use the contract to put into 
question the beliefs constructed in a public culture o f a well-ordered society, finding 
reasonable arguments to defend or to contest them. And in this sense, he has to disagree 
with the narrowness o f a communitarian critique.
I specify my point. First, the emphasis given to the individual in the OP as 
someone able to set and perceive his main goals, interpreted by Sandel as a defence o f a 
person who is prior to his ends, does not imply a rejection o f the fact that the social 
milieu helps develop his inner abilities. It should be regarded much more as a cautious 
note indicating that a capacity to be reflective in a critical way is intrinsic to the 
individual’s nature, whether he develops it or not. In this sense, there is nothing that 
should be seen as unchallengeable or completely deterministic. The standards created by 
the community, and the values embodied in them, can always be discussed and re­
examined58. Second, the defence o f a thin theory o f the good (primary goods) to preserve 
individuals’ particular set o f choices has a purpose. It seems to dismiss any possibility o f 
seeing the community dictating the ends to be attained by individuals. Liberty and self- 
respect, seen as primary goods, are not pursued as a final end but as a pre-condition for 
the attainment o f meaningful projects, ultimately defined by each individual according to 
his disposition.
Following this path of reasoning, I would say that there is no assumption in the 
presentation o f the Rawlsian theoretical scheme that the individual can be conceived 
apart from the community. The parties to the agreement in the OP are not only 
characterised by their rationality but also by their sociability that shapes the use of their 
rational capacities. In this sense, the rationality involved in the contract (definition of 
rights) does not exist in a vacuum. Even if individuals are subjected to the veil o f  
ignorance, they still have a general idea about a social environment politically regulated
57 This presupposition refers more specifically to the publicity condition o f  the contract. See John Rawls, 
A Theory o f  Justice, p.454.
58 A similar kind o f  argument seem s to be sustained by Will Kymlicka,, “The Social Contract Tradition” in 
Peter Singer, A Companion to Ethics, p. 190 and Allen Buchanan, “A ssessing the Communitarian Critique 
o f  Liberalism”. Ethics 99. July 1989, pp. 858-862.
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where the idea o f right emerges and sustains the development o f their inner capacities 
(including rationality). If individuals’ right is underlined here it is because it is generally 
understood that nothing is “authoritative” before their autonomous judgement.
The points I have made in Rawls’ defence cannot however dismiss an important 
objection made by the particularists. The role the community plays in individuals’ moral 
experience (the social character o f this experience - the social bond that is formed among 
the members and the way it influences the use o f critical capacities) and supports a 
motivation to act reciprocally in an autonomous way is not seriously discussed.59 It is at 
best taken for granted. Looking from this perspective, Rawls has still to be able to offer a 
more systematic answer to this key challenge posed by communitarians, one that offers 
more than bits on individuals’ structure o f choices behind a theoretical device.
Rawls attempts to do this in the later set of articles that offer his concept of 
Kantian constructivism.60 The Rawlsian arguments presented around this concept try to 
formulate an alternative to the Kantian dilemma and thus to give a consistent account o f 
the relationship between intelligibility and applicability.61 He will do so by offering a 
potential defence of individuals as natural choosers without recourse to metaphysics or a 
completely disembodied subject. The reconciliation o f the individual with his social 
dimension is expressed in the OP, seen as a construction that helps to define what is
59 See M ichael Walzer, “The Communitarian Critique o f  Liberalism”. Political Theory. Vol. 18, N o. 1, 
February 1990. He stresses the fragmentation, and consequently the instability, o f  a liberal society always 
based on voluntary associations (marked by the right o f  rupture and withdrawal).
60 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, The Journal o f  Philosophy, p. 517.
61 Kant’s moral principles are based on a metaphysical conception o f  the person, seen as som eone who 
possesses and applies to his actions a rationality that is regarded as universal and independent o f  contingent 
influences (a  p r io r i knowledge). Although this metaphysical conception brings consistency to his 
arguments since it clarifies the issue o f  how the principles becom e intelligible, it also becom es a constraint 
when discussing the issue o f  applicability because it tends to neglect the significance o f  historical context 
in the individuals actual use o f  his reasoning capacities. This problem is exem plified in his analysis o f  the 
compatibility between individual freedom and coercion. This compatibility is based on the ideal 
relationship between morality (seen as the theoretical branch o f  right) and politics (the applicable form o f  
the right), b u t in the real world, this compatibility can never be fully attained given the imperfection o f  
human nature and the environmental constraints it is obliged to face. Concerning the discussion about 
freedom and coercion in Kant, see Immanuel Kant, “The M etaphysics o f  Morals” in Hans Reiss, Kant’s 
Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 134 and Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” in Hans Reiss, Kant: Political W ritings, p. 116.
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justice for us in virtue o f how we (modem liberal democratic polities, more precisely the 
American society) conceive o f persons.62
It is a Kantian procedure so far as the justification o f principles does not depend 
on any particular conception of human nature or behaviour but on an account o f the 
person as moral agent and his powers. In the case of the Rawlsian framework, this agent 
has basically a conception o f the good and a sense o f justice and is moved by the two 
highest order interests in realizing and exercising these powers.
But contrary to the Kantian individualistic position expressed in the Categorical 
Imperative, he admits that the description o f a moral person will vary from one society to 
another, although it is American society on which Rawls focuses. By the same token he 
also assumes that the reasonable (condition o f fairness) that constrains the rational and is 
the foundation to the construction of ethical principles is not related to the public in its 
universal form but to the public seen as fellow citizens living in a bounded community 
(well-ordered society). That is why just principles are to be seen as a construction of 
human agents who regard themselves as members o f a well-ordered society or who are 
able to share the values o f this society. That is also why they are to be seen as justifiable 
in the sense that reasons for action can be provided to this kind o f audience.63
From my perspective, what is important to underline is the fact that in his 
explanation of Kantian constructivism Rawls is implicitly admitting that the development 
o f a moral individual is dependent on the way he relates to the public. It is as 
autonomous citizens that individuals should address each other in order to think about 
just principles. Autonomous citizens are in this sense to be seen as expressions of moral 
persons.64 When pressing the argument a little further towards an ethical interpretation, I 
would assume that eventually one essential step in becoming a moral agent is individuals’
62 The perception that Rawls is trying to establish a dialogue with Kant is supported not only by the author 
him self but also by som e o f  his critics who w ill analyse the implications for his framework. See John 
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 251. Concerning the implications o f  Kantian Constructivism to the 
construction o f  just principles in a Rawlsian framework, see particularly M ichael S a n d e l,, Liberalism and 
the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 14-24 and Will Kymlicka, 
“Liberalism and Communitarians”, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy, p. 201 and Onora O’N eill, 
“Constructivism in Rawls and Kant” in S. FREEMAN, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 347-367.
63 Chandran Kukathas & Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics, pp. 125-127. For the way 
Rawls build his notion o f  Kantian constructivism see also O ’NEILL, O., “Constructivism in Rawls and 
Kant” in S. FREEM AN, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls , pp.347-363.
64 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, The Journal o f  Philosophy, p. 532.
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autonomous participation in a political process o f decision-making, in which they are to 
reciprocate commitments taking into account their equal worthiness (source o f valid 
claims). Individuals’ constitution as active moral agents would be at the end of the day 
related to a qualified political participation in communal life, by which the exercise o f 
their equal basic liberties is to be fundamentally preserved though the construction o f a 
system of rights.
Unfortunately, the community’s ethical role suggested above will not be fully 
explored in Rawls’ writings. He follows a more restrained path by arguing for a mere 
political conception o f  justice. In “Political Liberalism” (PL), he will be looking for 
ways o f securing agreement in a democratic society where individuals hold different 
comprehensive views o f the good. And in these terms, it seems that he affirms a political 
conception o f the person, in which a thinner notion o f toleration that requires just 
reasonable pluralism between individuals’ different takes on the good instead o f a 
broader defence o f the moral ideal o f the person, in which liberal values such as 
individuals’ equal right o f exercising autonomy has to be argued for.
It should be stated however that his defence of political liberalism as a way 
towards social unity and political stability cannot succeed without implying a developed 
notion o f moral agency. By taking for granted this notion o f moral agency without 
analysing the elements involved in its development, his argument will necessarily lead to 
a quite impoverished understanding o f the construction o f just principles. Let me specify. 
In his explanation o f the three main ideas grounding political liberalism, Rawls make 
continuous reference to the need for a moral conception o f the person. First, the idea o f 
an overlapping consensus is based on a political conception o f  justice by which 
constitutional essentials express common values o f a public political culture that is not 
too distant from the individuals’ own set o f interests. This conception o f justice is 
focused on justice as fairness. It, therefore, affirms a determinate conception o f society 
(democratic society) and citizens as persons who have political virtues leading to mutual 
respect between free and equal individuals.65 Second, it is based on the priority o f the 
right over the good. It looks for neutral grounds, expressing a political conception o f the
65 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 147.
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society and the person that impose limits on permissible ways o f life.66 In this context, 
citizens are to be seen as able to develop moral virtues, which range from civility and 
tolerance to reasonableness and the exercise o f a sense o f fairness.67 Third, it focuses on 
the idea o f public reasoning understood as the reason o f equal citizens who are ready to 
explain the basis o f their actions to one another in consistency with their mutual freedom 
and equality.68
The ideas delineated by Rawls in PL do, as he is prepared to admit, subscribe to a 
notion o f a person that is to be constructed as part o f a determinate social environment. 
The individual is someone who is able to reason publicly, in a way that is conceptually 
distinguished from, but not necessarily incompatible with, his private reasoning, as a 
member o f a liberal democratic society. He is to be seen as a citizen participating in 
democratic procedures, limited by his ability to specify his demands in a coherent way 
and to respect other individuals as equally valid sources o f claims. To some extent, the 
structure o f an agreement between him and his co-nationals should reflect the way they 
value equality and freedom as essential parts of their human existence.
It is also worth pointing out that in a non-ideal world, this process will tend to be 
sustained by a welfare state, able to provide public means (economic and social facilities) 
that assure the emergence o f individuals equally capable o f developing their respective 
autonomous abilities.69 In the Rawlsian scheme, the priority given to equality over 
efficiency (second principle o f justice) seems to support this view and to hint once more 
at the potential ethical significance that could be attached to the role played by the 
political com munity70.
But without a more detailed explanation of the reasons why individuals’ 
participation in well-established democratic procedures becomes significant for the
66 Ibid.. p. 192.
67 Ibid.. p. 194.
68 Ibid... p. 218. It is worth pointing out that the notion o f  public reasoning so crucial to Political 
Liberalism w ill be further developed in little bits in John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, p. 136. Here he will 
underline the notion o f  reciprocity as individuals’ ability to accept one another’s reasoning. He will also 
stress individuals’ need to exercise ultimate political power as a collective body.
69J. D. M oon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1993).
70 It is worthwhile to notice that this active role assigned to the political community, in particular the state, 
is part o f  a new interpretation given to Kant’s moral and political philosophy. See, for example, Allen 
Rosen, Kant’s Theory o f  Justice (London. Comnell University Press. 1993), chapter 5.
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construction o f just principles and vice-versa, the exercise proposed by Rawls in PL 
becomes too limited, impairing its explanatory potential. The straight defence o f a 
political conception o f the person leads to a narrow understanding of the formulation of 
principles o f justice. It is applied and justifiable only to a specific audience, which limits 
the potentiality o f thinking about international morality. In broader terms, this defence 
restricts the philosophical exercise that is behind the construction o f just principles. The 
aim o f theory becomes more to articulate values and beliefs already existing in a 
particular context than to critically build arguments in defence o f values that, though 
appealing first to the members o f a specific society, do not necessarily circumscribe 
themselves to them. 71 In so doing, he neglects the importance of the engagement of 
ideas outside a specific audience to build a legitimate justification for his principles.
1.3) Towards an Ethical Approach
I turn my attention now to the exploration o f some o f the elements o f the ethical 
path that is hinted at but not fully developed in Rawls’ work. I think the exploration of 
such elements can give way to a better understanding of the construction and realisation 
o f enduring just principles in the international context, one that better considers the 
formation o f a moral agent and how his qualified involvement in the political process of a 
specific system o f rights can contribute to his moral development. What is o f particular 
interest to my analysis is the exploration o f two interconnected ideas delineated by 
Rawls: 1) that the development and preservation of autonomous thinking is foundational 
to the constitution o f an active moral agent who stands as guarantor o f agreements that 
guides common actions. This point is more properly explored by Rawls in his writings 
on Kantian constructivism; 2) that the exercise o f citizenship (political participation in a 
well-ordered society) constitutes part of individuals’ development as functioning moral 
agents able to think publicly in terms o f equality and freedom. This point is indirectly 
dealt with in PL and in The Law o f  Peoples.
71 The same kinds o f  argument w ill be further on developed in John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political 
not M etaphysical” in Shlom o Avineri & Avner de-Shalit.. Communitarianism and Individualism., p. 186.
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Let me be more specific. Rawls focuses on a notion o f moral agent that is centred 
on individuals’ perception o f themselves as independent thinkers. By that he means that 
individuals have the capacity for a conception o f the good -  to form, revise, and actively 
pursue a system o f ends and values. They are also able to take part in a qualified 
common enterprise (co-operative endeavour among equally free situated members), 
sharing the capacity to accept, and act on respect, for the fair terms o f this enterprise. 
The development of these agents’ moral power, particularly their ability to act on the 
basis o f fairness and to identify themselves with the values behind the acts taken (linked 
to the notion o f having a sense o f justice), has nonetheless to be understood in terms of 
their active involvement in the construction o f a public culture.
It could be said that the development o f individuals’ moral capacities is dependent 
on the possibility o f their fully exercising citizenship’s rights. When taking part in 
democratic procedures, they learn to make explicit their own claims (related to their 
particular notion o f the good), raising the possibility o f their being contested and causing 
them to change their mind. By the same token, they learn to consider others as equals in 
the sense that they have to treat them with the same respect (as equal sources o f valid 
claims). If we push the argument a little bit further, it could be said that: 1) they are 
exercising their independence and mutually recognizing each other in their capacity to 
make independent claims; 2) they are also learning to reciprocate commitments by 
understanding the requirements of mutual beneficial and fair co-operation and act on the 
basis o f that; 72 3) and finally, they are learning to see themselves as units taking part in a 
whole they help to build and which has an overall effect in the building o f their identity.
This suggested interpretation leaves open the way to a more comprehensive 
understanding o f the exercise o f public reasoning. Public reasoning is not only to be seen 
as a form o f finding an overlapping consensus as suggested by Rawls, which implies in 
many cases the accommodation of different values held by the members o f a society.73 It 
can also be regarded as a form o f individuals’ exercising their capacities as moral agents. 
In this sense, it can be seen as a dynamic exercise in which individuals are prepared to
72 See Cohen on the links between the exercise o f  political liberties and the developm ent o f  moral powers 
as w ell as between the developm ent o f  political liberties and self-respect. See J. Cohen, “For a Democratic 
Society” in S. Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, pp. 96-111.
73 That seem s to be implicit in the notion o f  reasonable disagreement suggested by Rawls in Political 
Liberalism. Chandran Kukathas & Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics, p. 148.
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question and challenge values as well as to reflect about competing comprehensive 
conceptions o f the good, even if it implies a long, slow and sometimes fruitless process. 
It is as participants in this process that individuals realise their autonomous critical 
thinking capacities and learn to set the limits o f their actions in respect to others.74
This exercise o f public reasoning certainly presupposes the assignment o f an 
ethical role to the political community. The polis is responsible for the preservation o f 
basic individual rights, including both civil, legal and political rights (such as freedom o f 
expression, access to fair legal procedures and participation in public decisions) as well 
as socio-economic rights (such as the right o f access to employment and a minimum 
wage), which back the full exercise o f the first generation liberties. But in providing this 
secure environment, the polis plays more than an instrumental role. It also instigates 
meaningful interactions by making individuals take part in the construction o f a common 
public culture, sharing among equals the responsibility o f  shaping a common institutional 
environment that has a significant input in the formation o f their personalities and more 
importantly in the moral motivation they have.75 76
The ethical role that can be assigned to the political community has nonetheless a 
limit that should be clarified. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, it is far 
from being fully determinate as the communitarians seem to suggest when arguing, with 
different degrees o f intensity, for the community’s direct interference in the construction 
o f a common identity in order to maintain social cohesion. Individuals’ opportunities to
Cohen is close to the developm ent o f  this argument when interpreting R aw ls’ meaning o f  democratic 
participation and the problem o f  denigration. See J. Cohen, “For a Democratic Society” in S. Freeman, ed„ 
The Cambridge Companion to R aw ls, p. 121.
75 Gutmann sees Rawls defending an intimate marriage between these political liberties and personal 
freedoms. As she says: “Without basic personal freedoms, on the one hand, citizens cannot truly be free to 
criticize their government or to stand up to a majority in the name o f  justice. Without basic political 
freedoms, on the other hand, individuals cannot be as free as possible (consistent with basic personal 
freedom s) to shape the laws, institutions, and practices within which they can make personal choices about 
how best to live their own life.” Am y Guttmann, “Rawls on the Relationship between Liberalism and 
D em ocracy”, Ibid.. p. 176. M y interpretation goes a little beyond this notion o f  mutual dependence so to 
emphasise the constitutive role the political community has in individuals’ moral formation.
76It is significant to note that Rawls seem s to point in this direction when admitting that in the realisation o f  
their citizenships’ rights individuals are also exercising the sense o f  justice (to be guided by a reflective 
acceptance o f  justice, that means, by a commitment to pursue their own good respecting other individuals’ 
equal right also to do so). But he does not develop the issue further on. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 
334.
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develop minimal critical reasoning (the source o f their autonomy) should always be 
maintained since the latter is foundational to the existence o f the political community.
The implications o f this interpretation for the understanding o f the construction of 
international just principles are many and also need further exploration. In consonance 
with Rawls’ arguments, there should be no denying that liberal societies provide for the 
moment the necessary framework for individuals’ development of their basic moral 
capacities and that the possibility of maintaining and further developing these 
individuals’ capacities will be dependent on the existence o f the same minimal conditions 
in other communities. But this admission does not represent the end o f the story. It is 
important to notice that the enlargement o f the social conditions responsible for 
individuals’ further exercise o f moral capacities will be dependent on the building up of a 
consensus among the communities over this minimum. And this building up is itself 
considered a dynamic exercise in which the general values on which this minimum 
consensus is grounded can in principle be contested by the representatives of 
communities, offering counter-arguments to better justify them. In this sense, it should be 
seen as an exercise o f going back and forward on what counts as the more appropriate 
elements to the constitution o f a moral agent
Looking from this perspective, the construction o f international just principles 
becomes more than a mere compliance issue as Rawls suggests. It could continue to be 
seen as an ongoing process o f justification o f principles but one through which we can 
learn further about individuals’ moral capacities since confronted with differences that 
are stronger than the ones related to the comprehensive doctrines present inside a 
multicultural society. By learning to deal with these differences through attempts to 
establish meaningful interaction (consensus), individuals could grasp what new 
significance respect for others as valid sources of claims could possess and consequently 
have new critical insights on the composition of their identity as well as on the validity of 
their actions. Kymlicka has expressed this point by affirming that ethical reasoning 
involves a continuous comparison between an encumbered potential self with another 
encumbered potential self. 77For him, the basis o f individuals’ critical thinking criticism is 
always a balance o f their individualistic perceptions and what society can offer to them in
77 W ill Kym licka, “Liberalism and Communitarianism”, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy, p. 190.
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terms o f common values as well as an understanding o f their socially located self and the 
prospect o f what another social environment can contribute to the development of their 
capacities.
1.4) Concluding Remarks
Rawls has paved the way for the articulation and strengthening o f universalistic 
and particularistisc interpretations of the contemporary debate on justice. But he also 
offered some elements for the construction o f a third perspective, one that reinterprets the 
relation between the individual and the political community in a less asymmetric way. 
This perspective assigns an ethical role to the political community in the formation of 
morally motivated individuals while preserving their independent thinking capacities. 
And in so doing, it can offer a set o f reasons to understand why the political community 
has still an important ethical role to play in the construction o f an international just order, 
subscribing to a view that the international dimension has to be comprehended in terms of 
its own dynamics and not as a mere extension o f national concerns as suggested by Rawls 
when making the argument for compliance issues.
That can happen because I think it is possible to advance an argument that 
understands the agreement on principles of justice as a product o f a constructed dialogue 
primarily established among communities who share a similar set o f common values 
(democratic societies sharing the notions of freedom and equality as essential to their 
moral development). But these communities, because o f the very essence o f their role in 
helping individuals’ development o f their moral capacities (critical thinking), the exercise 
of which does not stop at the borders, will not be constrained by discussing international 
principles just among themselves and merely enforcing these principles around the world. 
They will have the disposition to look for meaningful forms o f interactions, creating 
opportunities and incentives to attract other communities that hold different values to take 
part in an extended form of dialogue on how best to preserve their citizens’ integrity as 
well as to extend their citizens’ further exercise of inner moral capacities. And in so 
doing, they will tend to have a more encompassing and legitimate view on the
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construction o f international human rights principles, one that they will be willing to 
reinforce.
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CHAPTER 2: Universalism
I will call universalism the ensemble o f perspectives that characterises moral 
individuals as beings who essentially share a universal rationality and need the society 
only instrumentally to develop this innate rationality. Though individuals need society to 
provide a secure and predictable environment where they can develop their capacities as 
well as attachments that influence their perception o f the self, individuals are not 
determined by it. They are not therefore pre-disposed by a historically situated viewpoint 
when thinking about general principles of justice. These principles can easily be derived 
from the fundamental equality that individuals enjoy qua potential rational entities, 
leading them to a fair agreement.78
In the contemporary literature, this approach emerges mainly as a response to 
what is perceived as incoherence in the Rawlsian framework developed in A Theory o f  
Justice. Universalists such as Pogge, Beitz and Barry regard as unfounded Rawl’s 
assumption o f self-sufficiency and self-containment o f schemes o f social co-operation to 
characterise the parties in the second OP. They all agree that the present economic 
interdependence conditions and the eventual claims deriving from the scarcity o f natural 
resources invalidate claims to the existence o f such schemes. These observations lead to 
an analysis o f international relations from the perspective o f the universal individual 
defined in the first OP.
In the present chapter, I argue that one o f the greatest merits o f this approach is its 
capacity o f focusing on the fundamental elements that characterise the individuals as
78 This version, which has its inspiration in Kant’s works on the possibility o f  a cosmopolitan order, is also 
presently called moral cosm opolitanism in opposition to institutional cosm opolitanism . Moral 
cosm opolitanism is linked to the idea that individuals are fundamentally equal, which grounds the notion o f  
impartial treatment, w hile institutional cosmopolitanism is related to the political constitution o f  the world, 
more specifically to the possibility o f  world government. See Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan liberalism and 
the state system ” in Chris Brown (ed.), Political Structure in Europe: Ethical Perspectives (London, 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 124-125 and Brian Barry, “International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” 
in David Mapel & Terry Nardin, International Society: D iverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press), p .146.
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autonomous entities despite their limiting historical conditions, making possible a much 
more comprehensive view o f the content of principles o f justice. But this approach also 
faces essential limits. The one I am particularly interested in exploring here is the way it 
neglects the analysis o f how individuals actually become morally motivated entities. I 
argue that this approach does not understand the constitutive role historically situated 
political communities play in the formation o f individuals able to understand, to get 
acquainted and to act in consonance with their moral responsibilities. By overlooking 
this issue, universalists end by creating schemes that, though leading to quite well- 
described and needed encompassing international principles, reflect a great gap between 
what is desirable and what is in fact feasible.79
The present chapter will be divided in four parts. The first part explores 
the main thesis o f the universalist approach and sketches a set o f criticisms against this 
approach that will serve as elements in the construction o f my own version o f an ethical 
approach. The second and third parts are dedicated to the illustration o f these criticisms 
with the analysis o f some universalist authors’ arguments. More specifically, the second 
part explores the universalist versions proposed by Beitz and Pogge, who work with the 
universal elements already present in a Rawlsian scheme in the description of the 
conditions o f the first OP in order to construct a cosmopolitan order. The third part 
analyses more extensively the theoretical scheme proposed by Barry. This scheme is 
particularly significant for my analysis because it evaluates more explicitly the 
implications o f the Rawlsian scheme from individuals’ moral viewpoint to the 
construction o f a just order. And from this point, it constructs a more robust version of 
moral cosmopolitanism based on Scanlonian premises than the ones suggested by Beitz 
and Pogge. And finally, some concluding remarks on the issues are presented.
79From this perspective, the construction o f  consistent international principles o f  justice relies on 
equilibrium based on the denial o f  two extreme positions. It should not translate a utopian project that 
highly idealises the moral agent and disregards the circumstances that put constraints on their behaviour. At 
the same time, it should not represent the description o f  a mere reality since it would tend to restrain the 
principal aim o f  theorists when formulating principles, to propose a guide to a critical evaluation o f  present 
institutional arrangements and to the possibilities o f  change. This point has been constantly discussed in 
O ’N e ill’s works. It has particularly been a subject o f  analysis in the public lecture “Is Universalism in 
Ethics Dead?” given at The K ing’s C ollege, London, Januaiy 19th 2000.
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2.1) Critical Issues in the Universalistic Argument
Universalism regards the individual as someone who is bom with the potentiality 
to exercise rational capacities to form an independent viewpoint and critically assess the 
circumstances that influence its construction and allows its pursuit. Every individual can 
be said to be equally owner o f this potentiality though differing in the degree to which 
they share this potentiality and in the capacity o f making use o f it. The inner 
cosmopolitan dimension o f a moral agent is, therefore, here presupposed, as everyone 
being potentially able to present equal valid claims to each other.
For this approach, individuals need society to develop their potential moral 
capacities but such a need is markedly limited. There is a clear admission that it is as 
member o f a historically situated community in which social relations can be properly 
managed that individuals can realise their liberty without undue interference from others. 
It is also as part o f this community that they perform social roles, establish routines and 
construct links that not only offer significance to their choices but also make their lives 
more predictable. The community nonetheless plays here only an instrumental role in 
individuals’ development whose moral cosmopolitanism is intrinsic to their nature. Its 
action is at the end o f the day limited by the impartial considerations that are derived 
from the realisation o f the universal rational character already presupposed in 
individuals’ constitution.
In my opinion, one o f the greatest merits o f the universalistic approach is to make 
possible an analysis o f the deliberation o f just principles from an ab initio point, in the 
sense that what is to be considered essential to the deliberation process is what makes 
individuals autonomous sources o f valid claims in whatever the historical circumstances 
they find themselves. In so doing, this approach defends more embracing principles of 
justice. It will not be concerned merely with a formal analysis o f these principles, that 
prioritises first generation rights (political and civil rights) in detriment o f a more detailed 
understanding of second generation rights (social and economic rights) in the formation 
o f moral agents. It will focus on the need to defend subsistence rights as a means to the 
full enjoyment o f the more traditional civil and political rights as well as on policies to 
validate these rights at the global level. At an international level, it will question how far
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economic re-distribution should be seen as a necessary strategy to empower the structures 
o f existing political communities in the way to form agents who are both conscious of 
their moral responsibilities and motivated enough to act on the basis o f them.80
The merits o f this approach are however impaired by the way it disregards the 
partially constitutive role that historically situated political communities play in the 
formation o f motivated moral agents. The universalistic approach tends to take for 
granted the characteristics that define a moral agent in order to deduce far-reaching just 
principles. But in so doing, it underestimates the historical and social circumstances that 
make possible individuals’ development and exercise o f their moral capacities. It does 
not pay enough attention to the limits individuals have as historically situated beings who 
need the political community to provide for a social dynamic that helps to constitute them 
as active moral agents. It is in the exercise o f their citizenship in a limited political 
community that individuals fully recognise each other in their equal capacity of 
independent critical thinkers (equal source o f valid claims), learning to reciprocate 
commitments and to understand and appreciate the notion o f partnership in the 
construction o f common decisions. That exercise engenders a more motivated 
comprehension o f their moral responsibilities and o f what these responsibilities require 
from them in terms o f actions.
I think it is a great error to underestimate such a constitutive role played by 
historically situated political communities in the development o f individuals qua valid 
interlocutors. That is so because it reinforces the gap between individual’s moral will {a 
priori thought) and individuals’ empirical will (the proper exercise o f the will taking a 
historical context). As a consequence, it leaves open the question o f how desirable 
principles o f international justice become comprehensible to individuals whose 
rationality is partially defined by the historical context in which they live. By the same 
token, it leaves unanswered the question o f how these principles come to be seen as 
feasible and really carried out by motivated moral agents.
80 This point w ill be explored in the next sections in which representatives o f  the universalistic approach, 
such as Pogge and Barry, w ill be looking not only for arguments to sustain the defence o f  re-distributive 
principles at the international level but also for the various possibilities, including international taxation, for 
their implementation.
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2 .2) Interpreting the Rawlsian Framework: Universalism in the Works of Beitz and
Pogge
Beitz and Pogge develop their cosmopolitan schemes taking directly into account 
the Rawlsian framework. For them, the move made by Rawls from the description of the 
first OP in which individuals are subjected to a veil o f  ignorance when thinking about 
justice, to a second OP in which co-operative schemes of social co-operation (political 
communities) are said to represent the same individuals when deliberating about 
international just principles is essentially unjustified. The assumption o f self-sufficiency 
and self-containment of social units that could eventually lead to the justification of 
political communities as the main moral entities in international relations do not hold 
anymore. Boundaries could not determine the limits o f our social co-operation if we 
consider the present “circumstances o f justice” -  related to the increasing economic 
interdependence o f these units and the scarcity o f natural resources. Therefore, they 
could not determine the limits o f our social obligations.81
Let me specify the arguments o f both authors. Beitz believes that there is 
a need for a new normative theory in IR. The realist framework that currently dominates 
the IR debate, with its sceptical view of the formation o f an international moral order, is 
no longer sustainable. That is so because the process o f economic interdependence 
impairs the self-sufficiency and sovereignty o f the units of this system.82 While this 
process brings multiplication o f common benefits to the political communities, it also 
deepens inequality o f power and access to resources among them. It ends by putting 
burdens on the domestic spheres o f some countries, such as difficulty in controlling the 
domestic economy given the distributive and structural effects felt by their participation 
in the international economy, that jeopardise the integrity o f their citizens.83 
Consequently, new forms of long-term co-operation that privilege the development o f the 
individual no matter where and under at circumstances he finds himself are urgently 
needed.
81 Charles Beitz. P olitical T heory and International R elations, p. 151.
82 Ibid.. p. 36.
83 Ibid.. p. 147.
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In addition to the implications o f his circumstantial observation on the evolution 
o f the process o f economic interdependence, Beitz presents a moral argument related to 
the countries’ present access to natural resources. He argues that the scarcity o f natural 
resources seems to put severe constraints on any claim o f self-containment o f social units. 
Natural resources are a factor that by helping or hindering the development of 
personalities can determine the success o f domestic co-operative schemes. Because of 
their scarcity and their fundamental importance to individuals, the present distribution o f 
resources can be regarded as morally arbitrary by the parties deliberating on international 
just principles.84 Therefore none should have entitlements over these resources without a 
clear justification o f why some individuals should be excluded from their use.
The above two considerations offer the foundation for the author’s re­
interpretation of Rawls’ process o f deliberation o f international principles on the basis o f 
the conditions expressed in the first OP. Individuals and not political communities, 
having no information about their inner capabilities and social conditions, should be the 
ones deliberating about the two principles o f justice, concerning equal rights and socio­
economic re-distribution. States can be understood as subjects o f international relations 
only derivatively, so far as they are better placed than individuals or no matter other 
entity to guarantee practices and carry out policies that secure the effectiveness o f the 
principles at the global level.85 In this respect, the self- determination o f political 
communities is regarded as an instrument to the proper end o f social justice, related to 
individuals’ exercise o f their autonomy at a cosmopolitan level.86
I think Beitz’s arguments rest nonetheless on doubtful assumptions. In his 
defence o f the instrumental role played by the state, he assumes that the world can largely 
be interpreted as a scheme o f social co-operation. That seems doubtful in the following 
ways. Economic arrangements, technical support and even matters concerning the 
invasion o f an aggressive country are gradually being discussed in connection with a 
common accepted framework o f international rules and principles, which translate the
84 Ibid.. p. 138.
85 According to B eiz, the international difference principle should be applied to persons but states can be 
understood as subjects so far as they are more appropriately situated than individuals to carry out whatever 
policies are required to implement global policies. Ibid.. p. 153.
86 Concerning the issue o f  self-determination, Ibid.. p. 132 and also Chris Brown, Political Restructuring in 
Europe: Ethical Perspectives (London, Routledge, 1994), p. 124.
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values o f equal freedom at large. Partially, this tendency reflects the increasing pace o f a 
process o f interdependence that forces states and civil societies to find a form o f 
regulating their interactions in a more direct and rationalised way. However, the process 
of interdependence as well as the expansion and validation o f the main values underlying 
this process suffer some constraints. Individuals do not regard themselves as full 
members o f an international scheme o f economic or social interactions yet. Individuals 
are still more attached to rules, social roles and values constructed inside national borders 
responsible for giving them a common sense o f identity, than the ones that are still in a 
developing phase in the international context.87
The verification o f present setbacks facing the interdependence process paves the 
way for some consideration on the limits o f a universalistic view, which insists in 
attaching a merely instrumental role to the political communities in the construction of 
moral entities. Beitz’ considerations on the potential existence o f an international scheme 
o f social co-operation notwithstanding, political communities still assume both a 
functional and constitutive role in the formation o f individuals qua moral entities. 
Individuals are historically situated beings who need to form part of a social whole to 
become actively valid interlocutors. More particularly, they need to exercise their 
citizenship in a political community that allows them to take decisions autonomously, to 
respect each other as autonomous sources o f valid claims and to reciprocate actions. It is 
in this environment that they become acquainted with values, such as equality and 
freedom that are to be incorporated in their lives as a guide to relationships not only with 
compatriots but also w ith . non-compatriots, thus grounding their moral personality. 
Therefore a more active role exercised by the political community should be seriously 
taken into consideration when discussing the construction o f just principles.
An important note should however be added here. I think that present political 
communities cannot be considered organic wholes in the full sense o f the term. By 
organic whole, I mean an entity that gives a homogeneous and well-established unity to
87M oreover, there are no conclusive elements to support the view  that the process o f  interdependence, by 
revolutionizing the speed and intensity o f  interactions, will help forge a cosmopolitan identity among 
individuals in the near future. Even if  this possibility could be easily envisaged, there would be a need to 
analyze in a more detailed way one particular side effect o f  the process. Besides contributing to the 
formation o f  possible new global identities, it helps individuals not only to be aware o f  their links with 
particular comm unities but also to be more inclined to develop them as the result o f  a search for 
differentiation in a highly hom ogenized world.
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individuals that form part o f them. This is mainly due to the character o f contemporary 
multicultural societies, composed o f individuals who differ in terms o f religious beliefs, 
ethnicities and group interests. But it is possible to say that these societies still offer the 
framework, mainly through the maintenance o f a propitious environment where 
citizenship rights can be actively exercised, to the construction o f basic common values 
that help individuals to constitute themselves as moral agents.
Instead o f offering some responses to the kind o f criticisms signalled above, Beitz 
prefers to go on defending a more embracing version o f cosmopolitanism in subsequent 
articles. In this version, he thinks it unnecessary to consider the circumstances of justice 
- the existence o f an international scheme o f social co-operation - in the construction of 
universal just principles. He only takes the individuals in their universal potential 
capacities as moral agents. As he states:
[...th e  tw o essential powers o f  moral personality -  a capacity for an effective sense o f  justice and 
a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception o f  the good. Since human beings possess this essential 
power regardless o f  whether, at present, they belong to a comm on cooperative schem e, the argument for 
construing the original position globally need not depend on any claim about the existence or intensity o f
international social cooperation.]^
By taking the individual for granted without really considering the necessary limits he is 
subjected to in the development o f his capacities, Beitz disregards the effects o f the gap 
between individuals’ moral will and their practical will in the deliberation o f just 
principles. The a priori universality o f individuals’ rationality does not provide them 
with the moral motivation to carry on with the realization o f their capacities in practice. 
This motivation is much dependent on the feelings that arise among individuals in the 
exercise o f citizenship, learning to reciprocate commitments and taking part in the 
construction o f a common identity in historically situated political communities. It is 
under these particular circumstances that individuals get acquainted with their moral 
responsibilities and acquire a commitment to them.
Just like Beitz, Pogge also sees the limitations o f IR theories that interpret 
international relations on the basis o f a prudential rationality that is affected by the 
current distribution o f power. But differently from him, Pogge proposes the construction
88 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment”, The Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. LXXX, 
N o. 10, October 1983, p. 595.
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of a moral global order based on value pluralism.89 Tolerance, bom from the acceptance 
o f reasonable disagreement among political communities, will lead to the gradual 
establishment o f firm-value based institutions that will stand above the shifts o f power. 
This will pave the way to a world without serious deprivations and with feasible 
institutional schemes able to effectively secure basic human rights.90
Despite this defence o f valued pluralism among political communities, what 
grounds Pogge’s conception o f a moral global order is a universal individualistic 
conception o f the moral agent and its rights derived from his interpretation o f the 
Rawlsian scheme. Pogge argues that the distribution of natural resources is a social fact. 
It is among the benefits and burdens o f social co-operation and therefore needs 
justification. Taking the perspective of the individual in the second OP, he poses the 
following question: Given individuals’ equal right to have a share in the world’s natural 
resources to develop their autonomous capacity, how would a just global institutional 
scheme regulate ownership and control over these natural resources?91 The answer to 
such a question would involve the maximal support o f basic rights and liberties to foster 
fair equality o f opportunity worldwide. The generation of social and economic 
inequalities would be possible so far as it optimises the social conditions of the globally 
least advantaged.92
For Pogge, a feasible scheme towards a more egalitarian global economic 
institution would necessarily involve the implementation o f a Global Resource Tax 
(GRT). Such a tax is a tax on consumption and would fall on goods and services roughly 
in proportion to their resource content, to how much value each takes from our planet.93 
The income derived o f this tax would revert to the poorest in the world, bettering their 
access to basic services that are fundamental to their development as valid interlocutors 
in the international scenario.
89 Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p. 226.
90 Ibid.. pp. 238 and 269.
91 Ibid., p. 252.
92 Ibid.. p. 254. Implicit in this reasoning is the defence o f  the two principles o f  justice proposed by Rawls. 
They represent a form o f  guaranteeing that every individual w ill have the resources to develop as 
autonomous beings (valid interlocutors), keeping even pace with the eventual changes in the circumstances 
o f  other individuals who can profit from differentiated social and natural capabilities as stated in the 
difference principle.
93 Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law o f  Peoples” in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Summer 1994, Vol. 
23, N o. 03, p. 200.
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In my understanding, the fundamental problem in Pogge’s theoretical framework 
is the fact that it is based on an abstract construction o f the moral entity that downplays 
the role a social milieu has in providing for the actual functioning o f this agent. Though 
historical circumstances are considered when defending reasonable disagreement in the 
actual construction o f the value system, it is clear that Pogge takes the individuals as a 
priori moral entities to derive the core principles and their pragmatic implications. In 
doing so, he comes to attribute a mere instrumental role to the political communities, 
which should be evaluated only in terms o f their capacity to provide basic services to 
their members, guaranteeing the enjoyment o f their autonomy without substantially 
affecting the autonomy o f non-members.94
Following the same line o f criticism I have been addressing in relation to Beitz’s 
scheme, Pogge can be accused of underestimating the fundamental role historically 
situated political communities play in the flourishing o f moral individuals. It is when 
taking part in the construction o f a political community that affects his notion o f identity 
that individuals can get acquainted with specific features, particularly an understanding of 
interlocutors as equal sources o f valid claims that will form them as motivated moral 
entities.
I am aware that the defence of this line o f argument encompasses a tension 
between the two sides o f the moral agent -  a universal rationality that is innate to every 
individual and its specific social realisation that offers it meaning and helps to motivate 
this individual to action. But rather than seeing it as undesirable as is the case in the 
universalistic view, this tension is seen as an intrinsic part o f individuals’ moral 
development. Individuals must be able to reconcile themselves with the social roles they 
are supposed to perform by having a critical insight into their function.
Pogge’s analysis illustrates the point. In the development o f his arguments, he 
prefers to deconstruct the tension by focusing on the universal rationality o f individuals. 
He implies that individuals have an innate moral motivation, which can be developed 
universally in similar terms despite the historical constraints it faces. But in the actual 
construction o f a principled international system, he is obliged to consider the existence
94 For Pogge, political arrangements should be evaluated impartially, in terms o f  the impact on the basic 
HR and interests o f  all those affected. By all those affected, he means the interests o f  individuals globally  
located, compatriots and non-compatriots. Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p. 135.
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of moral disagreement and the need for giving incentives to stimulate reflection among 
compatriots so they can think about the burdens and gains o f a new order based on more 
egalitarian global economic institutions.95 With such a move, he is assuming that there is 
a gap between what is ideally aimed at and what the obstacles to make it feasible are. 
Moreover, he assumes that the best way to deal with this gap is to make a two-steps move 
instead o f analysing the issue in an interrelated way. He considers first the view o f a 
universal individual in abstract and then identifies the best measures to arrive at the goal 
given the constraints these individuals face in the real world. As a consequence, his 
scheme can be accused o f being too demanding for an individual who does not act a 
priori and so does not act logically and unattached to his social circumstances.
2.3) Barry’s Innovative Theoretical Scheme
Barry’s criticism o f the Rawlsian scheme relates to what he regards as an 
incompatibility between rationality and reasonableness (impartiality) in the definition of 
the parties and the circumstances o f justice in the first OP. This incompatibility generates 
inconsistencies that affect the integrity o f the international deliberation o f principles in 
the second OP. The emphasis merely on the rationality o f the parties, each one pursuing 
his self-interest, can lead to a modus vivendi situation. Yet the introduction of 
reasonableness through the veil o f  ignorance to deal with this kind o f permissive effects 
leads to an unsatisfactory definition o f the contracting parties, forcing Rawls to add 
controversial assumptions to his scheme so as to construct a properly functioning moral 
agent. For Barry, these assumptions reveal clearly the fact that Rawls’ understanding o f 
justice is just an expression o f liberal values. And they serve to show that international 
principles can only work out among liberal societies, serving in this sense to maintain the 
present status quo.
Let me explain the point. For Barry, Rawls’ admission that the parties 
should be primarily regarded as rational actors capable of defining their specific good and 
choosing the best means to attain it imposes a constraint on the construction o f the
95 Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law o f  Peoples” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, p. 220.
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principles o f justice both in the first and second OPs. The principles would somehow 
result in a sense o f common advantage among the participants, who would regard them as 
a necessary means to pursue their different conceptions o f the good. Such a sense o f 
advantage is derived from a bargaining game among agents who, despite having diverse 
notion o f interests and tactics, do not necessarily have at their disposal the same level o f 
power. The assumption of the discrepancy in the allocation o f power leads to the 
possibility that the political community that is capable o f gathering a significant amount 
of economic, cultural and military resources, will set the rules at the international level. 
When this argument is driven to extremes, realpolitik, marked by the idea that political 
issues in the international context are considered in relation to the national interests of 
each bounded community -  seen generally as opposed to each other, becomes a fact.
As Barry points out, there will hardly be a possibility o f supporting the 
principles suggested by the Rawlsian scheme in this scenario. From a rational point of 
view, it is too demanding to ask a political community to act fairly, a process which will 
eventually involve compromise and delays in the attainment o f its objectives, when they 
can get what they want more quickly and more effectively by using their power. Second, 
even if the rich and powerful political communities could rationally accept principles 
founded on the value o f freedom and equality, there would be no guarantee that these 
would constitute a fair agreement. It is most probable that they would result in very basic 
rules o f co-existence that would allow powerful countries to meddle in the affairs o f other 
countries when it is convenient.96 In these terms, any notion o f universality o f principles 
of justice will become quite limited, if non-existent.
On the other hand, the use o f reasonableness to cope with the undesirable 
effects o f self-interested parties’ actions in the construction o f just principles brings 
another set o f problems. As Barry suggests, the introduction o f the veil o f  ignorance, a 
device requiring the contracting parties to act uninformed about their particular skills and 
status in society, leads to a distortion o f the characterisation o f the parties and to a flawed 
justification of the agreement. In the international context, the political communities 
would not know about their general welfare, related to the extent o f their territory, 
population, natural resources, economic development, and amount o f power.
96 See Brian Barry, Theories o f  Justice (Berkley, University o f  California Press, 1989), page 187.
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Consequently, the entities are obliged to reason taking into consideration their position of 
intrinsic equality - an impartial standpoint.
However valid, the use o f the veil does not take into consideration the issue of 
“separateness o f people” .97 By eliminating the entities’ access to knowledge about the 
essential components o f their identity and ranking the search for primary goods among 
their most important aims, Rawls fails to consider any fundamental distinction among the 
parties. Even if we admit that there can be a difference in the way the parties perceive 
the distribution o f primary goods, with some of them preferring to have more access to 
this kind o f goods than others, the general structure of desires and goals will be already 
defined. Therefore, the bargaining game implicit in the assumption of the rationality of 
the parties will be either pretty limited or non-existent. And the need for an agreement 
will be eventually put into question.98
The introduction o f other theoretical devices to deal with the shortcomings 
derived from the use o f the veil imposes further limits to Rawls’ scheme. In the first OP, 
Rawls is obliged to add risk-aversion in the characterisation o f the parties, in the sense 
that they would not make an agreement that they know they couldn’t keep, or one that 
would impose great difficulty in following99. That happens because he cannot prevent 
the parties under the veil from choosing principles on the basis o f a utility function -  
which could impose enormous burdens on the worst-off in the name o f the well being o f 
the majority. By the same token, he cannot restrain the entities, on finding out that they 
fare badly after the lifting o f the veil, from rejecting principles. Such a theoretical device 
rather than solving the problem of moral motivation facing the individuals serves to 
underline it.100 The full attribution o f a moral nature to the entities will be further 
explored in the works published after the debate stimulated by A Theory o f  Justice and
97 The problem o f  “separateness o f  people”, as expressed by Barry, is primarily linked to the construction 
o f  the first OP, national context. However, I think that the same kind o f  criticism is valid for the second  
OP. That is the reason why I am introducing the subject in the analysis o f  the international context.
98 See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), page 61.
99 Ibid.. pp. 62-65 to an evaluation about “the strains o f  commitment” in R aw ls’ theory. For a more 
synthetic version, see Paul Kelly., “Contractarian Social Justice: An Overview o f  Some Contemporary 
Debates” in David Boucher & Paul K elly (eds.), Social Justice From Hume to W alzer (London, Routledge, 
1995), page 183.
100 See John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, page 57.
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more recently in the re-edition of The Law o f  Peoples, in which he fully attributes a moral 
nature to the entities.
Rawls tries to put aside many o f the above criticisms by reiterating the view that 
the problems facing the characterisation o f the parties in the first OP do not necessarily 
transpose to the second OP. That happens because according to him the entities in the 
second OP are reflecting on the advantages o f applying principles that already exist at the 
national level and not starting a process o f choice from scratch. Under these 
circumstances, the parties are solely characterised as peoples that are restrained in the use 
of their “prudential rationality” by the moral concerns o f their representatives.101. They 
are then seen as the legitimate representatives o f groups o f individuals that are part o f 
self-contained co-operative schemes regulated by just political and social institutions 
(well-ordered societies), which influence the formation o f their moral character. From 
this viewpoint, the action of peoples has to be guided by the notion o f fairness that is 
embedded in these national institutions and has a substantive role in the development of 
their members’ moral character.102
By explicitly admitting that the way a co-operative scheme is in effect run 
influences the formation o f moral entities, Rawls calls attention to an important feature of 
his scheme that was not made explicit before. The different communities described by 
Rawls are in fact characterised by a common endorsement o f the elements that compose 
reasonableness (freedom and equality) despite the opposing interpretations about their 
relative importance or the best methods to institutionalise them. Principles o f justice will 
therefore be better formulated and implemented among individuals living in the same
101 Taking into consideration the international context, Rawls introduces a distinction between states, a 
concept w idely employed by rea lists  like Clausewitz, and peoples. W hile the state embodies the acceptable 
use o f  “prudential rationality” in the pursuit o f  national interests, including the right to go to war, peoples 
are constrained by moral concerns when choosing a strategy o f  action. John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, 
page 38.
102 Despite the appeal o f  attributing a moral character to the entities, Barry is right in the fact that Rawls 
still has to explain why it should override rational considerations. Considering that the primary objective o f  
the political comm unities is to maintain their “territory, environmental integrity and size o f  their 
population”, why should they necessarily opt for just principles (fairness condition) to establish a regulated 
pattern o f  interactions that guarantees the emergence o f  a secure and prosperous international environment? 
Rawls seem s to be neglecting the importance o f  rationality in attitudes o f  individuals’ representatives when 
reinforcing the idea that people should act morally. And that som etim es seem s to be a too stringent 
demand . This question is particularly posed by Brian Barry in Theories o f  Justice, page 185.
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Vcommunity or, at the limit, among individuals who though part o f different political 
communities are able to share quite similar values.
Considering this revised version o f the Rawlsian scheme, Barry makes a valid 
criticism by affirming that it will most likely be the case that these principles would end 
up making sense only among liberal states. Even if they could help thinking about the 
needs and restraints experienced by non-liberal communities, their capacity to address 
problems derived from a different perception o f fundamental values would always be 
considered pretty limited. Such a limiting scope for these principles would contribute to 
reaffirm the claim that “justice runs out when we most need it” .103
Barry also presents another valid set o f criticisms regarding Rawls’ 
understanding o f the content o f principles o f justice. For him, Rawls assumes that 
individuals should be part o f a self-contained scheme of co-operation in order to be 
considered a subject to whom justice is own. But this supposition clashes with some 
observable facts. First, there are many individuals who despite being unable to co­
operate in a national context because o f some temporary or permanent incapacity are still 
entitled to the benefits o f the co-operative scheme. Second, there are many people who 
although contributing to different national schemes o f co-operation - other than the one 
he is formally attached to - are not entitled to receive the full benefits of these schemes in 
an increasingly interdependent world. Besides that, it is possible to present a counter­
argument based on the fact that distributive questions can appear before co-operation 
necessarily takes place104.
In face o f these points, a Rawlsian defence o f a formal content to the principles, 
re-emphasising the premises o f the existent system o f international public law -  
supposition o f equality among peoples, duty o f non-intervention, respect for human 
rights, has to be rejected as superficial. It does not take into account the substantive 
implications o f accepting equality and freedom as general principles, neglecting an 
analysis about the fairness o f the present distribution of wealth and power among 
communities and how it affects individuals’ development. In other words, it fails to
103 Ibid* p. 339.
104 It is easy to realise that Barry follow s B eitz and Pogge in som e o f  the criticisms presented here. Brian 
Barry, “Can States be Moral? International Morality and the Compliance Problem” in Brian Barry, 
Democracy. Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), page 423.
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discuss the principle o f “an equal distribution o f income” at the international level and its 
consequences for individuals’ access to the minimal means necessary for them to 
function as moral agents.105
The above criticism raised by Barry regarding the Ralwsian framework paves the 
way to a new version o f moral cosmopolitanism. For Barry, international principles of 
justice should be based on an impartial consideration o f each individual who will be 
affected by the final choice regardless o f space and time. Membership o f a society is 
important in the formation of individuals’ identity since it offers them a sense of 
belonging to the point that they can find their greater fulfillment within the dense network 
of family and community, which helps them to carry on social obligations. But this 
social membership is deprived o f deep moral significance in two broad senses.106 First, 
it does not demand from individuals continuing and close subservience to a specific 
national political authority given that this subservience is justified on the basis of its 
direct impact on individuals’ enjoyment o f basic rights that are taken to be universal and 
equally assessed by people living worldwide. Political power has here a mere derivative 
and contingent value.107 Second, any regime of exclusion could be justified on a 
universal ground. It is acceptable that individuals living in a specific community share 
some obligations and rights that are not attributed to non-members. Nonetheless, the 
attribution o f special treatment to compatriots could be justified taking into consideration 
reasonable arguments, which are regarded as acceptable by everyone.
From this perspective, Barry rejects the rigidity o f borders just as much as Beitz 
and Pogge. Though demarcated communities influence the constitution o f an 
individual’s identity, giving them an attachment to particular social standards, they do not 
predispose the individuals to think about international justice from a comprehensive point 
o f view on the good. Individuals have the potentiality to realise that the boundaries 
established and maintained by political authorities are a mere useful convention. The 
existence o f these boundaries are instrumental to their development but can easily be put
105 See Brian Barry, “Can States be Moral?” in Democracy. Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory.
106 See Brian Barry., “International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” in David Mapel & Terry 
Nardin. International Society: D iverse Ethical Perspectives, pp. 145 and 157.
107 Ibid.. p . 160.
68
into question when considering the fundamental equality that should underline a fair 
agreement in the international context.
In the process o f constructing a more robust version o f moral cosmopolitanism 
than the ones presented by Beitz and Pogge, Barry considers Scanlonian theoretical 
premises. He introduces the idea that individuals have, as common experience shows, a 
“widely shared and deeply grounded” desire to justify their actions on the basis that none 
could reasonably reject108: The effectiveness o f this desire rests on the individuals’ 
ability to have a freely chosen objective and to envisage rational means to attain it, 
including their capacity for discussing with their fellows on an equal basis the validity of 
the argument. In these terms, equality signifies that everyone has a veto power to reject 
unreasonable claims based on likes and dislikes and not on logical arguments that justify 
their validity109. Moreover, it also implies the existence o f a similar level o f moderate 
scepticism among the parties in order to prevent any comprehensive conception o f the 
good from constituting the basis for an agreement on reasonable terms.
In regarding specifically the characterisation of the parties, I would say that such a 
theoretical framework is much more persuasive than the Rawlsian one. The identity of 
the parties is here fully preserved. They are supposed to decide about the principles 
having a complete knowledge about their social status as well as their particular abilities 
and interests. Additionally, their impartial considerations are not dependent on the 
existence o f any external device, such as the veil o f  ignorance. Impartiality is supposed 
in the motivation each individual has to act reasonably so as to obtain consensus.110 
There is in this sense a subtraction of the importance o f context to individuals’ moral 
constitution. Moral motivation is simply taken for granted as a potential, constant and 
generalised element in the constitution of an individual. However questionable, the
108 See Brian Barry, Theories o f  Justice, page 284.
109 The notion o f  reasonableness, as a search for consistency through the rational explanations o f  an action 
opens the way to universality, defended by Barry in the construction o f  the international principles. A good  
argument linking morality and the criteria o f  universality is exposed by A. Ward, “Morality and The Thesis 
o f  Universalisability” in M ind. V ol. LXXXII, No. 326, April 1973.
110According to this view , impartiality reveals individuals’ interest in coexistence as autonomous 
individuals, equally able to present valid claims. Partiality is what falls outside this basic concern, making 
possible actions that are based on specific social attachments. But it has to be justified by impartial 
considerations. To som e extent, it is a defence o f  the instrumentality o f  partiality -  a functional view. I 
com e back to this issue when discussing the functional view  in chapter 4. I will then make a point in 
relation to Barry’s view s in “Justice as Impartiality”, which offers som e insights in the understanding o f  the 
role played by different political communities in the international context.
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avoidance o f discussing how moral motivation can actually flourish serves a purpose: to 
underline the essence o f the moral agency and, from this viewpoint, to interpret the 
content o f the principles in a more enlarged way, focusing on the basic needs and 
interests o f individuals worldwide.
The content o f the principles proposed by Barry takes into account three issues 1) 
the allocation o f rights. Human agency should be respected equally. Any inequality 
should be justified on reasonable terms; 2) desert. Any individuals should be held 
responsible for their acts and the victims o f unavoidable misfortune should be 
compensated; 3) need. Every individual should have their basic human needs satisfied in 
relation to their non-vital interests. The logic behind the principles is that everybody 
should not only be entitled to equal rights but also to dispose o f the necessary means to 
enjoy them. From this viewpoint, basic rights (including the right of subsistence) should 
have priority over other ones that despite their importance assume a derivative 
character.111 Inequalities are allowed only so far as it has a justification that can be easily 
assessed and accepted by everybody. They are not to be the fruit o f coercion or 
established in detriment o f the non-fulfilment o f basic needs. Everyone should hold 
moral responsibility for harmful acts towards his fellows. Human misfortunes should be 
compensated so far as it is the fruit of bad luck -  something that goes against the 
presupposition o f equality and is not caused directly by the individuals in question.
The contrast between what is theoretically conceived in terms o f principles and 
what is in fact demanded leads Barry to defend global taxation. On the one side, he sees 
the fulfilment o f individuals’ basic needs as the sine qua non requirement (minimum) to 
the development o f moral agents. This achievement is essential so far as it is only in a 
world where the interlocutors are fully aware o f the rules o f the game and effectively 
assume their role as moral agent, openly expressing and putting into practice their 
primary motivation, that peace can be established in the long run. On the other hand, he 
realises that nowadays there is widespread poverty in the world and the gap between rich 
and poor is far from narrowing. This realisation leads him to make a pragmatic demand:
11 lrThe defense o f  fundamental equality, based on the fulfillment o f  individuals’ basic needs, leads to a 
discussion about the importance o f  subsistence rights. It emphasises the fact that rights such as political
liberties cannot be enjoyed without the minimum means o f  econom ic and social welfare being guaranteed 
to the individual, for example shelter, food, access to education. Otherwise, it becom es just a hypothetical 
right that means no right at all in terms o f  validity.
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the imposition o f a tax on rich countries (proportional to their GNP) destined to meet the 
basic needs o f poor individuals. 1,2
I see as one o f the great merits o f Barry’s encompassing understanding of the 
content o f the principles that it paves the way to a much needed discussion about how far 
egalitarianism can be considered without economic redistribution being necessarily 
vindicated. As I pointed out in chapter 1, Rawls defends the widely accepted idea that 
rich countries have a duty o f assistance towards impoverished nations that is valid until 
they are able to dispose o f the minimum to achieve their political autonomy.113 Although 
it should be praised as an effort to delimit the final objectives o f distributive principles, 
this interpretation is unable to deal with the issues in question. There is not necessarily 
the possibility o f a claim-right (based on the idea that someone justifiably deserves 
something) being made by developing nations towards developed ones when a duty of 
assistance is emphasised. A positive action can’t necessarily be urged or pressed against 
someone. It can always be seen as a favour being done by rich countries towards poor 
lucky people114. Moral responsibilities are not precisely defined in this context.
I think the emphasis on the duty o f assistance seems also to neglect the essential 
issue in the debate about the content o f justice: how far the promotion o f economic 
development should be pursued as a goal in order to sustain political autonomy. Studies 
that underline the idea that political autonomy in disadvantaged societies has to be 
achieved with “a helping hand” from more developed communities don’t take seriously 
the present need for discussing re-distributive issues in a comprehensive way115. This 
“helping hand” seems to constitute the minimum of economic and social support 
necessary to consider a political community as a player in the international scenario. But 
the achievement o f this minimum does not end the discussion about economic
112 See Brian Barry, “International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” in David Mapel & Terry 
Nardin. International Society: D iverse Ethical Perspectives, pp. 146-154.
113 According to Rawls, this minimum is associated with just liberal or decent institutions, which are 
responsible for the developm ent o f  full moral agents nationally and ethical states internationally. John 
Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples.
114 This point has more precisely been made by Shue in Henry Shue, Basic Rights Subsistence. Affluence 
and U .S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 14.
115 See for exam ple the way Rawls discuss assistance to a burdened society. According to him, this society  
can benefit from the political and cultural background o f  more developed communities as well as the 
human and material capital offered by them to develop its basic public institutions. John Rawls, The Law o f  
Peoples, p. 160.
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redistribution if great levels o f inequality will still persist, as it is the case. The structures 
o f the world economic order currently lead to the perpetuation o f inequalities (gaps of 
development) responsible for the formation o f a category o f second-class citizens in 
world affairs that needs justification. In these terms, the criteria that establish the 
countries’ ownership o f natural resources by denying the historical contingency of 
borders and also the present international rules and institutions that while claiming to be 
fair allow worldwide deprivation will have necessarily to be put into question.
The defence o f such a comprehensive view on redistribution has many 
important pragmatic implications that should be further considered in the following 
chapters. It does not only demand the formation o f an international economic aid scheme 
supported by developed countries as proposed by Pogge and Barry. It also requires a 
clear evaluation o f categories o f analysis, such as the duties to avoid deprivation (“not to 
eliminate a person’s only available means o f subsistence”) and to protect from 
deprivation (“duties to protect people against deprivation o f the only available means of 
subsistence by other people”) in the international context.116 This last duty is directly 
linked to the reformulation of present international institutions in terms o f making 
effective the necessary means to prevent communities from deprivation - from the use of 
coercive mechanisms to a search for a more balanced representation between the different 
claims made by societies.
Barry’ merits in constructing far-reaching principles o f international justice do 
not however eliminate the fundamental problems facing his scheme in my view. It fails to 
consider the intrinsic relation between the construction o f general just principles and the 
historically dependent formation o f moral entities. While the attribution o f a certain kind 
o f moral motivation among individuals living worldwide helps to generate a serious 
debate about individuals’ general needs and interests as thinking agents, it also represents 
a trap in the development o f a consistent theory that aims to serve as a guide to action. 
That happens because Barry works with an ideal situation in which all individuals share a 
moral motivation to justify actions on the basis that none could reasonably reject. By 
sharing this motivation, they are predisposed to recognise each other as interlocutors o f a 
dialogue based on the respect for equal autonomy, a feature that will result in the
116 See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence and U .S. Foreign P olicy .
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formulation o f international just principles. But a pressing question is not answered here: 
how do individuals become in fact actively morally motivated agents? Without offering 
a consistent answer to this question, his scheme can be accused o f turning morality into a 
banal issue, misinterpreting the relation between desirability and feasibility when 
considering the construction of principles or even, what is worse given Barry’s own 
motivation, o f trying to impose comprehensive liberalism on the world.
To be fair to Barry, it is important to point out that he does give two conditions to 
the development o f individuals’ moral motivation: 1) experience o f dependence on 
others. Individuals develop the feeling that they can rely on each other; 2) equality of 
power. Individuals have the assurance that they can have access, in relative terms, to the 
same kind o f means to express their claims. They will not be wrongly induced or pressed 
to accept a certain proposition.117 It is clear that these conditions are based on the idea 
that individuals are pre-disposed to live in a social environment where they can share 
some values, much linked to equal respect for individuality and the rationality of 
arguments.
But if that is the case, Barry will be impelled to consider how far the kind of 
social context here implied can be found worldwide and, at the same time, how far the 
role o f contingent communities can be disregarded in the development o f moral 
motivation. It is possible to admit that individuals prefer to justify their actions on 
reasonable terms in world affairs nowadays. That is what indicates, for example, the 
spectrum of multilateral regimes and the great number o f their members. But the 
evidence supporting this view is far from constituting a firm ground for the emergence of 
a cosmopolitan world order or a cosmopolitan identity based on values such as equality 
and freedom as pointed out in chapter one. It is still as a member o f a territorially limited 
political community that individuals develop and learn to appreciate these values. And in 
my view it is also possible to say that the development o f “a sense o f justice” to maintain 
a just world derives in fact from a “socialisation” process involving the links individuals 
develop not only with family, neighbours, and civil society but also with the political 
institutions. It is when being exposed to institutions that embody rational deliberation
1,7See Brian Barry, “Can States be Moral? International Morality and the Compliance Problem” in Brian 
Barry, Democracy. Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory, and “Can States be Moral?” in Ibid.
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practices, referring to the presentation of arguments on the basis that every claim should 
be treated equally, and actively exercising their citizenship that the individuals become 
able to appreciate some virtues as openness to co-operation, tolerance and so on.
In face o f these observations, I think my criticism o f Barry’s scheme still holds. 
Political boundaries still substantially affect the formation o f an individual’s identity. It 
is as members of a defined scheme of co-operation regulated by just institutions that 
demand from them an active participation in political decisions that individuals develop a 
common understanding o f moral responsibilities and how these responsibilities should be 
transformed into action. A circumscribed and stable social environment, with well- 
functioning institutions and established practices of rational deliberation, that can more 
effectively be evaluated, sets common standards that can contribute to the proper exercise 
o f citizenship. It is by exercising their citizenship in this environment that individuals 
learn to reciprocate actions on the basis o f independent reasonable claims while feeling 
part o f the construction o f a common whole, which grounds a common identity. Both the 
attitude and the motivation here developed will be fundamental to the formation o f an 
active and responsible moral entity.118
As I pointed out before, the constitutive role here supposed by the community 
does not however imply that individuals are irreversibly determined by it. They develop 
their capacity to put in question the legitimacy o f a political authority so far as they are 
exposed to institutions and practices that embody a defence o f rational procedures. In the 
process o f getting acquainted with rational argumentation based on equality, they develop 
their moral autonomy -  the ground on which universalism rests. Boundary, in this sense, 
should not be taken as a static concept. It can be contested when the political authorities 
are undermining the existence of a social environment in which the achievement of 
welfare and the development o f moral capacities by the individuals are possible.
Taking into account my criticisms, Barry’s project actually has to assume a much 
more limited dimension to sustain his claims regarding the possibility o f constructing a 
moral world order. The formative elements o f the ideal situation proposed by him are, as
118 There is certainly the idea that, by securing the existence o f  a certain environment, historically situated 
political communities naturally allow  som e ways o f  life to flourish better and therefore to be more fulfilling 
than others are. This is particularly valid when impartiality is seen as a precious component o f  an 
individual’s perspective on the good (partial standpoint).
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a matter o f fact, still circumscribed to liberal societies where a social environment 
characterised by the institutionalisation of the public use o f reason on equal terms allows 
the development o f moral agents and their primary motivation. It is only in these 
societies that individuals tend to form the integral identity, i.e. without dichotomy or 
contradictions, that is necessary to think about international justice on the grounds 
proposed by the author’s original scheme. Consequently, his argument about an 
international redistribution o f resources, implicit in the creation o f a tax, will only make 
sense among liberal countries where individuals consistently share the same moral 
motivation.
It is clear that the acceptance o f the limits o f his enterprise can put Barry in an 
uncomfortable position. As he tends to consider only those who already have a qualified 
moral standpoint -  someone able to present a claim on reasonable terms and to act 
according to it, one could argue that the others who haven’t this moral disposition are not 
seriously taken into consideration in his analysis.119 Moreover, when regarding people 
living worldwide as sharing the same essential values and dispositions, his scheme 
supports the idea that there is only one coherent notion, based on equality and freedom, 
about what justice is and what it demands. This kind o f perception could easily justify 
the view that people who are not prepared to share the same values can be coerced in a 
legitimate way. In other words, there is the possibility that, by taking for granted a 
widespread moral motivation, Barry would end up embracing a notion o f comprehensive 
liberalism that dangerously neglects the real importance o f diverse contingent identities 
in the interpretation o f the content of international principles.120
A way out o f this difficulty, and one that I intend to explore in the following 
chapters, is to accept that individuals living in liberal countries have a duty or an interest 
in enlarging the conception o f a moral community. In this perspective, there should be a 
clear admittance that liberal states share the general intention to construct a more 
regulated and yet challenging international environment for their citizens. And therefore 
they look forward to pursue foreign policies directed to the defence o f equal freedom, 
perceived as the requisite for the empowerment of moral agents no matter where they
119This point was specifically raised by Prof. John Charvet in discussions on the topic.
120 j develop this last point more properly in chapter 5, on the characterization o f  the international system.
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live.121 This strategy would be mainly grounded on the realisation that the diffusion of 
the main elements that sustain a notion o f reasonableness can enable individuals to 
become effective and trustful interlocutors.
In this perspective, the scope of justice is neither necessarily restricted to liberal 
states nor represents the forceful co-optation o f non-liberal communities. It has a 
dynamic character so far as it represents a dialogue that is being continually constructed, 
primarily, between political communities representing individuals that share similar 
values and further on, between them and societies representing individuals who are 
subjected to a quite different kind of political and social logic but are willing to take part 
in a meaningful kind o f interaction. It involves an ongoing process o f inclusiveness 
based on how far individuals’ representatives are ready not only to agree on values and 
standards o f interaction but also to discuss from various perspectives its underlying 
function and significance.
Universality will be in this sense derived from a dialogue that though founded on 
the basic acceptance o f fundamental values such as freedom and equality among 
communities is constantly in construction, involving exchange of ideas and openness to 
accommodate difference. In this view, the specificities that offer differentiated characters 
to communities will continue to exist among countries that emphatically reject liberal 
values as well as between those endorsing them. The ones that are prepared to share 
common values sustaining individuals’ basic rights in the international context will not be 
condemned to a homogenisation process concerning their internal affairs. They will still 
have the space to discuss particular forms o f putting into practice these rights as well as 
expressing their identities.
121 Even if  Barry does not expressly endorse the view  that fundamental equality should be translated as a 
coherent foreign policy o f  liberal states, it seem s to be implicit in the acceptance o f  a transference o f  
resources between rich and poor countries based on the idea that “Equality o f  power is conducive to the 
formation and elicitation o f  moral motivation”. See Brian Barry, “Can States be Moral? International 
Morality and the Compliance Problem” in Brian Barry. Democracy. Power and Justice: Essays in Political 
Theory, page 431.
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2.4) Concluding Remarks
One o f the main merits o f universalism lies in its pursuit o f far-reaching 
internationally just principles that take into account not only individuals’ access to basic 
human rights but socio-economic factors that affect the full enjoyment o f these rights and 
make it possible for them to become functioning moral agents . Particularly, it puts into 
question the privileged access some countries have to natural resources and to the 
benefits o f an interdependent international economic structure. And it vindicates a wide 
redistribution o f resources among political communities as a way for them to properly 
perform their function in providing individuals with a suitable environment where they 
can constitute themselves as thinking autonomous entities and construct a common sense 
o f identity.
Nonetheless I think universalists such as Beitz, Pogge and Barry fail when 
underestimating the role played by the political community in the constitution o f morally 
motivated agents. They take for granted the universal rational capacities shared by 
individuals to define a functioning moral agent without paying attention to the fact that 
these capacities can only flourish through specific kinds o f interaction that take place 
inside political communities. Even in a world characterised by an ongoing process of 
interdependence, bordered political communities still constitutively influence the 
formation o f the individuals’ identity and the way they act in the public domain, being it 
at a national or at an international level. In denying this fact, it exposes the gap between 
what is ideally desirable in the construction o f just international principles and what is 
actually feasible given individuals’ dependence on historically situated social structures.
It is obvious that the assignment o f an ethically constitutive role to the 
political community still leaves open some questions. The most pressing one is to what 
extent the role performed by this community could signify an impairment o f individuals’ 
realisation o f their independent critical thinking capacities. In this respect, more has to be 
said about what kind o f links individuals’ should maintain with this community as well as 
how a universal rationality that allows individuals to critically access the links and 
commitments derived from being a member o f a society can be preserved. It is with
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these specific concerns in mind that I turn to an analysis of the communitarian and 
nationalistic claims in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3; Particularism
The particularist perspective here analysed encompasses the ensemble o f 
communitarian’ and nationalist’ claims bom as a critique of Rawls’ individualistic 
presuppositions in a Theory o f  Justice. These claims are based on a critique o f the 
methodological abstraction presupposed in the description o f the “veil o f ignorance”, by 
which the individuals are supposed to abstract from their particular social circumstances 
and differentiated skills to deliberate about principles o f justice. According to these 
critics, this kind o f abstraction in the construction o f a method is philosophically 
problematic. That is so because it underestimates the importance o f social circumstances 
in making individuals’ choices significant. It is as historically situated beings that 
individuals not only develop a perception o f themselves and the goods that are 
meaningful to their lives but also acquire essential virtues, or character dispositions, that 
allow them to be morally motivated actors, able to abide by a system o f rights.
Although the particularists’ criticisms lead to a more incisive discussion o f 
how an individual is in fact morally formed and becomes able to exercise practical 
reason, their framework o f analysis proves rather restrictive when thinking about the 
deliberation o f principles o f justice. It is my claim that the particularists mistakenly 
emphasise the idea that communal feelings and attachments, which are not necessarily 
consciously grasped, are fundamental in informing individuals’ sense o f identity and 
ways o f action in public. In doing so, they end by putting at risk individuals’ ability to 
become a full moral agent, critically capable o f understanding and assessing the role they 
are supposed to perform as agents in the construction o f moral norms.
As a consequence o f this supposition, the particularists tend to defend a merely 
formal (de facto) conception of citizenship instead o f comprehending how its exercise 
can lead individuals to develop reflective public argument in a way that takes into 
consideration the others as independent sources o f claims and at the same time as partners 
in the construction o f a common good. In this last view, a morally responsible individual 
is bom out o f conscious awareness o f the rules and their implications and not primarily 
out o f a sense o f connectedness. The constitution o f an independent thinking and yet
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engaged moral agent could help to pave the way to a new understanding o f a process of 
deliberation o f just principles at the international level, one that is less circumscribed to 
the arbitrary needs o f a particular community and more centred in individuals’ integrity 
and further development as a moral agent who is intrinsically able to exercise his abilities 
beyond the limits of a bordered political community.
The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section presents my 
general criticism o f the particularists’ supposition that a strong feeling o f belonging, 
even at the expense o f reflection, is a necessary element in the formation o f an active 
moral agent and the maintenance o f a stable and just system o f rights. And it ends by 
succinctly showing the implications o f this view to the understanding o f the international 
deliberation o f internationally just principles. The second and third parts illustrate my 
arguments against the particularist views. The second part analyses the works of 
communitarians such as MacIntyre and Walzer, which stress the social aspect of 
individuals’ use of practical reasoning. While MacIntyre defends a more general and 
historic-tradition concept o f practical reasoning, Walzer by concentrating on how social 
interactions determine the nature of the good reveals the influence of a socially 
determined use o f practical reasoning in the definition o f justice. 122 jh e  third analyses 
the claims o f nationalists such as Miller and Tamir. Their works represent a 
philosophical attempt to defend nationalism as one o f the main definers o f a moral 
agent’s identity and the factor sustaining political allegiances. Although Tamir tends to 
overemphasise consciousness in the formation o f a nation, they both tend to agree that a 
national identity is the most efficient source o f trust and loyalty necessary to 
substantiate, by offering moral motivation, a just social system.
3.1) Critical Issues in the Particularist Argument
For the particularists, the individual has to be understood primarily in his 
social dimension. He gets to know himself and develop his capacities for making
122 For a full explanation o f  why both MacIntyre and Walzer can be considered o f  the same theoretical 
family, see S. Mulhall & A, Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, pp. 161-162.
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valuable choices in connection with the feelings of belonging developed as member o f a 
historically situated society. The perception he has o f himself is very much dependent on 
the sentiment o f loyalty and trust that he shares with his compatriots. And the capacity to 
choose the course o f his life -  such as career, family organisation and lifestyle -  is highly 
influenced by the kind o f social values and roles that are asserted when being part of this 
specific social environment. It is as being part o f this social context that he exercises 
practical reasoning, leading to the construction of a system o f rights (the regulation of 
individuals’ liberties). It is also in this condition that he strengthens his dispositions of 
character (civic virtues) and become a morally motivated agent, acting out o f respect to 
the law and bearing the consequences o f his actions.
There are nonetheless implicit limits in the development o f particularists’ 
arguments. For them, the individual develops his capacity o f critical thinking under the 
auspices o f a social environment that helps shape his identity (preferences, skills, social 
roles) and the way he acts. And this social environment guarantees its existence mainly 
through the formation o f a sense o f connection among individuals that is much founded 
on the subjective interpretation o f reality. Social cohesion is here based on a blurred 
picture o f reality. The existence o f mechanisms provided to guarantee public discussion 
in the way to the formation of a social imaginaire avoiding any abuse in its manipulation 
has an intrinsic limit. It cannot offer incentives to individuals’ exercise o f their 
autonomous capacity o f thinking since they can risk the sentiment o f belonging that 
founds the social tissue and guarantees individuals’ allegiance.
In this sense, individuals’ identity tends to be in many ways defined away from 
their own conscious effort to grasp the very components that form it. The awareness of 
their personality and the relation it has with a social environment is truncated. There is a 
clear limit to the possibility o f distancing themselves from the particular roles they are 
supposed to perform in a society and the attachments that shape membership in this 
society so as to understand and evaluate them. And this limitation is not related purely to 
the historically situated condition o f man but to the basis upon which this socio-political 
order is supposed to rest.
The overall particularist understanding o f individuals’ formation of a common 
identity influences the way it perceives the political community and the role it should
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play in the moral development o f individuals. Communitarians and nationalists are 
against the neutrality o f the state defended by liberals. 123 The state is not neutral in the 
managing o f individuals’ pursuit o f their differentiated goods, as defended by liberals. It 
represents the greatest social good, communal life understood in its inclusive form as an 
essential ingredient o f the good life. In this version, it is up to the state to maintain the 
strong social attachments that define membership and secure its legitimacy.
While individuals’ sense o f identity and ways o f behaving are primarily 
developed in civil society, in the different relations and attachments that are formed 
through their participation in a variety o f groups o f civil society, the public sphere 
represents the arena in which these different interests and group attachments come to be 
formally represented and accommodated to maintain social cohesion. It is where I enjoy 
my citizenship rights, regarded here much more as a formal concept (to be equally 
represented) than a moral stage in individuals’ development. Political participation is 
backed by the chains o f social attachments that are formed so far as I grow up and can be 
appealed to in the name o f social cohesion. It does not necessarily demand from 
individuals an autonomous effort to reciprocate actions under conditions o f equality and 
to critically regard themselves as part o f a whole that helps shape a common identity. 
That is so because such an autonomous effort is weakened by the sense of belonging 
developed in the civil society and reinforced in a discretionary way by public institutions. 
In this condition, my moral responsibilities are much more felt than backed by 
convincing reasons.
It is clear that this perception of the relation between the polity and its members 
has a limiting impact on the understanding o f the international system and the process o f 
deliberation o f just principles among its members. As the main definers o f common 
identities, the political communities are to be seen as the prime actors o f the international 
system, and as giving priority to their interests in the preservation o f the elements that 
sustain social cohesiveness. While not denying their compatriots the possibility o f 
establishing meaningful relations with a distant other, the political community can 
nonetheless severely restrain such relations appealing to the subjective sense of belonging 
that primarily shapes their personalities and help to define political allegiances.
123 On a more detailed discussion about state neutrality, Ibid.
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At the level of a deliberation process o f just principles, the political community’s 
priorities will be felt in the way it rejects the understanding o f this process as an 
opportunity for individuals to further exercise their moral abilities by independently and 
critically assessing with the help o f distant others different interpretations of the good 
life. Political community will tend to agree on a thin version o f international principles 
(minimum rules o f co-existence), which mostly privileges a strict view o f the self- 
determination principles over the reinforcement o f clear international human rights 
principles that care for the integrity o f a moral agent no matter where he lives.
3.2) Communitarian Thought in the Works of MacIntyre and Walzer
In general terms, communitarians such as MacIntyre and Walzer share the belief 
that the individual is only able to develop and exercise his capacity for practical 
reasoning in society. It is as a member o f a historically situated community that 
individuals become able to apply reasoning so as to define their personal choices and the 
roles they are supposed to perform in the building up of a system o f rights. Moreover, it 
is the sense o f belonging gradually inculcated in the individual in this process of 
socialization that will offer meaning to the choices made and roles performed by him. 
Given this overall perception, the deliberation of just principles that offer form and 
content to the system o f rights will be to a great extent influenced by the very same 
values that are characteristic of the social dynamic individuals are subjected to.
MacIntyre directs its criticism mainly against the liberal conception o f the self. 
Persons must be regarded as partly constituted by their membership in a tradition, a 
specific grand historical and social narrative about how to live a good life, which is 
articulated with the help o f cultural and linguistic elements. It is in relation to this 
tradition that individuals make rational decisions about how to pursue the good, learn to
evaluate and criticise this pursuit and to interpret the good in question J  24 Therefore, 
individuals’ sense o f identity and integrity is constructed primarily through their 
engagement in a tradition.
124 Ibid.. pp. 90-91.
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As each tradition is defined by MacIntyre as a narrative among individuals living 
in a historically situated context, there is not one rationality but many, depending on how 
many traditions are available in the world. And the disagreements that appear in each 
and every culture reflect individuals’ ultimately arbitrary differences in preferences and 
feelings as well as their particular attempts to influence one another whatever the
means. 125
Following this argumentation, moral philosophy tends also to reflect the 
disagreements o f a culture. According to the author, the incommensurable nature of the 
philosophers’ premises turns moral philosophy into an endless attempt to alter the 
preferences o f one another under the veil o f impartiality. Past efforts made to reverse this 
tendency, by offering a rational justification to moral rules and norms, have failed. The 
Enlightenment project exposed the impossibility o f appealing to absolute forms of 
reasoning on moral issues that abstract from historical contexts, determining the final fate 
o f both moral philosophy and government. Moral philosophy becomes a tool to impose 
liberal preferences under the pretension o f rational thought, while the government 
becomes an instrument to impose a set o f rules through a bureaucratic unity on a society 
that lacks consensus. 126
What is striking in MacIntyre’s argumentation is the intrinsic limitation oh 
individuals’ autonomous thinking supposed by the conception o f an emotivist self and its 
relation with a tradition. My particular choices are the reflection o f an ultimately
arbitrary will, which are open to manipulation in the social relations I take part in. ^27 
What gives some homogeneity and direction to this particular will and the other ones that 
I relate to are the mechanisms envisaged in the construction o f a tradition’s narrative that 
makes me feel part o f a specific community sharing language, cultural traits and history. 
It comes with the centralisation function assumed by the state as well as the theoretical 
explanations proposed by philosophers that reflect the spirit o f a tradition. In both cases, 
the biased control o f subjective elements involved in the construction o f such a tradition 
can be seen as constitutive o f their function, a valid form in obtaining social cohesion.
125 Alasdair Macintyre, W hose Justice? Which Rationality? (London. Duckworth, 1988), pp. 1-12.
126 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (London, Duckworth, 1985), pp. 6-36.
127 For MacIntyre, the social content o f  emotivism entails in fact “the obliteration o f  any genuine 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations”. Ibid.. p. 23.
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Such an argumentation assumes that the feelings giving unity to the tradition can 
occupy the space left empty by the incongruities of an emotivist self. Coherence, * 
stability and meaningful purpose in individuals’ lives and the relations they establish can 
be attained by a sense o f belonging developed in the build up o f a common historical and 
cultural narrative. But the point is that in the construction o f such a narrative the 
individual’s capacity for distancing himself and critically assessing the elements that 
define it is necessarily restricted in the name o f social cohesion. Individuals have to see 
themselves much more as part o f a tradition, with the performance o f social roles that 
cannot be easily contested, than as someone who is consciously aware o f his identity and 
how his participation in the construction o f a common narrative affects this identity.
MacIntyre’s thought on the construction o f a moral agent illustrates the point. For 
him, morality is related to the social roles individuals are supposed to perform inside a 
tradition. Though not defining ultimate moral conduct, social roles demand from their 
performers a certain attitude towards life, which serves to put pressure on their behaviour 
and to provide a culture with moral definitions by means o f exam ples.!28 According to 
this understanding, moral conduct is much more dependent on the following o f examples, 
o f what is already established as part of a role, than the individuals’ conscious effort to 
relate to each other as autonomous sources of equally valid claims in the construction of a 
system o f rights.
Moral learning is therefore mostly defined socially. Though the exercise of 
citizenship is considered in the construction o f a moral agent in MacIntyre’s scheme, 
individuals’ attitudes towards the public are more linked to the kind o f values inculcated 
in them when they grow up. The public roles individuals assume are largely interpreted 
as an extension o f their private inclinations and vice-versa. 129 j ^ q tension between 
being an individual with private concerns and someone who exercises a public role is 
here suppressed.
In my view, the suppression o f the tension between private and public spheres is 
done to the detriment of the individual. The tension, rather than being an inconvenience
128Ib id ..p.31.
129 The Aristotelian ideal o f  society defended by MacIntyre seem s to imply such a straight connection 
between individuals’ private and public spheres o f  concern. See Ibid.. pp. 256-264. See also S. Mulhall &
A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 81.
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in the formation o f a moral agent, can be regarded as individuals’ opportunity to develop 
independent thinking, leading them naturally to question the elements involved in the 
construction o f a common identity as well as the importance o f  their participation in the 
definition o f a social order.
MacIntyre’s understanding o f the formation of a moral agent has a direct impact 
on the way he comprehends the international system and its dynamics. If the plurality of 
traditions implies a plurality o f practical-rationalities and justices, to get to know the
distant other is only possible s u p e r f i c i a l l y .  130 Individuals’ interactions could be marked 
by tolerance of the different backgrounds they inherit. It could even lead to the eventual 
exchange o f determinate experiences but it would hardly represent an exchange of 
independent viewpoints aiming at the understanding o f the values inherent in the 
demands o f their social roles. To do so, it would have to imply that I grow up in more 
than one tradition. Alternatively, it would have to imply that individuals can distance 
themselves from their own tradition, even if temporarily and partially, to really become 
open to others’ claims. While the first option can be thinkable in MacIntyre’s scheme, 
eventually opening the way to the possibility of independent thinking, the last one hardly 
constitutes an alternative at all.
Given the perception that a moral agent’s capacity o f independent critical thinking 
and o f open interactions with outsiders is constrained by his immersion in a tradition, the 
emergence o f a genuinely universal order is unlikely. As MacIntyre emphasises, it is 
relegated to become “a philosopher’s project”, based on the false belief that all can be 
potentially translucent to understanding. The only kind of long term agreement that can 
actually be established among the representatives of individuals (political communities) 
in the process o f international deliberation is the one that guarantees the existence o f a 
plurality o f traditions and defines minimum rules o f coexistence. These rules are, even 
according to MacIntyre, considered far too thin and meagre to supply what is needed to
secure individuals’ integrity. 131
In contrast to MacIntyre, Walzer concentrates his analysis on the perception o f the 
good in order to criticise liberals’ individualistic approach and define his communitarian
130 Alasdair Macintyre, W hose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 346.
131 Ibid.. p.334.
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“pedigree” . His maxim is that distributive justice principles are good-specific. And 
good-specific principles must be culture-specific. In other words, the objects of justice 
are goods that have different social meanings and values, depending on the cultural and 
historical environment in which they were generated. And since the goods are mostly 
defined through social processes, they should be distributed for different reasons, much in
accordance with what different kinds o f people perceive to be their need. 132 This maxim 
rests on the assumption that the most important social good, one that directs and informs 
other ones, is individuals’ membership in a community o f character. A community of 
character is the one marked by a cultural distinctiveness that people attach an intrinsic 
value to. It can also be understood as a national “family” when compared with other
forms o f association. 133
The emphasis on membership o f a community o f character, which is the political 
expression o f a common life and a national “family” united by feelings o f relatedness and 
mutuality, seems to open the way to social determinism. If individuals’ autonomy is the 
basis o f the constitution o f conscious moral agents, will it not be jeopardised by the role 
exercised by community in shaping individuals’ perception o f values and choices? In 
principle, Walzer refutes such a hypothesis by discussing the role o f social criticism - 
expressed in his conception o f philosophy, and through the mechanisms able to canalize 
such criticism in the making o f a political community -linked to the plurality o f groups in 
civil society and individuals’ exercise of citizenship.
For Walzer, philosophy serves as an instrument to articulate the elements that 
give meaning to a community of character. No matter how far the philosopher 
establishes links with the outside, it is basically an exercise inside a culture. The subject 
o f work is the co-ordination o f the different viewpoints forming part o f a historically 
situated community and the production o f a unity to them. As it involves an internal 
analysis, it is more than just a philosopher’s affair. It is also indirectly an analytical
132 The argument leads to the notion o f  complex equality, different distributional spheres for different 
kinds o f  goods. See Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A D efense o f  Pluralism and Equality (United 
States o f  America, Basic B ooks, 1983), pp. 6-10.
133 Ibid.. Chapter on Membership, p. 42. See also Mulhall who describes W alzer’s notion o f  membership 
as a repository o f  values. S. Mulhall & A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 123.
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exercise taken by persons who, in the daily exercise o f their professions, feel the need to 
reflect and engage in conversation with others about the meaning o f the good life. 134 
What is important to underline in Walzer’s perception o f social criticism is the way it 
is based mainly on internal arguments defined in subjective terms. According to him:
[...soc ia l criticism is less the practical offspring o f  scientific knowledge than the educated cousin  
o f  comm on complaint. W e become critics naturally, as it were, by elaborating on existing moralities and
telling stories about a society more just than, though never entirely different from, our o w n . ]  ^ 5
In these terms, a critical appraisal o f a subject is defined by individuals, who having a 
sense o f relatedness, tell stories to each other about their different perceptions o f reality. 
Therefore, there is no impartial standpoint as there is no way to define the definite or best 
story. Social meaning is loose and interminably subject to interpretation.
Given the plurality and subjectivity of interpretations, it could be said that a long 
lasting consensus for Walzer is dependent on relatedness and the feeling of connection 
that is present among the members o f the society. In this case, individuals’ ability to 
exercise critical thinking is implicitly restrained. The individual’s analysis o f what gives 
social meaning to a common good and offers him some value in the construction o f  his 
personality presupposes, at the end o f the day, an existing strong sense o f belonging to a 
group. This sense o f belonging tends, as in MacIntyre’s analysis, to be much more 
related to the historically consolidated sum of common intepretations of realities than to 
the conscious effort to understand what is involved in the making o f a common identity.
In an attempt to downplay the implications o f assuming relatedness as the basis 
for individuals’ actions, which involves the possibility o f the distorted use o f such a sense 
o f belonging by the community’s representatives, Walzer discusses in a later work 
mechanisms able to guarantee individuals’ sphere o f autonomy. The right of individuals 
to join voluntary associations (institutions o f civil society) and exercise citizenship 
(political participation) is seen by him as forms for maintaining the focus of toleration in 
the individuals and not in any arbitrary power o f a group.136 As participants in voluntary 
associations, they are able to choose with whom they mostly want to identify and to
134 M ichael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (London, Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 35- 
40.
135 Ibjd., 1987, p. 65.
136 M ichael Walzer, On Toleration. (United States o f  America, Y ale University Press, 1997), pp. 24-26.
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develop a close relationship. As citizen, they have the opportunity to relate to each other 
autonomously and on equal terms.
In my understanding, this attempt is doomed to fail given the fact that both 
mechanisms are still conceived on the basis of a very constrained possibility of 
individuals’ self-acknowledgement. Though it presupposes the plurality o f viewpoints, 
yet the element that gives direction to individuals’ participation in civil and political 
institutions is still an ill-defined sense o f belonging. Acting either as a member o f a 
religious group or as a citizen, it seems that I am still primarily guided by the subjective 
links established with the members o f the national family I am part of. And individuals’ 
consciousness o f the elements forming this sense o f belonging is not a pre-requisite to 
participation in both these groups.
Such a dispensable character of consciousness in the exercise o f citizenship is 
particularly problematic when analysing the effect on morality. I here come back to the 
point I made about MacIntyre’s work. My participation in an exercise o f reciprocating 
actions and in the construction o f a whole is done without a clear understanding of what 
is really at stake. I take decisions and reciprocate actions not necessarily because I can 
clearly take the other as an end and identify with him but because I am used to seeing him 
in a specific form, as a member o f a national family.
In terms o f moral learning, I am not necessarily taking the other as an independent 
being who needs to have his integrity respected so as to become a competent interlocutor. 
I see the other as someone who I care for. In this context, my moral obligations are not to 
be founded on the objective appraisal o f individuals’ need but on the sentimental links 
that found our relationship.
As in MacIntyre’s case, the implications o f Walzer’s scheme to the understanding 
o f an international deliberation process ends up as a mere reflection o f the central role 
played by community in the construction of a common identity rather than being an 
exploration o f its dynamic role in individuals’ moral learning. He defends the plurality of 
communities, as they are all equally producers of culture. And he also offers the 
individuals an international dimension in the sense that they can extract some learning 
from contact with these different cultures. But there is a limit to the relationship between 
compatriots and non-compatriots. Individuals are essentially autonomous beings within
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the auspices o f a historically situated community, membership in these communities 
being the principal social good that these individuals are attached to. Contact with the 
external world will always be significantly constrained by such a perception o f the 
primordial value o f communal attachments.
In these terms, international agreements can only be conceived on a thin version 
o f principles, described as a moral minimum. This minimum is understood in terms o f 
common principles and rules that are similar to various systems o f rights though 
representing expressions of different views about the world. 137 it should lead to a 
certain degree o f solidarity among the parties since the notion o f individuals’ 
fundamental need is acknowledged as part o f this minimum, such as in the case o f 
refugees. But it would far from express a full universal doctrine. 138 The discretionary 
power o f  communities should be maintained for the sake o f the national character that 
determines the distinctiveness of a culture. Therefore the right to analyse and create 
restrictions to minimise the impact o f an international agreement on a culture remains a 
feature o f a community’s self-determination. 139
3.3) Nationalism according to Miller and Tamir
In contrast to the communitarians, nationalists such as Miller and Tamir make a 
stronger claim about the source o f trust and loyalty necessary to substantiate a just social 
system. Both authors search for a philosophical defence o f nationality, seen as the 
founding element o f an ethical community. They ground their philosophical defence on a 
criticism o f the abstract and unrealistic account o f individuals and moral motivation 
found in studies about justice in contemporary thought. National identities have to be 
acknowledged as the most efficient source of solidarity that helps solidifying 
redistributive regimes. By being bom inside a national community and assuming 
different social roles, individuals develop special links to their compatriots that are
137 M ichael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (London, University o f  Notre 
Dame Press, 1994), p. 17.
138 Ibid.. p. 07 and p. 11.
139 M ichael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A D efense o f  Pluralism and Equality, p. 51.
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constitutive o f their moral agency, such as reciprocity, loyalty and care, thereby learning 
to respect the rights and duties they primarily hold towards each other.
For Miller, nationality involves five dimensions. 140 first, it is based on the 
belief that a group of individuals belongs together and intends to stay together (reciprocal 
commitments). Second, it implies historical continuity. It means that individuals are able 
to identify with past events and heroes that helped in constructing the nation. Such 
identification makes the community something that not only stretches back and forward 
across generations but also cannot be renounced by present generations. Third, 
nationality involves an active dimension, meaning that individuals do want to do things 
together. They have a pre-disposition to engage in social life, making collective 
decisions and holding responsibility for these decisions. Fourth, national communities 
should, in ideal terms, be identified with political communities that aspire to have a
legitimate authority over individuals living in a limited territory.141 The political 
community serves here to formalise social attachments, individuals’ desire to live 
together, to co-operate and take responsibility for their actions. In other words, Miller is 
admitting that the effectiveness of solidarity links partially depends on the existence o f an 
authority over individuals living in a limited space. But also the fact that the public 
sphere serves to give a framework to their social attachments, bestows on them a sense of
articulation and unity. 142 Political community reflects in a broader way the cultural and 
social ideals that are shared by individuals in a context. Fifth, nationality is marked by a 
distinct public culture. This culture expresses how a group o f people conducts life 
together and offers them uniqueness. In this sense, it involves political principles, social 
norms and cultural ideals that range, for example, from religious beliefs to the defence of 
the purity o f language. 143
In my view, the subjective dimension o f nationality paves the way to the proper 
understanding o f how individuals can exercise critical thinking in Miller’s scheme. The
140 See David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter on National 
Identity.
141 See Ib id , p. 24.
142 This comm ent seem s to depend on the assumption that, in practical terms, individuals are them selves 
limited beings. They better identify with others i f  their spectrum o f  relations can be seen as limited or 
bounded by som ething.
143 Ibid.. page 26.
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first dimension, involving shared beliefs, raises a well-pointed objection in the literature. 
In order to become members o f a community, individuals have to share common values 
and learn to respect common rules and authority. The stress on heroes and the common 
interpretation of past events in the construction of these common values can nonetheless 
have disturbing consequences for moral agency. The notion o f belonging will be here 
based on true beliefs, facts that actually happened, as well as on false ones, imaginary 
events and personages constructed in a selective way so as to create a collective 
m e m o r y .  ^44 Given these mixed beliefs and the fact that the driving force o f common life 
becomes sentimental attachments constructed on the basis o f biased interpretations of 
reality, the appraisal o f individual’s notion of belonging and how it affects our 
relationship with others could become not only difficult but also unproductive. The risk 
o f falling into a subjectivist position will be very great.
The second dimension, the extension o f shared beliefs over history (historical 
continuity) also brings some latent problems to Miller’s scheme. By emphasising this 
component o f nationality, Miller makes unlikely the idea that ethical communities are 
open to change as well as to the reception o f broad forms o f criticism arising from the 
interactions established with outsiders. Individuals who do not share our history are not 
necessarily assimilated in our community. This poor notion o f individuals’ interactions 
has certainly a disturbing effect on individuals’ construction and critical assessment of 
their identity.
The author defends himself from the above accusations by suggesting in the 
presentation o f the third and fifth dimensions o f nationality that the beliefs can always be 
critically assessed in potential terms. The values and principles grounding the public 
culture can always be assessed by the various sub-cultures forming the society. And to 
prove that public culture is not an all embracing concept, Miller even envisages 
mechanisms to guarantee individuals’ fundamental rights and to permit change. In these 
terms, individuals’ freedom of conscience and expression should be protected as a form
of preserving individuals’ capacity for developing critical thinking J  45 Moreover, the
144 Concerning this subject, see the discussion in the last chapter ( “ Memory and Forgetting”) o f  B. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, Verso, 1991).
145 David Miller, On Nationality, page 123.
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right o f refugees should be acknowledged as a form o f exploring different interpretations 
o f national identity. There is here an admission that national identity does not depend 
exclusively on individuals’ deference to established institutions or myths that sustain it. 
All that is needed is to ask o f immigrants that they have “a willingness to accept current 
political structures and to engage in dialogue with the host community so that a new 
common identity can be f o r g e d . ”  146
I think Miller’s defence does not however supplant the vagueness present in the 
construction o f a national character. As he admits, nationality should involve more than 
just de facto  citizenship. It trespasses on ethnic concerns and cultural issues that are not 
clearly or formally defined. 147 While it expresses the uniqueness o f a society, the 
concept does not incorporate sufficiently objective elements for us to apprehend its 
significance. To some extent, its broad and indeterminate character is intentional. It 
offers a blurred picture o f reality, one that is flexible enough to facilitate social cohesion 
while rendering more difficult individuals’ conscious political participation.
The admission o f cultural pluralism in the process o f constructing this public 
culture far from diminishing the problem of conscious political participation in Miller’s 
scheme by offering a plurality o f viewpoints, adds to its unarticulated character. The 
participation o f different groups in the political sphere is not clearly defined. There is no 
way o f assessing what a cultural group means as well as how one group’s demands can 
prevail over another. The lack of criterion defining groups and the kind of relationship 
essential among them means that there is a real possibility that individuals’ demands be 
lost or unconsidered in the construction of a common culture.
In my understanding, the efficiency o f a public debate in the construction o f a 
common culture much depends on the political environment’s capacity for offering 
incentives to its members to exercise critical thinking while making available 
mechanisms to absorb these criticisms. The general and subjective character of the 
public culture defended by Miller would nonetheless make difficult the existence o f
146 Ibid.. page 130. Sentence underlined by me.
147 For Miller, it is “almost inevitable that there will be areas in which nationality does  trespass on ethnicity 
and the fostering o f  national identity w ill require the curtailment o f  certain aspects o f  ethnic identity in the 
interests o f  creating and maintaining a common public culture. The extent o f  the trespass will depend on 
the particular national identity in question.” David Miller, “The Ethical Significance o f  Nationality” in 
Ethics. 98, July 1988, page 657.
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effective institutions and practices that help individuals to articulate and conduct 
autonomous forms o f criticism. That happens because nationalists have, in a much 
stronger way than the communitarians, to ground the existence o f a public culture 
ultimately on what Callan describes as a civic sentimental education, responsible for the 
construction o f politicised fictions of the moral purity o f a nation that simplify reality and
make the choices less difficult. 148 gy  doing that they are able to manage the elements 
in the construction o f a common identity and to secure social cohesion. But at the same 
time, they make unlikely individuals’ clear understanding and assessment o f the choices 
available to them in the process o f deliberation as well as the kind o f values that permeate 
social institutions and yet influence their lives.
Miller’s form o f understanding the construction o f a public culture has an 
immense impact on moral issues. Individuals’ moral obligations to each other would 
again tend to be strongly felt but not clearly comprehended since they are based on the 
vague and yet all-encompassing notion o f preservation o f a national identity. A clear 
standard to assess a claim-right, derived from individuals’ effort to establish a 
relationship o f reciprocity on the basis o f equally valid autonomous claims, would be 
missing. Moreover, individuals’ ability to be motivated, to act responsibly, to promote 
the common good (civic virtues) would tend to be exercised in a passive manner, not 
necessarily derived from a process o f reflection that would culminate in a conception o f 
the common good as in congruence with their own specific interests.
The impact o f Miller’s scheme on the perception o f an international system and 
its process o f deliberation can prove disturbing. The national approach seems to offer 
few elements to sustain the idea that individuals while forming part of specific
148 According to Callan, “in order to insulate politicised fictions o f  moral purity from ready falsification, 
the historical imagination must be truncated in ways that blind us to the possible values that were rejected 
in the choices not taken, and this w ill tend to blind us to the contemporary relevance o f  those same values. 
This is a liability that sentimental civic education must incur, irrespective o f  the particular values it is made 
to subserve.
Second, the simplification o f  reality necessary to fictions o f  moral purity w ill remain precarious at 
best unless judgm ents that relate even indirectly to the object o f  emotion undergo a supportive 
sim plification...
Third, sentimental civil education w ill tend to be conservative in a sense that even conservatives 
should find troubling. The fiction o f  moral purity is eroded so far as w e acknowledge any defect in the 
political accomplishment or at least the political vision, o f  those who belong in the pantheon, and so to 
resist erosion it becom es necessary to deny or palliate any defect.” In Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: 
Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 107-108).
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communities can effectively enlarge their present sense o f identity or construct new ones 
towards outsiders. Its theoretical framework tends to defend a notion of community that 
has the potentiality to be quite closed, insisting on the prominence o f national 
identification and offering unclear internal mechanisms by which the individual can think 
critically about his social attachments and forge meaningful links to outsiders.
As a consequence, the discussion on international justice will tend to be mainly 
guided by the simple dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals, failing to explore 
the richness o f elements existing in the relationship between them and how it can 
contribute to their moral development. An illustration is Miller’s understanding of the 
process o f deliberation o f just principles, particularly the unsolved balance between a 
community’s self-determination (principles defining the relation among nations) and the 
defence o f basic human rights (principles that secure the relation between human beings 
in general). Self-determination is defended as the general principle o f international 
justice since it represents the best political condition for securing national identities. So 
far as possible the boundaries o f nations and states should coincide because:
[Where a nation is politically autonomous, it is able to implement a schem e o f  social 
justice; it can protect and foster its common culture; and its members are to a greater or lesser 
extent able collectively to determine its common destiny. Where the citizens o f  a state are also 
compatriots, the mutual trust that this engenders makes it more likely that they w ill be able to 
solve collective action problems, to support redistributive principles o f  justice, and to practise
deliberative forms o f  d e m o c r a c y . ]  149
Following this principle, the relation between nation-states should be based on non­
interference (states should abstain from harming and exploiting other states as well as 
comply with international treaties) and aid (reciprocity and ensuring a fair distribution o f 
resources among political communities).
The emphasis on self-determination leads to a set o f questions related to the 
moral standing o f individuals living in other societies. For example, to what extent 
should they be treated merely as the nationals of another political community or as 
human beings who should equally be regarded as ends themselves? Although Miller 
grounds his interpretation o f basic human rights in “the feeling of sympathy” that 
individuals have towards the great suffering o f others, he does not clarify to what extent 
this feeling implies a defence of a common moral standing o f individuals living in
149 David Miller, On Nationality, page 98.
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different societies. As each society develops its own notion o f need, based on a particular 
context, any agreement on a list o f basic human rights, which distances itself from the 
fundamental level (starvation), could be regarded as biased and, in a more radical sense, 
as an instrument o f domination. Even if an agreement could be reached among societies 
sharing similar values regarding the fundamental needs o f a person for the enjoyment of a 
meaningful life, there is no guarantee that it will be implemented or become effective
beyond national borders. 150 Giving our attachments to compatriots and their impact on a 
re-distributive regime, human rights should be first defended at home and then abroad. 
Moreover, any attempt to apply the principle o f basic human rights abroad should be 
weighted against what specific communities understand to be their social priorities. 151
Given the above considerations, what is left to non-compatriots? Despite his 
reference to the relief o f starvation, Miller does not present a clear criterion to define 
what should be regarded as priorities among individuals living in different communities 
and to what extent these priorities can justifiably trump the obligations compatriots have 
towards their fellows. The relations towards less fortunate foreigners seem to be defined 
by the treaties already signed by the states (state-state relation) or by occasional unilateral 
acts.
Miller’s insistence on the dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals as the 
basis o f reflection about international principles is also to be found in his recent 
discussion about transnational citizenship. According to him, bounded citizenship, 
understood in congruence with national character, should be preferred as the form for 
individuals to develop their capacity to reciprocate commitments and form communal ties 
-  trustful relationships, which are a necessary condition to the existence o f a stable 
system o f rights and duties. It is only when exercising civic virtue nationally that
150 Human rights is here understood in a positive sense, including for example access to basic resources to 
pursue any set o f  aims, obligation to ensure that food, medical aid and so forth are available, as well as in a 
negative way, not to treat people in certain ways. See David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity 
(Oxford, Polity Press, 2000), p. 174.
151 I have still to develop the arguments linking nationality to human rights. This last paragraph is only 
indicative o f  how I w ill deal with the subject. M iller’s understanding o f  the obligations nationals have 
towards foreigners as benevolent treatment is implicit in David Miller, On Nationality., chapter 3 and 
David Miller, “The Limits o f  Cosmopolitan Justice” in David Mapel & Terry Nardin, International Society  
D iverse Ethical Perspectives.
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individuals become able to discuss meaningful relationships to outsiders, opening the 
way to the possibility o f transnational citizenship. As Miller says:
[The main point is that such possibilities for transnational citizenship as may exist depend upon 
first strengthening citizenship and inculcating civic virtue within national boundaries, and then hoping that
these qualities may carry across to wider constituencies.] ^
However promising, Miller’s arguments constitute an intrinsic limitation, derived 
from the link established between citizenship and civic virtue, for understanding and 
enlarging individuals’ level of moral obligation. For him, civic virtue is not devoid o f the 
subjective and ethnic considerations that impair individuals’ proper exercise of their 
autonomy, including their ability to enrich their sense of identity and to acquire extensive 
civic self-knowledge. Consequently, the qualities and values that individuals may try to 
stress in their relations towards non-compatriots will not necessarily be the same as the 
ones reinforced at home. Tolerance, for example, will not necessarily be derived from 
this environment and translated to an international scenario. In fact, the opposite attitude 
is more likely to emerge, in detriment o f the enhancement o f international relations. The 
other problem is the passive attitude assumed by this kind o f statement. There seems to 
be no intention o f treating the international scenario, including in this case treaties, 
conventions and organizations, as another arena where new forms o f individuals’ 
expression of their identity are systematically explored and given voice in order to serve 
as a counter-point to the national dimension. Rather than a dimension to be explored, the 
international level o f moral obligations is something to be seen as merely derivative of 
the demands o f a national community - reinforcing a non-compromising attitude towards 
non-compatriots.
Like Miller, Tamir sees as necessary and possible a philosophical defence o f 
nationalism in liberal states, one that is based on a normative claim about the plurality of 
nations and includes a set o f prescriptive claims related to the means necessary to secure 
a national world order as well as the welfare o f each particular nation. It is however 
doubtful whether she can be more successful than Miller in constructing a philosophical 
defence o f nationalism, one that reaffirms the significance o f a national consciousness
152 David M iller, Citizenship and National Identity, page 95.
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while offering the individuals a background for meaningful choices and social evaluation 
that does not put at risk their autonom y.153
Tamir is primarily concerned with the malaise of our time, “the atomism, 
neurosis, and alienation that inflict liberal states and may leave them defenseless”. For 
her, equality and freedom are too thin concepts to offer individuals a sense o f common 
purpose and commitment. She searches for a new meaning to social contract, not 
regarded anymore just as a means to protect individual interests but also as a means to 
meet the need for roots, for stability, for a place in a continuum that links the past with 
the future.154 The remedy is presented in the form o f nationalism, seen as tool the state 
can use to restructure the political community, offering the citizens a stable and 
continuous national identity. It is through this national identity that individuals build up 
their self-esteem and give significance to their actions, learning to identify themselves 
with the needs and values o f the nation.155
But the force o f Tamir’s argument depends on how accurately nationality can be 
defined in the construction o f individuals’ personalities and hence related to the 
functioning o f a liberal public domain. In other words, it depends on to what extent the 
existence o f a national culture constricts the individuals’ autonomous exercise o f their 
critical capacities, affecting their conscious enjoyment of their right to citizenship as well 
as their conscious perception o f moral obligations.
153 Many normative claims based on the instrumentality o f  nations to individuals’ development can be 
thought about according to Tamir. For example, membership in a national community can offer a 
backgroung for strong evaluation and choice, self-developm ent and self-expression and most importantly, 
self-esteem . It can also lead to a better understanding and cooperation among members, strenghtening their 
sense o f  mutual responsibilities over generations. I will be touching on all these issues when discussing  
Tamir’s framework. Yael Tamir, “Theoretical D ifficulties in the Study o f  Nationalim ” in Rethinking 
Nationalism  (Calgary, Canada, University o f  Calgary Press, 1998), p. 86.
^ E x p l a i n i n g  the usefulness o f  nationalism, Tamir says: “But why should the insertion o f  nationalistic 
ideals and im ages influence the citizens’ preferences and choices? The answer has to do with the ability o f  
the nationalist way o f  thinking to transform the self-im age o f  individuals by portraying their personal 
welfare as closely  tied to its ability to contextualize human actions, making them part o f  a continuous 
creative effort whereby the national community is made and remade. By so doing, nationalism imparts 
special significance to even the most mundane actions and endows individuals lives with meaning. It is in 
this sense that nationalism bestows extra merit on social, cultural, or political acts and provides individuals 
with additional channels for self-fulfillm ent that make their lives more rewarding “ Yael Tamir, “Pro Patria 
Mori! Death and the State” in R. McKim & J. McMahan. The Morality o f  Nationalism  (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 232.
155 Yael Tamir., Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), p.85.
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The author admits that the defence o f nationality involves an unclear balance 
between objective and subjective elements. To be a national is to share a national 
consciousness. On one hand, it involves features such as to live in a demarcated territory 
as well as ethnic characteristics in some cases. On the other hand, it encompasses, as the 
author describes, “a self-awareness o f distinctiveness” . Individuals feel they want to 
belong together, sharing conciliatory aims and feelings with one another. They want to 
be part o f a distinct culture, which gives them a unique identity. And for that, they are 
supposed not only to express their objective will to validate the arrangement but also to 
participate in the creation and maintenance o f myths, ideals and symbols that sustain 
common beliefs and the common desire to be part of a nation. Given such a voluntary 
character, it is almost impossible to distinguish between nations and other cultural 
groups. As Tamir admits, if one group that shares some national characteristics defines 
itself as a nation, it “ought” to be seen as one.156
A fundamental question remains, however, to be answered. What is precisely the 
space for critical thinking in this scheme? Though the individual perceives that his life 
becomes more meaningful in community, gradually learning to take some pleasure and 
pride from the achievement o f other members and develops a strong sense of 
responsibility towards the others, membership in a state is not for Tamir to be derived 
from a conscious process o f reflection. For her, individuals are constantly able to review 
the concept o f the national community they are attached to as well as to understand its 
importance to their lives. At the limit, nationality has to be conceived as an object of 
choice in a liberal multicultural society. Membership in a national community is an 
individual’s rig h t.157 In the exercise o f citizenship, they are able to form part o f a cross­
culture debate among members o f different nations in a sphere where impartiality and 
respect for the law is prevalent.158 Individuals’ capacity for reviewing the tacit choices
156 Ibid.. page 68.
,57This idea is connected to her concept o f  national self-determination. It should be pursued as a strategy 
to give voice to cultural diversity. In a broad sense, self-determination may range from the recognition o f  a 
voice in the public sphere o f  a political community to the possibility o f  opting for new political 
arrangements When this recognition is made unlikely. This notion has little to do with civil rights or 
political participation, the formal concept o f  citizenship. It is more connected to the idea o f  recognition -  
search for status. It involves a sense o f  familiarity or even identification with the rulers. Ibid.. page 96.
158 Ibid.. p. 54.
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made in the course o f their growing up is preserved in the contact with different 
viewpoints.
It seems that Tamir advocates in these terms a balance between nationalistic 
feelings and impartial concern so as to sustain a social order in which individuals’ 
exercise o f autonomy can be maintained. My national affiliation, which influences the 
constitution o f my identity, comes to be seen as an object o f choice that has to be 
represented in the public sphere where impartiality is preponderant. In turn, the public 
sphere, the place in which rights and obligations are defined, gets its backing in those 
national sentiments that are developed in civil society. Its decisions though based on 
impartial considerations are informed by the main values defended by the various 
national groups represented.
I think however that the argumentation here presented is not as persuasive as 
Tamir would like it to be. If nationalism is to perform the function it is supposed to 
perform, creating a strong identification among its members, individuals’ capacity for 
reflection should be somehow truncated. Let me develop my point. According to 
Tamir’s scheme, my identity is largely defined by the national group I am part of. As 
illustrated by her use o f the expression “true lies” in a recent study, this nationality is 
partially subjectively constituted.159 The creation o f true lies, a social imaginary that 
emphasizes common aspects among members, simplifies the choices faced by them and 
encourages them to act promptly in the name o f the state. It is false because is based on a 
biased interpretation o f reality. It is true because the object is still linked to reality and its 
interpretation serves a well-defined function that can be tacitly accepted by nationals, to 
maintain a sense o f cohesion among them. Moreover, the liar, in whatever form he 
assumes, can be identified as one o f them. In these terms, there is an implicit admission 
that the national sentiment is an object o f manipulation. And therefore, individuals’ 
capacity for critically reflecting about the elements that constitute this identity can, and in 
many cases should, be curtailed for the sake of this state unity.
In the interpretation proposed by Tamir, the state is restructuring the perception 
by individuals o f their participation in a political community. The exercise of citizenship,
159 Yael Tamir, “Reconstructing the Landscape o f  Imagination” in Simon Caney, D. George & Peter Jones 
(eds.), National Rights. International Obligations. (United States o f  America, W estview Press, 1996), p. 
229.
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though formally guaranteed by rights that emphasise plurality o f opinions and 
impartiality, is informed by nationalistic feelings that are open to manipulation. And in 
appealing to these nationalistic feelings, Tamir is downplaying its moral significance. 
Citizenship is far from being regarded as an exercise in reciprocity between autonomous 
members in the construction of a whole that is meaningful from the standpoint o f a 
common identity. It becomes much more the formal enjoyment o f political rights, one 
that is in fact sustained by sentimental ties that are reiterated in the build-up of 
nationalism and subject to manipulation in the name o f social cohesion.160
Moral obligations in Tamir’s sense are also to be mediated by this national 
sentiment. Though responsibilities can be objects o f reflection, the conscious discovery 
o f one’s position in the construction of the common sense o f belonging, they are not 
necessarily viewed as such. They are mainly dependent on a sense o f belonging and 
identification that is tacitly accepted by the individual as someone bom into a tradition 
and living his life in accordance with it. In this sense, they are duties I have, given the 
fact that my compatriots, when taking part in the construction o f a common identity, 
become objects o f my affection.161
Although Tamir does not pay direct attention to the impact o f her 
theoretical scheme on the understanding o f the international context and the possibilities 
o f the establishment o f legitimate international principles o f justice, I think much can be 
inferred in this respect from her views on difference (toleration). Tamir clearly expresses 
a determination to regard the dialogue between different cultures not only as a form o f 
individuals’ enrichment but also as a way o f bringing more legitimacy to the current 
liberal state. Derived from the fact that individuals do have allegiances to different 
private associations and national groups that juxtapose each other at the national level as 
well to different supra-national arrangements, toleration becomes the first path to be 
taken in the construction o f a cosmopolitan individual. And it can slowly pave the way 
for an active exchange o f cultural experiences. This exchange in many ways can lead to 
an accommodation o f diverse and sometimes conflicting demands among individuals,
160 In relation to this point it is worth pointing to what Tamir says about the true essence o f  associative 
obligations: “they are not grounded on consent, reciprocity, or gratitude but rather on a feeling o f  belonging  
and connectedness” . Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism , p. 137.
161 Ibid.. pp. 134-135.
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which help legitimise the existence o f a multicultural state, as exemplified by liberal 
ones. And internationally, it can help to sustain an order based on a self-determination 
principle that legitimises the existence o f a plurality o f sovereign nation-states while 
preserving the possibility o f general co-operative arrangements among them .162
One of the main problems with this form o f reasoning is, however, the fact 
that behind this notion o f tolerance there is an assumption about different degrees of 
importance o f certain allegiances, specifically the primordial role played by national ones 
in the construction o f common identities. As Tamir admits, national ideas o f belonging 
will be informing the political process. And there are no specific ways o f assessing how 
impregnated by subjective criteria, and consequently open to manipulation these national 
ideals are and to what extent they will become an obstacle to a significant dialogue 
among compatriots as well as between compatriots and non-compatriots. These faults 
challenge the view that there is a necessary link between life in a pluralistic cultural 
environment and the development o f feelings o f tolerance that lead to an exchange of 
viewpoints and a more encompassing understanding o f the international deliberation 
process o f just principles.
3.4) Concluding Remarks
The above criticisms signal an inherent constraint in the argument of 
particularism, especially in the strong version proposed by nationalists such as Miller and 
Tamir. On the one hand, a communal or national identity should be regarded as a 
phenomenon that can be adaptable to respond to the demands o f multicultural societies. 
And in this respect, it has to be something that is always in flux, able to change and adapt 
to the new challenges presented by its members and outsiders in the form o f internal 
criticism. On the other hand, the possibility of processing new demands in the 
construction o f such an identity is partially obstructed by the very idea that individuals 
should still distinguish themselves as a nation or a socially tight community -  sharing
162 Concerning the derivation o f  a self-determination principle and the possibility o f  co-operative 
arrangement among the sovereign nation-states, see Ibid.. pp. 153-155.
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particular characteristics that are not always rationally apprehensible or defensible, and 
therefore cannot be properly questioned.
The conflict between these two issues is latent and yet not solved. When 
particularists try to underline the first issue they end by emptying nationality o f its real 
significance. If  nationality can be questionable, changed, etc, and yet be impregnated 
with subjective criteria in its definition, it becomes less an efficient instrument for giving 
uniformity to the social tissue than one more issue over which individuals can dispute and 
seek to exercise power. And that could easily be made in detriment of compatriots’ full 
awareness o f the exercise o f their autonomous capacities, including their active 
participation in the construction o f a common identity through the enjoyment of 
citizenship.
Particularly in relation to this last point, I argued that there is an underestimation 
o f the normative scope o f the exercise of citizenship in these studies. By concentrating 
on communal affiliations and national feelings as necessary ingredients to substantiate 
the exercise o f citizenship, they tend to disregard what citizenship (equal rights) really 
entails in the moral formation o f individuals.
When participating in the public sphere as independent sources o f valid claims 
looking forward to defining the basis o f long lasting co-operation, individuals are invited 
to exercise critical thinking while learning to present reasonable arguments, reciprocate 
actions, reach compromises and bear the consequence o f the common decisions taken. 
This ethical understanding o f the relation between political communities and its members 
will have a considerable impact on the way individuals’ interests are perceived and 
defended at the international level. Political communities will be much more willing to 
look for a more encompassing and sustainable understanding o f international obligations, 
centred not only in their formal recognition as ethical units but also in the enforcement of 
international rights that guarantee the integrity o f their citizens as active moral agents in 
an increasing interdependent world.
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CHAPTER 4: Individual Autonomy and Political Community
Having critically reviewed the particularist and universalist positions in the 
contemporary debate of justice, I intend in the present chapter to summarise some o f their 
claims and categorise them in two broader distinct groups, instrumental and constitutive 
views, referring to how individuals’ common participation in a situated political 
community contribute to the formation o f an actively motivated moral agent. Roughly, 
the first group considers the instrumental aspect of the relationship. Individuals engage 
in a political community mainly because it is regarded as an efficient way o f promoting 
their liberties and welfare. The second group emphasises the nature o f the relationship. 
In this case, the relationship among individuals in a polity is valued per se. It is defined 
by attachments that help to shape their notion o f identity and the obligations they have 
towards each other.
The above summary and categorisation will pave the way to the construction of 
an alternative view, which I call the ethical view. I argue that this view is comparatively 
best suited to deliver a more balanced understanding of the relationship between 
individuality and political community. Having its roots in a contemporary interpretation 
o f the Hegelian thought on die Stittlichkeit, this view regards the exercise o f citizenship 
as a significant moral stage in individuals’ lives. By forming part o f a political 
community, they are able to develop independent critical thinking on an equal basis while 
contributing to the formulation and implementation o f a historically situated system o f 
rights. In this development, they become able to critically identify with the foundational 
elements o f the public decisions, helping them to carry on their moral duties in a more 
responsible way.
It is important to observe however that individuals’ identification with their 
political community’s norms and values, which give them a sense o f belonging, is made 
with the possibility o f applying (independent) critical thinking in order to comprehend the 
role these attachments play in both giving backing to a social order and in helping
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construct their individuality. In this understanding, the state exists so far as it 
encompasses a unified rationality that can be regularly scrutinized by its citizens. It is 
therefore responsible for providing mechanisms to sustain the conjoined exercise o f their 
citizens’ free will.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the claims and 
drawbacks o f a functional view, which stretches from Rawls’ description o f a closed 
society as part o f the circumstances o f justice in the first OP to cosmopolitan claims made 
by Gewirth and Barry. The second section critically assesses the claims o f a constitutive 
view, exemplified by the discussion o f communitarians and nationalists raised in chapter 
3. The third section introduces the ethical view and analyses to what extent it can offer a 
more balanced account o f the relationship between individual autonomy and political 
community. And finally, I present some concluding remarks.
4.1) The Instrumental View
The instrumental view represents the ensemble o f viewpoints that understands 
that the exercise o f individuals’ rational abilities is carried on through a regulated social 
environment in which the reciprocation o f actions can be guaranteed. But though 
depending on this environment to exercise their liberty, individuals are not seen as 
substantially affected by the social interactions in which they take part. They can easily 
distance themselves from their milieu to objectively scrutinise the terms of the social 
agreement. The political community plays in these terms a strategic role, establishing 
impersonal constraints to make co-existence possible and, when individuals’ autonomy is 
put at risk, guaranteeing a fair distribution o f resources among them. Special attachments 
have a place only as a variant in such a strategic role.
A first version o f such an argument is presented by Rawls in A Theory o f  Justice 
when describing the circumstances of justice. He sees the political community as a 
closed system o f co-operation for the mutual advantage o f individuals. Every citizen who 
carries the burdens of providing for the common good is entitled to receive the benefits of 
the enterprise. Members relate to each other as contributors who have the common 
purpose o f providing sustenance for a polity responsible for the guarantee o f their basic
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liberties and a fair distribution o f resources.163 By focusing on individuals’ gains from 
their disposition to contribute to the collective good, this approach duly highlights the 
strategic rationale necessary to the construction of a political community. But it gives 
little account o f the constitutive role the political community plays in the formation o f a 
moral agency and how such a formation depends on a well-established and 
interconnected national and international environment to develop.
Let me develop the point. One could say that this version seems to imply a 
proportional relation between an individual’s contribution to the provision o f the public 
good and the benefits individuals can have as citizen o f a polity. But given the diversity 
o f human lives and the social circumstances surrounding them, it would be hard to 
stipulate the proportionality between the two terms. Comparatively to their efforts, there 
are necessarily people who profit more from the common goods being produced than 
others because o f differences in intrinsic and socially acquired abilities. In all cases, 
individuals’ abilities are determined by their inherited but variable genetic code. In other 
cases, the individual’s ability to acknowledge and develop a skill is highly dependent on 
a familiar and specific social environment.
Even if a measurement system could be eventually conceived to determine the 
benefits a member o f a political society can enjoy compared to their social input, it would 
not eliminate further problems derived from its application. The marginalisation o f 
sectors o f the society that can hardly contribute, because o f severe cases o f individuals’ 
disability, comes to mind. Either they would be treated with no consideration at all or 
with very limited interest, having their possible role in society discarded or minimised. 
In this case, the legitimacy o f political institutions and social arrangements that support 
imbalances in power would seem disputable from a liberal viewpoint. Considering the 
contemporary debate on moral luck, it would be counter-intuitive to punish individual 
bad luck and not choice.164 Or, taking into account the broader theoretical debate on
163 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 126-128
164 Ibid. Rawls argues that the distribution o f  natural inequalities is arbitrary and that everyone needs 
access to primary goods, including the right o f  effective political participation. Ronald Dworkin, “What is 
Equality? Part I: Equality o f  W elfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 10, N o. 3, Summer 1981 and 
Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part II: Equality o f  Resources”, Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
Dworkin will argue that inequalities should not be founded on brute luck in personal and impersonal 
resources.
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morality, particularly the Kantian presupposition o f treating each and every individual as 
an end, the categorisation of persons in terms o f their capacity to offer social inputs could 
be considered rather odd.165
Following the same kind of argument, the case o f immigrants would also pose a 
problem. If the criterion of membership in a polity is based on the generation and receipt 
of benefits, why should compatriots be treated differently from the individuals that 
actively contribute to the co-operative system but are formally unable to influence its 
rules? The diverse role played by immigrants or expatriates in boosting the economic 
and social life in different societies should, following the logic o f this approach, lead to a 
claim for rights o f citizenship in these communities. But this logic is not so 
straightforward. Don’t these individuals necessarily have the political will or the legal 
resources to be participants in the construction of the public dialogue o f the communities 
they inhabit? By portraying the societies as closed systems o f co-operation, this approach 
tends to support the view that immigrants and expatriates are current exceptions or 
anomalies to be ignored or avoided in the long run.
Even considering that this portrait is to be understood mainly as a heuristic device 
in Rawls’ theory, it can still serve to defend a distorted picture o f the challenges 
confronted by multicultural societies as well as the opportunities they tend to offer to 
individuals’ moral formation nowadays.166 For this version, no necessary incentive 
would be offered to the individual to develop his international dimension in terms o f 
regarding a foreigner as someone who is worth knowing and forging meaningful relations 
with. The preservation of a closed understanding of society would much depend on the 
public control o f the possibilities individuals have to stretch both the limits of their
165 Immanuel Kant, “The M etaphysics o f  Morals” in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant Political Writings (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
166 Within Europe, many countries are feeling the need to re-address their immigration policies. Germany 
is currently reviewing its policy about working visas to immigrants com ing from East Europe, in their great 
majority o f  Turkish origin, who though allowed to work and to form a family, are deprived o f  any political 
voice. The UK is also being forced to question its immigration policy because o f  the econom ic need to 
curb the shortage o f  staff in priority areas such as education, health and computing services as well as the 
need to cope with clashes among its members who, having differences o f  ethnicity or religious beliefs, are 
facing increasing social prejudice. In theoretical terms, the debate is carried forward by authors such as 
Kymlicka, who has much contributed to address the issue o f  citizenship in multicultural societies. Will 
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) and Will Kymlicka, & W. 
Norman., Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
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creativity and their critical capacities through contacts with foreigners. A clear 
perception of how their identity could be otherwise constructed would be here denied.
Though the consequences derived from the assumption o f proportionality in a 
closed system o f co-operation can be further explored to back my general claims on the 
international dimension of moral agents, I want to leave it aside for the moment in order 
to turn my attention to the more fundamental issues this chapter aims to address. In this 
version, the individual’s calculus o f gain and losses is the decisive element in the 
definition o f political allegiances. The instrumental character attributed to the political 
community means that special obligations would be regarded as contingent in the 
following way. The individual has no need to identify with the values of the system to be 
considered a member. Although he has to abide by the procedures o f a political 
community, he has not necessarily to agree with the values that back these procedures 
and guide the determination o f norms. He can act as being part o f a modus vivendi 
environment, where the ends justify the means. In this environment, there is nothing that 
restrains him from breaking the commitments he previously made when it proves 
disadvantageous for him.
The perception o f a merely instrumental and contingent role exercised by the 
community could be seen as problematic. From the perspective o f individuals’ moral 
formation, individuals do not have a strong awareness of the significance o f the rules for 
the construction o f their individualities and the social commitments implied by them. 
They respect the rules as arbiter o f interactions among partners in a scheme o f co­
operation and do not necessarily identify with them as part o f a common effort among 
members o f the same political community to construct a system o f law that, while 
allowing them to exercise their individual critical thinking capacities, offers them a 
common sense of identity that influences the perception o f who they are and how they 
should act. They do not regard the rules as the embodiment o f values that should be 
preserved for the sake o f a public life that allows individuals to exercise their autonomy 
while offering them a sense of belonging.
As social relations inside the community are shaped by individuals’ strategic 
rationale, whose strict calculus of gains and losses tend to determine their contribution to 
the attainment o f a common good as well as their prevailing perception o f a public life,
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political participation in a common system of rights tends to be seen as contingent to the 
palpable benefits these individuals can have. And the consequent lack o f social 
attachment among the members o f the political community can eventually pave the way 
to a fragile system o f rights, undermined every time it fails to promote individuals' 
strategic interests or to offer them incentives that can be easily perceived.
The other common version o f  the functional approach is known as moral 
cosmopolitanism, as it is exemplified in chapter 2. It takes up the challenge of 
constructing arguments to overcome some o f the problems outlined above. It proposes to 
combine an open conception o f society with individuals’ moral dimension. In such a 
version, individuals share a potential universal rationality, which make them in some 
fundamental moral sense equal.167 And given this universal rationality, there is the 
possibility o f deducing principles of equal respect for the freedom o f each and every 
individual regardless o f their particular social condition. Political borders have therefore 
only non-derivative significance in the construction o f just principles.
Specific obligations towards participants of the same political community can be 
accepted on the basis o f their function in realising the ideals o f universal freedom and 
equality. But they could only be justified if they could be argued for on the grounds of 
impartial concerns -  taking into account the equal universal status o f individuals as 
rational beings. Gewirth’s defence o f the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) 
illustrates the point. The principle o f ethical universalism, which demands that 
individuals respect their common rights of freedom and well being, can indirectly serve 
to justify certain types o f ethical particularism.168 Special treatment could be defended as 
an effective form o f securing individuals rights. As the individuals recognise the 
protection o f the political community (guarantor o f a system o f rights and welfare), it is 
morally permissible for them to show special concerns to their country (political system) 
and to the compatriots who provide backing to the system.
The notion here implied, that partial concerns are a useful tool in the build-up of 
cosmopolitan principles, is best expressed by Barry. Supposing that his views on
167 Brian Barry, “International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” in Davud Mapel & Terry Nardin 
(eds.), International Society: D iverse Ethical Perspective. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998), 
page 144 and A. Gewirth, “Ethical Universalism and Particularism” in The Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. 
L XX XV , N o. 6, June 1988.
168 A, Gewirth,, “Ethical Universalism and Particularism” in The Journal o f  Philosophy, p. 291.
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impartiality are to be expanded to the international domain, Barry would be arguing for a 
second order impartiality to be applied to the moral and legal rules o f a global system.169 
He would be concerned about what would be the reasonable constraints to coexistence 
among beings that, though living in different contexts, can be potentially regarded as 
equally able to present valid claims to each other.170 Following this reasoning, 
individuals are interested in principles that primarily secure impartiality in their 
coexistence as autonomous individuals, human rights principles in general. A fair 
distribution o f resources becomes a point to consider once the autonomy o f individuals, 
and therefore their ability to guide actions by impartial concerns, is put at stake. In this 
case, re-distributive principles become imperative.
Partiality could be considered the domain of what falls outside the framework o f 
basic norms, representing a discretionary social sphere in which individuals can take 
decisions on the basis of specific social attachments. A more comprehensive form o f 
interpreting his views on partiality, however, would be to consider his justification for 
rejecting first-order impartiality. Here, we would be faced with efficiency arguments. 
The existence o f bounded political communities, with particular interpretations o f general 
moral norms, would be justified on the basis that it is the best alternative to cope with 
problems o f control, co-ordination and compliance in the population.171
In this understanding o f Barry’s view, specific political allegiances would be a 
function o f how efficiently the polity is in the provision of the public good. The support 
for national agreements would, however, not be as contingent as in the closed system of
169 A more comprehensive v iew  on the argument o f  Barry on impartiality is presented in chapter 2. Here, 1 
am only concerned with how it can serve to illustrate a functional interpretation o f  special obligations.
170 According to Barry, second-order impartiality is a “test to be applied to the moral and legal rules o f  a 
society: one which asks about their acceptability among free and equal people” w hile first-order 
impartiality is a “maxim o f  behaviour in everyday life.” Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 194.
171 C ontrol is related to individuals’ desire to have som e discretionary power to make choices that affects 
their particular lives and, at the same time, their need to recognise that they cannot have this power unless 
they concede it to everybody. Considerations about control is illustrated by the establishment o f  a system  
o f  private property. C oordination  refers to the ability o f  the members o f  a society to define how closely  
they should regulate conduct. The burden o f  coordination would drastically increase in a society that 
accepts universal first-order impartiality. C om pliance  refers to how difficult it would be to secure 
compliance among individuals. For Barry, in a society guided by first-order impartiality, “a huge number 
o f  decisions that are now left to private judgement would have to be turned over to public officials, and all 
decisions left in private hands would be open to scrutiny and censure on the basis o f  the hypertrophied 
positive morality o f  the society.” Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 202-207. Quotation from page 
205.
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co-operation described above, where the short sighted interests o f  individuals dominate. 
It would be substantially balanced by a universal rationality that sustains a moral kind of 
cosmopolitanism. Individuals would not merely see each other as co-partners in a 
scheme o f mutual advantage but as someone they can identify with given their human 
capacity to present valid claims. It is taken into account in this view o f rationality that 
international principles o f justice can be not only formulated but also respected.
Though this version should be praised for considering the moral dimension of the 
individual while not denying specific attachments, I would argue that it also suffers from 
a fundamental problem. It downplays the role of different contextualised political 
communities in individuals’ moral development, making the argument too demanding. 
In offering an account o f partiality as a variable o f an impartial system o f norms, Barry is 
asking the individual to justify specific allegiances by'im partial considerations that 
abstract from the context, which actually offers them some concrete meaning. In this 
context, where they assume a merely functional role as an efficient method to put into 
place a system o f reasonable constraints, individuals’ historically constructed specific 
attachments lose their significance as the necessary counterpoint to impartiality, one that, 
at the same time that it creates tension in the management o f social relations, provides it 
with pre-established criteria of behaving that makes the decisions o f the day to day life 
easier to be carried on and gives them an overall sense o f purpose.172
Barry in this sense fails to perceive that individuals’ cognitive capacities to grasp 
and act on the basis o f universal principles are not determined beforehand. Individuals 
realise their rational capacities (the basis o f their moral capacities) in a web o f social 
relations that, while providing them with opportunities to contribute to the construction of 
a common system o f rights, also offers them some pre-established standards of 
judgement and action without which their life would become not only unmanageable but 
also meaningless.
172 To balance partial and impartial considerations through the use o f  critical capacities that are, up to a 
certain point, historically constructed is the main challenge facing the individual. Follow ing this line o f  
argument, see Taylor’s illustration o f  the individual’s need to be, at the same time, in society and a 
separated person in order to become full moral agents. Charles Tavlor. Philosophy and Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 306. See also Charles Taylor, 
Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  M odem Identity. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
28-30.
In general terms, I would say that the argument tends to concentrate on the ideal 
situation that offers validity to moral norms without paying enough attention to the 
particular circumstances in relation to which these norms are actually realised. 173 The 
validity o f moral norms is derived from a priori thought, an impartial standpoint that 
offers a general standard to regulate individuals’ claims on each other. The problem 
however is that there is a need to transcend the gap between this moral will and the 
empirical will that offers the content to moral principles and takes into account the 
historically situated individual with his partial demands. It is in relation to this empirical 
will that these principles are interpreted and can be successfully put into practice. It is 
also from this perspective that their legitimacy is constructed.
Following this line o f criticism, universality would be realisable through 
individuals living in these specific historical settings who are jointly able and willing to 
question the foundations o f the value systems in which they live and to formalise 
universalisable principles. In these terms, universality, though latent in the rational 
singularity o f a human being, can only be fully grasped through the interaction among 
situated individuals, in which different interpretations o f the principles aiming at totality 
are confronted. It is not a discovery made through a plunge into our rational nature but a 
process o f gradual and constant acknowledgement dependent upon the interaction of 
particular situated individuals.174
173 This point is related to one o f  the main criticism presented by Hegel to Kantian morality. Since Kant 
regards the autonomy o f  the moral w ill as an a priori determination o f  itself, there would be a necessary gap 
between this w ill that conceives general moral principles and the empirical w ill that has to interpret and 
adopt them. See G. W. F. H egel. Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  R ights, edited by Allen Wood, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991). On the same point it is also worth looking at the 
Finlayson section about H egel’s criticisms o f  Kant’s moral theory in the article G. Finlayson, “Does Hegel 
Critique o f  Kant’s Moral Theory apply to Discourse Ethics?” in P. D ew s (ed.), Habermas; A Critical 
Reader. (Oxford, B lackw ell Publishers, 1999).
l ^ I t  is worth mentioning that this reasoning acknowledges the importance o f  conceiving the world in 
terms o f  diversity o f  political communities. Since the abstract effort to grasp universal principles o f  justice  
is taken by som eone who needs the community to become aware o f  his critical capacities, the activity o f  
reasoning can be fallible and, to som e extent, partial to a collective dynamic characteristic o f  a specific  
environment. In this sense, there is a need to argue for the existence o f  different political communities, 
system s o f  rights with their particular interpretation about the foundations o f  human interaction, which 
work as counter-examples in the construction o f  principles. By saying that, I am reinforcing the argument 
that the construction o f  universal principles is dependent on the establishment o f  a constructive dialogue 
among individuals living in different communities who are open to the claim s o f  one another. It involves 
working through counter-arguments that test “in a continuum” what universality implies. I com e back to 
this point in the next two chapters.
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And the implementation o f these universal principles would much depend on the 
development o f a “situated constructed” motivation among the moral agents involved. It 
would refer to what I will call their responsible engagement, mainly bom out of 
individual’s effective participation in the construction o f a specific system o f rights. 
Rather than being a mere co-operative endeavour by individuals who are prepared to 
carry the burdens in the attainment o f the common good in return for concrete benefits, 
the polity would be perceived as an endeavour that they conjointly help to construct 
through the exercise o f their citizenship. And in the process o f construction, they become 
critically aware o f who they are as distinctive individualities while strengthening group 
solidarity among them, making them more inclined to carry on their social 
responsibilities.175
Following this argument, the main problem would turn out to be how to Find a 
form o f narrowing the gap between two facets o f the individual -  someone who at the 
same time that he forms attachments to specific systems o f rights has a need to grasp 
general and more abstract principles to secure his integrity as a human being in a global 
environment. In the following pages, I will argue that one way o f dealing with the 
problem is to suppose that specific systems o f rights increasingly feel the need to 
acknowledge the cosmopolitan dimension o f the individual and therefore contribute to a 
more regulated international environment. The need is based on the perception that 
national and international environments are becoming mutually dependent. And in these 
terms, the legitimacy o f political communities is drawn from their success in coping with 
the duality o f the individual’s ethical life. On the one hand, he needs specific social 
environments to consciously develop his sense o f collective responsibility. On the other 
hand, he feels the need to explore their links with individuals living elsewhere so as to
More specifically, the point is correlated to individual’s motivation to act morally. This motivation 
derives from a rationally mediated formation o f  the will that com es hand and hand with practices o f  
socialisation and education that helps the individual to become aware o f  his personality. As Habermas 
suggests, sources o f  motivation are intrinsically linked to the development o f  individual psychology  
through social practices that while reinforcing his awareness o f  the other as an autonomous being (seen as 
an interlocutor who should be respected for his capacity for making consistent choices) as well as som eone 
he cares for (solidarity feelings), makes him prone to perform his role as ethical agent in a political society  
where relations o f  mutual recognition take place. See Jurgen Habermas, Justification and Application. 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), page 33.
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expand his sense o f identity in order not only to better comprehend his political 
allegiances but also to offer valid inputs to the society he was brought up in.
4.2) The Constitutive View
The “constitutive view”, illustrated by nationalists’ arguments and echoed in the 
communitarian writings, rejects the attribution o f a pure instrumental role to the 
community. 176 It pays attention to the active role exercised by the community in the 
constitution o f identities. On this view, it is basically through the affinities with the 
members o f my community and the way these affinities are framed in a system of social 
and political roles that I constitute myself and set priorities in my life. Given the fact that 
attachments derived from the common construction o f a national public culture help to 
create my identity, I am entitled to give weight to the demands o f my compatriots when 
thinking about the formulation and implementation o f general moral principles.
As I pointed out when discussing the particularist approach in chapter 3, one of 
the greatest merits o f the constitutive view is to throw light on the motivation problem 
facing the functional view. The individual abides by the system o f rights not primarily 
because it is instrumental to the pursuit o f his ends but because it is founded on a national 
culture that helps to shape the perception of whom he is and how he should act. As he
176 Though considering specifically the arguments o f  nationalists in this section, I believe that similar 
kinds o f  criticism could be presented to communitarian arguments, as chapter 3 indicated. Walzer, for 
example, seem s to approach the position o f  nationalists when advocating moral minimalism in the 
international sphere. For him, “ ...m oral minimalism is not a free standing morality. It sim ply designates 
som e reiterated features o f  particular thick or maximal moralities.” In this sense, it is not derived from a 
constructive dialogue among communities prepared to critically evaluate their own value systems. It 
merely represents what is common practice among moral cultures. Michael W alzer, Thick and Thin: Moral 
Argument at Hom e and Abroad. (Indiana, University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 10. By the same 
token, MacIntyre seem s also to portray a narrow view  on the possibility o f  finding a broad consensus on 
moral issues. His disillusion with moral philosophy is derived from its failure to solve moral disagreements 
via a defence o f  a pretentious universal rationality. The alternative would be a historical and sociological 
approach to philosophy, in which the analysis o f  rationalities existing in different cultural environments 
could provide the basis for the build-up o f  a minimum set o f  coexistence rules. This moral minimalist 
approach is reinforced by his comments on the im possibility o f  achieving genuine universal moral 
consensus given the nature o f  human beings, who either are inapt to find them selves in other cultures 
besides their own or, when they do have this ability, distinguish them selves by so many half convictions 
that they becom e sceptical about generalisations. Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral 
Theory, specially pages 243-254 and Alasdair Macintyre, W hose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 396-397.
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attaches some intrinsic value to this national culture, he will not be strongly inclined to 
put into question common practices and institutions. It would bring too many burdens on 
himself. To question these practices and institutions is to throw himself into a dangerous 
adventure, putting at risk important pre-established standards o f behaviour that guide his 
life and give it a sense o f purpose.
There is however a fundamental problem with this perspective. It regards 
membership in a community as the main definer of individuals’ identity without paying 
enough attention to the requirements necessary to construct autonomous individuals, 
more specifically individuals’ development o f a critical thinking ability that while 
making possible their distinction as individualities make them part o f humanity , and 
counter-balance the power o f a public authority. In many ways, it risks the development 
o f these individuals’ capacities in the name o f a social cohesion constructed with an 
unclear notion o f collective identity.
Let me explain. For the constitutive view, membership is based on characteristics 
either objectively present in a limited amount of individuals (ethnic similarity) or 
subjectively constructed through, for example, an interpretative remembrance o f past 
collective experiences.177 Given the multicultural components o f present societies, I 
understand that what defines nationality is less the genetic similarity among members 
than the common perception they have about their singularity as a group. More precisely, 
nationality involves the subjective perception o f sharing a national sentiment -our  
culture, our traditions.178 And in this sense, it refers to the not so necessarily conscious 
ability we share of identifying each other as part o f a distinctive whole.
The subjective elements that define membership leave open some questions. Is 
it possible for individuals to participate in a public debate that brings into question these 
elements? To what extent can the constitution o f these elements be assessed and 
reviewed? For Miller the construction o f a public culture based on particular cultural 
attachments can always be subjected to discussion by individuals. Tamir tends also to 
agree with this point when envisaging the possibility o f a liberal national state, one that
,77See on the subject the work o f  Anderson, which explores the implications o f  the construction o f  a 
collective imaginary to social order. B. Anderson, Imagined C om m unities.
178 The notion o f  a public culture open to political debate is developed by Miller. David M iller, On 
Nationality, pp. 68-69.
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unites democratic participation with social cohesion based on national sentiment.179 But 
as I emphasised before, such an interpretation cannot completely discard the aspect of 
manipulation o f the subjective elements that offer individuals a common sense of 
identity. No matter which mechanisms are envisaged to curb the alienating effects o f a 
distorted view o f reality, they become dispensable once national cohesion is put at risk.180 
Tamir’s reflection on the construction o f the Israeli national state illustrates this point:
[Using a nationalist discourse, states restructure the image o f  both the political community and the 
conflict itself. Thus creating a frame in which the difficult question o f  how an individual should act in 
relation to a certain conflict is simplified and reinterpreted in terms o f  emotional ties and moral 
obligations to family and com m unity...C ognitively, it focuses individuals’ attention on a small subset 
o f  all the consequences o f  the choice to sacrifice for the nation or not, and thus makes the choice set 
simpler, while also biasing it towards the nation. The restructuring o f  the citizen’s choices is 
indispensable for states that foster a contractual ethos as they lack the ideological foundations necessary 
to incite in individuals a readiness to risk their lives for the state and is much less essential for states 
w hose constitutive set o f  values provides a justification for self-sacrifice] 1^1
When considering the possibility of biasing individuals’ choice through the 
formulation o f a national discourse, this approach is indirectly constraining individuals’ 
capacity for applying critical thinking to the state structure to which they are subjected. 
In broader terms, it is impairing the full exercise o f citizenship by influencing the 
intelligibility o f the norms o f justice, the individuals’ understanding o f the reasons why 
their actions are to be regulated by general moral principles.
Let me specify my point considering individuals’ moral formation. The social 
attachments stressed by this view, derived from beliefs and perception individuals inherit 
or form when interacting in a specific social environment, are necessary. They help to 
define and to reinforce social roles and therefore collective forms o f behaviour. By doing 
that, they transform moral motivation into something intrinsic to the performance o f these 
roles, paving the way to what is believed to be a more stable political system.
179 I touched on these points in Chapter 3, in which an extended analysis o f  M iller and Tamir version o f  
nationalism is presented.
180 As Waldron remarks, there seem s to be a magic attached to the pronoun our, which stresses the 
construction o f  a collective imaginary at the expense o f  the critical apprehension o f  reality. See section on 
cosmopolitan culture in J. Waldron, “What is cosmopolitan?”, The Journal o f  Political Philosophy: 
Volum e 8, Number 2, 2000, pp.227-243.
181 Yael Tamir, “Pro Patria Mori! : Death and the State” in R. McKim & J. McMahan, (eds.), The 
Morality o f  Nationalism , p. 229
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Nonetheless, I think the critical appraisal of these beliefs and impressions should 
not be constrained by the imposition o f a homogeneous or biased view in the name of 
social cohesiveness. To allow that the community manipulates collective beliefs and the 
assignment o f social roles is to jeopardise individual’s reflection on the components of 
his identity and the kind o f commitments he has when forming part o f  a social order. It is 
to offer a blurred picture o f the individuals’ public responsibilities. Without any clear 
assignment o f these responsibilities, the system o f laws would lack accountability, being 
a wide range o f actions justified in the name o f an ill-defined notion o f culture.
Social attachments, which help to constitute a common identity and give backing 
to moral motivation, have to be counter-balanced. It has to come hand in hand with 
individuals’ conscious effort to understand his role in the construction o f this order as a 
citizen and the reasons why the exercise o f this citizenship is relevant and should be 
preserved. From this viewpoint, individuals’ autonomy (critical thinking) is to be seen as 
a pre-requisite to the existence o f a polity, a variable that in no circumstances can be 
suppressed or diminished.
In limiting individuals’ expression or ways o f defining themselves, the 
constitutive approach seems also fallible in relation to the fluidity o f individuals’ identity, 
the international dimension o f the individual. Individuals’ curiosity or the appreciation o f 
the unknown is previously restrained by social mechanisms developed inside the society 
in which they live. If openness to foreigners’ claims emerges in this case, it is less a fruit 
of individual’s critical appreciation o f how things are done elsewhere, influencing their 
perception o f how differently things could be done where they live, than a form of 
reaffirming his community’s particular values in face o f otherness. In this context, the 
individuals’ discovery o f new possibilities o f expression and self-fulfilment, linked to the 
understanding o f components of identity taking into account a broader spectrum of 
relations, is limited beforehand.182
182 Such a perception o f  foreigners could influence in a negative sense the formulation o f  international 
principles o f  justice. These principles would hardly be derived from a constructive effort o f  different 
comm unities to grasp what to be human implies. That could happen not because this approach a p rio ri 
tends to deny the possibility o f  any meaningful dialogue among comm unities but because it is restrained by 
the demands o f  a national community. The content o f  international obligations would tend to be interpreted 
in the light o f  the comm unity’s need to maintain a sense o f  national cohesiveness among its members.
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4.3) The Ethical View
The ethical approach tries to incorporate elements o f the above two 
tendencies, justifying special obligations on the basis of the value o f citizenship as it was 
suggested by Hegel. Illustrated in different ways by the works o f Habermas, Charvet, 
Scheffler , Dagger and Mason in the contemporary literature, it argues that it is through 
individuals’ participation in the construction o f a historically situated system o f rights 
that independent motivated moral agents conscious o f their common responsibilities can 
be formed.183 It is in the individual’s proper understanding o f the value o f citizenship that 
a balanced interpretation o f the instrumental and constitutional roles attributed to the 
political community is to be found.
Considering my own interpretation o f a Hegelian framework, I would say the 
ethical approach involves, first, a conception o f the individual. The defining feature of an 
individual is his capacity to be “concemful”, that is self-aware o f his aims in relation to 
the aims o f others and having the intrinsic will to actualise this nature.184 Contrary to a 
more individualistic position o f seeing the individual as being able to define a goal and 
carry on the means to attain what he wants, seeing others as either obstacles they have to 
overcome or at best useful means to achieve those ends, this understanding stresses the 
individual’s ability to reflect critically on his free will by considering to what extent
183 Despite underlying the commonality among these authors, I am aware that their objective o f  research 
and arguments have their own specificity. In general terms, Habermas, is formulating moral arguments on 
the basis o f  his theory o f  comm unicative action, in which the justification o f  norms is linked to our 
participation in a language community. Scheffler is concerned with striking a balance between the 
cosm opolitan dimension o f  liberal thought and the evidence that individuals attach value to their specific  
allegiances. Dagger aims at defending obligations derived from our membership in a particular polity 
considering the perspective o f  his theory o f  “fair play”. Mason intends to offer an account o f  special 
obligations based on the intrinsic value o f  citizenship. Jurgen Habermas, Justification and Application.: 
Jurgen Habermas, Moral C onsciousness. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992); Jurgen Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997), S, Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems o f  
Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), Richard Dagger, 
“Membership, Fair Play and Political Obligation” in Political Studies. 2000, Vol. 48, 104-117, M ASON. 
A., “Special Obligations to Compatriots” in Ethics 107, April 1997, 427-447. M ason’s argument was 
further expanded in A. Mason, Community. Solidarity and Belonging: Levels o f  Community and their 
Normative Significance. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000).
184 See Allen W ood. H egel’s Ethical Thought. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 17-19.
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others are conjointly helping him to define this will. It is a reflection on the social 
construction o f his will and its worth.
From this viewpoint, an individual is autonomous not merely when he has the 
capacity to act autonomously in the Kantian sense, acting rationally by taking others as 
ends, but when actually he exercises this autonomy in a situated, concrete living social 
environment.185 It is self-mastering the elements o f his identity, including more 
relevantly the conscious understanding and acceptance of the social roles he performs 
with others in a specific historically constructed environment. By being able to assess the 
shortcomings o f social interactions and to identify ultimately with their foundational 
elements, they become more inclined to bear the public responsibilities imposed on him.
This conception of the autonomous individual is based on the idea that self- 
consciousness can only be developed when individuals are actively involved in the 
construction o f social wholes, being the political community regarded as fundamental in 
this development.186 The political community here mentioned is not an abstraction but a 
body (the state) that exists through the individuals as concrete subjects deliberating on a 
specifically defined system o f laws (the structural basis on which lies this socio-political 
order). It derives fundamentally from the fact that individuals recognise each other as 
sources o f independent valid claims when participating in the formulation and 
implementation o f its collective decisions. Its structure can in this sense be consciously 
known. And it can also be willed for the sake o f its own rationality - a rationality 
embodied in the common decisions conjointly taken.
185 A llen W ood, H egel’s Ethical Thought. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 23-37.
186 The reference here is to H egel’s moral stages in individuals’ developm ent -  the family, the civil society  
and the state. When being part o f  a family, the individual becom es aware o f  the bare ideas o f  reciprocity, 
respect for other, altruistic feelings but is still dependent on parents to guide her actions and unable to grasp 
all the reasons w hy a range o f  behaviours are forbidden or considered inappropriate. As an adult 
participating in a working environment, the individual becom es aware o f  his independence. He is now able 
to provide for h im self and recognised as interlocutors by his colleagues. Though developing his sense o f  
reciprocating behaviours, keeping his words, abiding by contracts, compromising, he still finds h im self in 
hierarchical forms o f  relations. He regards the other as, for example, a client, a boss, a negotiator, an expert 
or authority in a subject. It is only as fully member o f  a political community that the individual is able to 
recognise others as sources o f  equally valid independent claim. Contemporary authors working within the 
ethical perspective have extensively discussed these moral stages. See John Charvet, A Critique o f  
Freedom and Equality. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981); Mervyn Frost. Ethics in 
International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jurgen 
Habermas, Moral C onsciousness and Communicative A ction. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992). Habermas 
w ill develop more loosely categories dividing the moral stages in terms o f  pre-conventional, conventional 
and postconventional stages o f  interaction
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It is important to underline here that the state assumes this role because it is the 
only fully recognised sovereign body where this collective rationality can be exercised. 
Even if it could be considered that individuals can nowadays exercise this kind of 
rationality in some groups o f a national or an international civil society, this possibility is 
ultimately dependent on the collective consensus of citizens o f a state or representatives 
o f states. The way other social wholes work (family and civil society) is therefore more 
and more a political decision in modem times -  ultimately scrutinized by the collective 
consensus o f citizens.187 Having said that, it is important to emphasise that this 
preponderance of the state is conditional. The state is actual only when its system of law 
represents the embodiment and the expression o f a collective rationality that was built by 
independent critically thinking individuals “concemfully” aware o f their social 
dimension.
Considering the above points, let me now work out more precisely what I 
understand by a system o f laws and how individuals’ involvement in its construction 
affects their moral development. Each system o f rights is first defined by general 
principles that set the conditions for the validity o f moral norms. These conditions are 
founded on a conception of human being. They presuppose that each and every 
individual despite the personal afflictions he endures or the social circumstances under 
which he lives has a valid claim on the enjoyment of his freedom, which should be taken 
on an equal footing with others. 188 They serve as a general and formal constraint on the
187 See Shlom o Avineri, H egel’s Theory o f  the State. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 80).
188 It is clear that one could argue that the development o f  individuals’ critical capacities is dependent on 
the existence o f  interlocutors, ones who are at least able to present their claims on an equal basis to their 
own. But a question remains. Why should I take all other claims as seriously as mine, when I know that 
there are substantial differences in our capacity for reasoning? The most important reason for recognising 
and abiding by the equality principle is that every individual has the capacity to grasp the principle o f  
freedom. It is to acknowledge that each and every person is able to understand that the exercise o f  his 
freedom is dependent on considerations regarding the free movem ent o f  other persons. Respect for the 
freedom each person has to think, m ove and form associations is significant no matter how questionable is 
anyone’s capacity o f  em ploying critical reasoning. That is so because to be recognised as a free agent 1 
have to be able at least to recognise others as provided with this capacity, otherwise my bare existence as a 
person w ould be put at risk.
The acknowledgem ent o f  this kind o f  equality does not imply the rejection o f  pre-selection. The 
individual best endowed can still select in a second stage the group o f  interlocutors he will be more 
frequently dealing with. This is not necessarily a bad thing to happen. The individual best endowed should 
be given incentives to the extent that the development o f  his abilities can have a positive effect on society’s 
organisation and development. But even in this case, equality can still play a role. By emphasising equal
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further definition of the content o f a system o f rights, a reminder o f what justice ought to 
imply.189
The content o f the system of rights encompasses a set o f legal, political 
and economic principles that guarantee the status o f members o f a specific community 
existing to secure a fair distribution o f liberties and set the conditions o f a united will 
formation.190 It deals with issues that give form to collective goals and somehow shape a 
common way o f life among members of the community. Each dimension is represented 
by principles that, though referring to validity principles conceived in terms of 
individuals’ ideal role as moral agents, are somehow derived from the interaction o f 
historically situated individuals. The formulation and interpretation o f these principles 
take into account the dynamics o f human relations, influenced by the particular interests 
and advantages a person has given his social position in a specific historical context.
The legal, political and economic principles presuppose each other. The 
legal principles are concerned with the equal distribution o f private autonomies among 
associates o f a political community. It guarantees that the law will be applied to 
everyone on a non-discriminatory basis (equality among legal agents). It also specifies 
who and under what conditions someone is entitled to be a member o f the community 
(criterion o f membership). And finally, it institutionalises a legal code, envisaging forms 
of dealing with members who infringe the liberties o f others.191
It is in the enjoyment of their legal status as members of a community that 
individuals become aware o f what personal freedom implies. Freedom implies mutual 
recognition. It is when recognising each other as sources of equally valid claims that the 
individual becomes aware o f his own status as an independent being whose viewpoint, in
rights, there will be a guarantee that leaders will be accountable to and get legitimacy from the broader 
audience they have. They w ill thus more easily represent the people’s w ill.
189 The categorisation o f  a system o f  rights in terms o f  general validity principles and specific principles 
dealing with its content as w ell as the differentiation between the legal and political dimensions here 
described was heavily influenced by Habermas works, particularly Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and 
N orm s.
190 In spite o f  focusing on the legal and political dimension, Habermas’ framework seem s to presuppose 
the re-distributive principles so as to guarantee individuals’ effective participation in the formation o f  a 
united will. This co-relation was particularly explored by Rawls when laying down his two principles o f  
justice, referring to the basic idea that “all social values -  liberty and opportunity, incom e and wealth, and 
the bases o f  self-respect -  are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution o f  any, or all, o f  these 
values is to everyone’s advantage.” John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 62.
191 Jurgen Habermas., Between Facts and Norms, p.106.
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opposition to asymmetric forms o f relations such as family and working place, has to be 
respected and prevented from being overridden by unreasonable claims. At the same 
time, individuals have a more encompassing idea about what social engagements demand 
from them. If, on one hand, they have entitlements as members o f  a community, on the 
other hand, they also have to act responsibly. A responsible behaviour is one that 
acknowledges that to exercise freedom is not merely to learn how to cope with necessary 
constraints, realising that undue behaviours will face punishment. It is also related to 
their personal engagement to respect the rights of compatriots seen as a source o f valid 
claims. In broader terms, individuals’ mutual recognition and their ability to act 
responsibly lead to a defence of reciprocity of treatment. As a participant in a social co­
operative scheme, each individual deserves to be respected as an autonomous being able 
to think and act reasonably.
In the exercise o f their political rights, individuals are persuaded to take 
the perspective o f the other on an equal basis and develop a particular sense of 
collaboration. The political principles envisage the establishment o f procedures that 
guarantee individuals’ fair participation in the deliberative and decisional processes 
relevant to legislation.192 Mainly, they refer to democratic procedures that provide each 
individual with an equal chance to offer inputs in the formation o f  collective norms and 
decisions that will guide the relations inside the community. Through the confrontation 
o f rationally situated wills in the development of the deliberative and decision-making 
processes, the individual perceives himself as someone who together with others helps to 
shape and to legitimise the content of a system o f rights. The individual comes to regard 
himself as part o f a whole, a united will that lays the foundations to the construction o f a 
particular social system.
As an active citizen, the individual learns to take others’ point o f view 
seriously, to have the capacity o f judging the impact his actions have on other lives and, 
somehow, to learn to grasp the differences in the roles he performs in his life, such as 
neighbour, family member, worker and social co-operator. In this understanding, he does 
not merely find himself embedded in pre-determined social structures. He can have a say 
in what these structures should mean since he is a participant in the formulation and
192 Jurgen Habermas, M oral C onsciousness and C om m unicative A ction .
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I
interpretation o f individual and collective rights. It is clear that this individual exercise is 
balanced by the impact the totality (the overall output o f the participation o f all members 
o f the community) has in the formation o f a common identity. The emergence of this 
distinctive form o f life will, in turn, influence the grasp o f his own personality.
The exercise o f citizenship implies nonetheless the existence of well- 
established economic principles, more specifically re-distributive principles. Related to 
individuals’ access to the means of economic subsistence, these principles represent a 
pre-requisite to the full exercise o f civic and political rights. To participate actively as a 
citizen and as a member o f civil society, persons should be economically empowered, 
having access to food, clean water, a health system and education. Otherwise the 
exercise o f liberties becomes stripped o f the meaning suggested by an ethical approach, 
individuals’ conscious effort to grasp the implications o f their participation in the 
construction o f a polity for their identity.
It is worth pointing out however that the notion o f re-distributive 
principles tends to represent more a set of open questions than final statements about the 
kind and the level o f economic goods that should be secured overall among the members 
of a society. Having said that, I think it is still worth speculating about the probable 
directions taken by the ethical approach when addressing the issue.193 Considering this
193 Follow ing the above reasoning, the approach here defended would reject the narrow individualistic 
view  proposed by contemporary libertarians. Such a v iew  leaves the market to decide the allocation o f  
goods, including the ones related to subsistence, w hile granting the state the minimum necessary function 
to guarantee that individuals don’t violate moral constraints determined by the rights o f  others. The 
insistence on regulative procedures underlines the basic assumption o f  this perspective, individuals’ 
independence and the possibility o f  comprehending the political domain only in terms o f  the reinforcement 
o f  negative rights (non-interference rights).
Libertarians tend to avoid a more comprehensive discussion about the nature o f  rights, one that 
considers the possibility that the constitution o f  individualities is dependent on social interactions that can 
be valued for them selves. By focusing on non-interference, they disregard the possibility that rights o f  
recip ience  can, and given the effect these rights have on social interactions, should be justified. According 
to this approach, there can’t be any affirmative action to protect individuals’ access to minimum levels o f  
food, education or health care. Such a protection has to be seen either as an unwary effect o f  the market’s 
dynamics or a fruit o f  particular interests acting at a precise time in the market. The risk o f  this strategy is 
to legitim ise excessive inequality, through the pretended neutrality o f  a market dynamic in the distribution 
o f  goods. In an ‘extrem e’ but not improbable scenario, the ablest individuals to profit from an 
econom ically com petitive environment will be the ones to benefit the most from the political process, 
without necessarily caring for the side effects on the rest o f  the population. The emergence o f  marginal 
sectors o f  the population, which can be stripped o f  their dignity as human beings since incapable o f  
effectively enjoying their liberties, can therefore become a real possibility. In this scenario, individuals will 
tend to regard each other as means and not ends that actively contribute to the formation o f  moral agents.
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approach, economic opportunities should be comprehended in broader terms, in 
correlation with the legal and political principles o f a society. They would have to 
represent an overall access to a minimum level o f welfare, which would guarantee 
individuals’ physical and psychological integrity to exercise their capacities as agents 
responsible for the construction of a system o f rights. The minimum would certainly 
include proper nourishment, housing, basic hygienic conditions, literacy. But this 
definition begs the question: is there any way o f determining an optimum level o f welfare 
that should be guaranteed among the members of a specific community? Given the 
constant change in environment conditions and personal expectations, a precise answer to 
the question looks improbable.
An interesting way o f approaching the issue could come from Vlastos’ 
considerations on the equality principle.194 Human beings would be entitled to this 
benefit at the highest level at which it may be secured. To get individuals to be as 
creative as possible and to bring to existence values that will enrich their lives and the 
lives of others. A mild interpretation o f this statement would defend economic equality 
in society to the highest level while allowing different outcomes in the exercise o f 
abilities to be rewarded.195 First, a minimum should be equally secured among 
individuals so they can secure the means to their flourishing, including the employment 
o f their critical capacities in the common construction of a polity. Second, although 
extremes between rich and poor should be avoided, there should be a place for merit, 
derived from the individuals’ effort to make use o f their different capabilities, when not 
infringing a general distributive principle that secure the basic rights o f individuals. 
Third, social and economic advantages obtained by the most capable individuals should, 
somehow, revert to society. It means that advantages should not be pursued despite their
The term “rights o f  recip ience” is used by Singer. Peter Singer, “Rights and the Market” in J. Arthur & H. 
Shaw (eds.), Justice and Econom ic Distribution. (N ew  Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1991), p.200.
194 VLASTOS, G., “Justice and Equality” in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories o f  Rights (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1984), page 64.
195 R aw ls’ thoughts on the issue on A Theory o f  Justice have contributed to reinvigorate the debate about 
redistributive principles and the place o f  luck, choice and personal endowments in its definition. Dworkin 
remains here a reference to what is at stake in the discussion about equality. Ronald Dworkin, “What is 
Equality? Part I: Equality o f  W elfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs. V ol. 10, N o. 3, Summer 1981 and 
Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part II: Equality o f  Resources”, Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 
10 .
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impact on other lives. Substantial improvements in individuals’ lives should have 
positive repercussions on the welfare o f other members o f society.
Behind the exposition of the need for individual’s participation in the construction 
o f a system o f rights (content) to realise moral capacities is an argument on special 
obligations, which takes into account at the same time the instrumental and the 
constitutive roles performed by the political community (state). I have obligations 
towards the members o f my community because together we put into place a system o f 
rights that, first, is functional to the development of our own moral (rational) capacities. 
It is as citizens o f a state that we seriously have to consider other viewpoints on an equal 
footing and to realise that our joint efforts, in respect of our status as equally worthy and 
responsible co-operators, ground a fair system o f rights. Second, special obligations are 
also founded on the fact that the system o f rights embodies a collective understanding 
about a way o f living. It comprises a whole of historically affected evaluations that serve 
as a reference to the justification o f our actions and to the discovery o f where we stand as 
distinctive personalities or, to put it in another form, to realise who we are as 
individualities.
The fundamental roles performed by the state in individuals’ moral development 
and implied in the explanation o f special obligations has however to be clearly qualified. 
Individuals need to be actively, or more precisely consciously, involved in the political 
process o f a specific polity. He has to find open institutional channels to develop his 
critical capacities and consistently grasp how he, conjointly with other members, affects 
the construction o f the system. Although I do not have to reflect on each and every norm 
I abide by, institutional possibilities to understand and evaluate the reasons why I act in 
accordance with a value system have to be available to me. In this sense, a conditional 
principle is implied in respect o f the role performed by the state. Political legitimacy 
depends on the state’s ability to offer sufficient institutional mechanisms so that 
individuals can actively feel part of the construction o f a system o f rights and identify 
with the values of the system even after appealing to their critical capacities to scrutinise 
its foundations.
Having said that, I think it is worth exploring a little bit more what is implied in 
this conditional role performed by the state in individuals’ moral development by
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answering the question raised by the recent literature on justice about whether the limits 
o f an ethical approach do not lie, as it does for nationalists and communitarians, in the 
community’s capacity o f asserting itself over the individual’s ability to exercise critical 
thinking and explore new dimensions o f their sense of identity.196 This will serve not only 
to reinstate in a more explicit way the above reasoning but also to explore to what extent 
the incorporation o f an international dimension becomes essential to the state’s 
performance o f its conditional role.
It has to be said that proponents o f the ethical view have somehow contributed to 
the view that the ethical approach faces similar kinds o f limitation as the ones faced by 
communitarians and nationalists. For example, Mason’ s defence o f special obligations 
in terms o f  the polity’s contribution to the moral flowering o f individuals comes hand in 
hand with a claim about the “intrinsic” value of citizenship.197 According to this 
interpretation, there is something special in the nature o f citizenship. To be a member of 
a polity turns out to be a good in itself, not necessarily subject to individual’s scrutinising 
reason.
In case this interpretation is accepted, there would be nothing substantively 
different separating this view from the one defended by particularists. There would be in 
fact a striking resemblance between the two perspectives if we take into consideration the 
insights o f Tamir on the implications o f morally dubious communities, such as the Mafia, 
for an argument founded on the nature o f relationships. If what defines obligations is the 
sense o f connectedness among the members, constitutive forms o f behaviour, such as 
bribery or murder to preserve the family’s honour should not be in principle contested. 
But as these behaviours are morally blameworthy, since they inflict irreversible pain on 
individuals, Tamir faces a dilemma similar to the one faced by Mason.198 Either they 
reiterate their point about the sense of membership being in itself a ground for special
196 That seem s to be the claim o f  Barry against the contractarian view  o f  Charvet, “within which the 
bounds o f  society are also the bounds o f  justice.” Brian Barry, “International Society from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective” in David Mapel & Terry Nardin (eds.), International Society: D iverse Ethical Perspectives, p. 
145. Scheffler also touches on the problem on considering the voluntarist objection to his moderate 
interpretation o f  associative duties. S. Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems o f  Justice and 
R esponsibility in Liberal Thought. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, page 56.
197 A, M ason, “Special Obligations to Compatriots” in Ethics 107, April 1997, p.443.
198 Yael Tamir., Liberal Nationalism , pp. 101-102. In these terms, Dagger also addresses the dilemma 
faced by Tamir. Richard Dagger, “Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation” in Political Studies. 
2000, Vol. 48, p . l l l .
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obligations and accept its consequences or they back a qualified view o f associations. 
Tamir’s chosen path is the one expected for a nationalist. She makes clear that the 
feeling o f belonging and connectedness should be regarded as the “true essence o f 
associative obligations”.199
More in touch with an ethical approach, Dagger proposes a qualified 
conception o f association. It has to incorporate a principle o f fair play, “everyone who 
participates in a just, mutually beneficial cooperative practice has an obligation to bear a 
fair share o f its burdens.”200 The society has to be reasonably regarded as a co-operative 
enterprise so that members have an obligation to do their part, to fair play and respect for 
the rule o f law, in maintaining the enterprise.201 Individuals’ disposition to fair play will 
be greater if they realise that the enterprise works to their benefit, in the sense that they 
do not endure non-eqiiivalent burdens.
Though this interpretation calls attention to the essential elements necessary to 
build an ethical conception o f the political community - seen as an endeavour based on 
individuals’ autonomy, reciprocity o f treatment and transparency, I think it comes short 
o f spelling out the reasons why these elements support this conception. It tends to put too 
much emphasis on the idea o f equivalent burdens o f a social enterprise without paying 
enough attention to the process o f individuals’ engaged self-awareness that can only be 
carried out in the contacts they establish with otherness (compatriots in this case) and the 
public institutional possibilities open to these individuals to effectively participate in 
these interactions. It is ultimately these factors that lead to the formation of a 
consciously accepted common identity capable of supporting the existence o f an ethical 
political community.
If we understand the world from this viewpoint, it is necessary to consider the 
diversity o f public institutional arrangements that not only guarantee individuals’ 
integrity as distinctive moral personalities but its actual exercise. As I will argue in the 
next chapter, there should be internal collective mechanisms that guarantee a clear
199 Yael Tamir, Liberal N ationalism . 1993, p. 137.
200 Richard Dagger, “Membership, Fair Play and Political Obligation”, Political Studies. 2000, Vol. 48, 
page 112. See also “Rights, Boundaries, and the Bonds o f  Community: A Qualified D efense o f  Moral 
Parochialism” in The American Political Science R eview , Vol. 79, 1985.
201 When considering society as a co-operative enterprise, Dagger is clearly referring back to Rawls. John 
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice.
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separation between civil society, conceived as a sphere where I assert my independence, 
and a political sphere where independent viewpoints are united through a fair process of 
public deliberation (involving reciprocity, transparency and so on) to constitute a distinct 
common whole. But there should also be international mechanisms envisaged by the 
states so that individuals’ process o f being challenged by otherness in the construction of 
their identity does not stop at the borders.
This last point is made taking into account the fact that despite 
individuals’ dependence on a specific historical context for developing their rationality, 
there is nothing a priori that necessarily limits the use and exploration o f their rationality. 
Individuals cannot in this sense be deprived of the sense o f fluidity o f their identity, the 
capacity for learning and re-evaluating their thought and actions through contacts with 
individuals who were constituted by the values o f different political communities. This is 
all the more so when considering that the possibilities o f individuals engaging in this 
exploratory exercise have been potentially enhanced by their explore to an increasingly 
interdependent world.
It could therefore be argued that there is a need to conceive an international 
framework composed o f global principles o f justice and institutions that embody a 
common sense o f rationality shared among states, making it possible for their citizens to 
further explore their moral capacities in encounters with distant others. It could also be 
argued, as I will do more properly in the next chapter, that this need opens the way to an 
understanding of the deliberation of international principles as the opportunity 
individuals, who are conceived as the formal representatives o f a state or merely as 
citizens, have to enhance their moral sensibility in the use of rational capacities. It 
emphasises that if  they want to critically appropriate the values underlying the social 
environment they live in and the possibilities of universality, they need to become more 
flexible about how they establish a relation with otherness. Given the diversity and 
peculiarities o f existing systems o f law, individuals have probably to focus not so much 
on the way o f  presenting their claims (reasonableness criterion) in order to be understood 
or to sound convincing but on the ways necessary to assimilate others’ claims. The urge 
to fix on what the other has to say expresses the urge to refrain from taking other’s 
positions for granted. Their thought has to be open to complexity, in a constant struggle
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to evaluate their way o f thinking by trying to catch the richness of other value systems in 
order to unveil the universal dimension o f their humanity.
4.4) Concluding Remarks
I have here explored the dynamic exercise o f mutual determination that 
characterises the relationship between individual and political community. In presenting 
my arguments, I rejected the instrumental and constitutive views on the ground that they 
portray an imbalance in the interactions between individual and polity. Both views pave 
the way to a unilateral determination o f one part over the actions o f the other, leading to a 
defence o f special treatment either on the basis o f strict individual rational calculation or 
in terms o f a loose notion o f social attachments.
Such biased ways o f defending special treatment have significant implications 
for the analysis of international relations. As the instrumental and constitutive views take 
the individuals’ mindset to be universally or socially pre-determined, the terms of 
individuals’ interactions in the international environment seem to become less flexible 
and open to criticism. They portray a rigid picture o f this environment rather than seeing 
it as a necessary complex and dynamic one, in which individuals’ engagement give them 
an opportunity to confront established beliefs derived from the construction o f a specific 
system o f rights and to use their moral sensibility to build up common principles of 
conduct
As an alternative to the shortcomings of these views, I argued for an ethical 
conception o f polity. It is through their participation as autonomous beings in the 
formation o f a common will, which legitimises political actions and offers reasons to 
justify special treatment, that historically situated individuals become aware o f moral 
capacities essential to the exploration o f their identities.
Even stressing individuals’ autonomy, fairness o f treatment and political 
accountability, such an approach has been facing criticism related to its ability to 
distinguish itself from social determinism. In reflecting on its possible deterministic 
implications, I called attention to the need not only for making available internal
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mechanisms that guarantee the effective representation o f different political voices but 
also for speculating about the possibility o f comprehending individuals’ engagement in 
an international environment as a complementary stage in their development. Though 
more has to be said about the last point, I think it is as a participant in the construction of 
a regulated international environment that individuals are able to exercise their moral 
sensibility and further question the common identity constructed inside specific polities. 
Principles o f justice in this sense should be, in part, conceived as the outcome of an 
ongoing process o f individuals’ attempt at self-discovery through openness to the claims 
o f others.
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CHAPTER 5: Characterisation of International Society
Until now the international dimension has only been indirectly addressed as part 
of a discussion about how the state, understood as a whole o f social interactions in which 
individuals’ mutual recognition as free agents takes place, is bound to provide 
mechanisms to foster individuals’ moral development. It is my intention in this chapter to 
characterise explicitly international society as one in which the states emerge by necessity 
as the fundamental actors. They relate to each other as sovereign units that mutually 
recognise the unique ethical roles they perform in individuals’ moral development. In 
this relation, they exchange viewpoints about the common grounding o f their ethical 
roles, learning from each other’s position so as to re-evaluate their individual 
performances and looking forward to the mutual accommodation of interests and values 
in the form o f regulatory institutional procedures at the international level.
I argue that there are two interconnected sets o f reasons why the states are to be 
seen as the main actors in international relations. First, the state effectively supports an 
ethical process bom out o f individuals’ relation with each other qua citizens determining 
a historically situated system o f rights. It provides legitimate and enforceable 
institutional mechanisms through which citizens, deliberating about the fundamental 
rights and duties that underpin their collective political life at a certain time and space, 
develop their moral abilities for independent and conscious thinking as well as o f relating 
to each other on the basis of these abilities. Moreover, it also reveals itself as an agent 
featuring its own individuality. Such an individuality (of the state) is derived from the 
formation of a distinctive public political culture by which citizens share a common sense 
o f identity and are motivated to act morally.
Second, the society o f states - understood in terms o f states’ interactions as self­
determining ethical entities which are equally and sufficiently open to the claims o f each 
other - constitutes the locus where distinct ethical interpretations o f the fundamentals of 
individuals’ rights can be exchanged, assessed and subjected to truly universal grounding. 
It makes possible a cross-examination o f ethical experiments across space and over time.
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Such an inter-state process paves the way to the robustness o f international principles of 
justice both domestically and internationally. It enhances at the same time their 
legitimacy and applicability.
As can be noticed from the points presented above, my interpretation is wholly 
rooted in a distinctively open and dynamic account o f ethical processes. I mean by 
openness the concept that states have to be individually perceived as ethical entities 
exposed to a diverse spectrum of ethical experiences and willing to respond openly to 
them. The account is dynamic at two levels. At the first level, and this is standard in any 
neo-Hegelian interpretation, states’ interactions have to be thought together with the 
evolution of history. At the second level, states recognise the foreign environment as a 
source of ethical exchanges, which lead them to have a better grasp o f the moral 
foundations o f their particular system of rights. Therefore, I put forward an innovative 
interpretation o f states that relies on openness and on an enhanced dynamism, which is 
determined by both the historical attribute o f the ethical processes and the inter-state and 
multicultural dialogues that naturally emerge in a society o f states.
Such an enhanced dynamism, I assume, leads us to perceive ethical states as 
necessarily ideal constructs that are embedded in a historical context and subject to its 
challenges. In this sense, the arguments refer to actual institutional practices defining 
some societies, mainly but not exclusively liberal ones, and how they have been 
challenged by a globalised world in the performance o f their moral roles The inexorable 
socio-economic interdependence based on technological development affecting the 
means o f communication, which shapes the lives of compatriots and non-compatriots and 
characterises the society o f states in our time, nourishes a notion of ethical processes. 
The cross-border flows o f people and ideas as well as the multinational flows of goods, 
services and financial resources foster the emergence o f new ethical discourses and 
organisations in the form o f an expanded international civil society - NGO’s, boards o f 
international corporations and informal networks. These practices and discourses 
permeate the development o f states’ ethical processes and as so they should be 
recognised in the construction o f international just principles.202
202 The state has been gradually obliged to face up to the expansion not only o f  N G O ’s, boards o f  
international corporations and informal networks but also o f  entities that are politically and legally off-
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Furthermore, and most importantly to my ethical framework, these flows expose 
the increasing clashes between developed societies and non-developed ones as well as 
between liberal and non-liberal ones. Rather than avoiding the implications of these 
clashes, there is a need to consider their significance in the construction of more 
workable international just principles. I argue that the way to consider this significance is 
to understand the formulation o f principles as an exercise in which ethical states have to 
openly exchange viewpoints on their particular interpretations of a system o f rights on the 
basis o f a revitalized reasonableness, which should include the exercise o f a moral 
sensibility. Such a discussion tries to capture what a historically limited (and mostly 
liberal) notion o f reasonableness cannot convey.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first one upholds the claim that the 
main characteristic o f an ethical state is its ability to guarantee the exercise o f reciprocity 
between equally free claimants, contributing in this form to individuals’ moral 
development. It explores what I perceive to be the fundamental elements involved in this 
exercise and briefly discusses the actual state mechanisms responsible for guaranteeing 
this exercise in view o f the challenges provided by context characterized by increasing 
interdependence. The second section offers a characterization o f the relations among 
states in an international society. This characterisation is made in terms o f states’ need to 
recognise each other as equally self-determining ethical units capable o f openly 
exchanging their particular views in the moral foundations of their system o f rights so as 
to construct viable international just principles. It then illustrates these terms of 
interaction by referring to the actual process that defines the content o f principles of 
justice in a forum such as the UN. The third section considers the constraints facing this 
deliberation process and examines to what extent states that do not share similar ethical 
values could be recognised as members o f an international society and eventually as 
participants in the construction o f international just principles. As a result o f the 
arguments backing the recognition o f states that defend different ethical values, the fourth
springs o f  the states, such as international organisations and regulation agencies. These entities, bom inside 
or outside states’ initiatives, respond to the increasing demand for what Rosenau calls “governance” : the 
formal or informal mechanisms and rule systems that exercise authority so as to allow individuals to pursue 
their coherence and attain their desired goals in a more globalized environment. J. N. Rosenau, “Strong 
Demand, Huge Supply: Governance in an Emerging Epoch” in I. Bache & M. Flinders, M., M ulti-level 
Governance. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 31.
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section explores the need state representatives and civic society groups have to combine 
reasonable (and mostly liberal) arguments with a moral sensibility that is capable of 
grasping in a less biased way the claims o f one another in the actual process of 
formulating valid principles o f justice. Finally, I draw some conclusions.
5.1) The State as Ethical Entity
The state provides a unique kind of institutional mechanism through which 
individuals can relate to each other on the basis o f reciprocity, fairness of treatment and 
trust. It sets legitimate enforceable mechanisms that make it possible for individuals of 
different backgrounds to effectively relate to each other as equal sources o f valid claims 
in the construction o f a common order that while limited in time and space touches 
diverse aspects o f their lives, influencing the formation o f their identity and how they act. 
By playing this role in the constitution o f moral individuals (citizens) and contextualizing 
it in face o f the characteristic diversity o f an international society, the state eventually 
paves the way for individuals’ rapports, among compatriots and non-compatriots, which 
are coherent, meaningful and stable in a broader international context.
In accordance with the traditional Neo-Hegelian framework presented in chapter 
4, I assume the state is fundamentally characterised by its ability to guarantee the 
reciprocity exercise between equally free claimants. It is as members o f a state that 
individuals can interact with each other taking into account their equal status as 
independent claimant. They are able to present reasonable claims to each other in the 
construction o f a historically situated system o f rights and duties that, as the result o f 
being their rationally scrutinised common will, they can come to understand and identify 
with as a group. In this exercise o f reciprocity, individuals develop independent critical 
thinking so to asses the roles they are to perform in the provision o f a regulated and stable 
social environment, becoming rationally aware of their communal responsibilities and 
motivated enough to carry the burdens associated with these responsibilities.
To present my own interpretation o f a Neo-Hegelian approach to an international 
society, it is however necessary to enunciate what I see as being the singularities of this 
reciprocity exercise taking place through states’ institutional mechanisms. First, this
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exercise is distinctly marked by inclusiveness. It involves people with different 
backgrounds, skills and interests as well as topics that are as general and varied as 
possible, relating to all possible aspects o f individuals’ lives. Even if these individuals 
cannot identify with all the decisions taken in a public sphere, they are still associated 
with the basic values that shape the institutions and processes through which these 
decisions are taken and recognition becomes meaningful. In liberal states, such as the 
USA, they can still identify with the Constitution’s essentials and the general 
implications o f the exercise o f citizenship and the state’s role.
One may counter-argue by pointing to the fact that individuals’ potential 
participation in a variety o f multifunction entities in a global age may well cover such a 
need for diversity and inclusiveness in individuals’ formation. Some reflections by 
Thompson on the possibility o f conceiving the world in terms o f specialised communal 
associations, such as ethnic communities, religious bodies, companies, co-operatives and 
trade unions, as well as by Held on the possibility o f instituting democratic law in a 
global order through a diversity o f self-regulating associations that hold no sovereign 
power, from states to cities and corporations, illustrate the point.203 While being 
responsible for assuring different individuals’ welfare needs, these associations would 
still have the advantage o f being competitive enough to contain any abusive use o f power 
by one o f them.
This counter-argument however does not account for a second characteristic of 
this exercise o f mutual recognition backed by states. In the exercise o f reciprocity that 
takes place through structurally defined and lasting state mechanisms, individuals can 
coherently construct an ensemble perspective o f  the components o f  their identity. As 
citizens o f a state, they contribute and are subject to a system o f rights that define the
203 This argument is implied by Thompson and Held in different ways. When arguing for freedom o f  
associations at an international level, Thompson says “as the powers o f  states become more limited, we can 
expect that other comm unities w ill take over som e o f  the tasks that governments are now expected to 
perform. Ethnic communities, religious bodies, even companies, co-operatives and trade unions will be 
increasingly able and w illing to take on the responsibility for ensuring the welfare o f  individual members.” 
Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry. (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 184. 
W hile Held develops the concept o f  “time-space clusters”, by which states can be disconnected with any 
idea o f  fixed borders or territories. A s he affirms, “sovereignty is an attribute o f  the basic democratic law, 
but it could be entrenched and drawn upon in diverse self-regulating associations, from states to cities and 
corporations.” David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the M odem  State to Cosmopolitan  
Governance. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), page 234.
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various aspects o f their private and public life. In this interpretation, the state not only 
performs a formative role in individuals’ lives, through the exercise o f mutual recognition 
taking place in public deliberation, but also a coordinative one by offering individuals the 
possibility o f consciously grasping the various social roles they perform in their lives, 
such as family member, professional, religious person and member o f an ethnic group. 
State institutions and practices amalgamate a collective vision o f priorities that affects the 
different aspects o f individuals’ lives. Such a coordination, which results from 
individuals’ direct or indirect participation in the formulation and implementation of 
public policies, is not clearly guaranteed by multifunctional agencies, whose relationship 
is marked by diffusion o f interests and power.
Third, and mostly important to define its singularity, the exercise o f reciprocity is 
guaranteed by the enforceable power o f states to be widespread and regarded as 
fundamental in defining social rapport. Contrary to multifunctional agencies or other 
forms of governance provided by an increasingly influential international civic society, 
state’s authority is endowed with the legitimate use of force and not derived merely from 
negotiating skills, habits, informal agreements or shared premises. Thanks to this 
legitimate use o f force, state’s authority can guarantee compliance more effectively. 
Implied in this observation is the idea that relations o f reciprocity among individuals can 
more successfully work inside a state’s institutional framework than in alternative 
arrangements, which cannot completely override forms o f non-reciprocal relations.
Fourth, the exercise o f reciprocity implied in the rapports of citizens is 
historically situated. It relates to interactions that take place in a circumscribed territory 
and at a specific time -  here also considered in terms o f levels o f socio-economic 
development. These differences in space and time, as embedded in states’ structure, 
substantially affect the way the ethical role o f states is defined. That is so because these 
differences imply partiality in the way the moral development o f individuals can be 
perceived and achieved.
To consider the extent to which these historical contingencies acquire 
significance in my framework, let me gather some of the main arguments questioning the 
possibility of a global state in the contemporary literature o f justice and then contrasting 
them with my own understanding o f reasons why the main units o f an international
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society (ethical states) should be seen as historically situated constructions translating 
differentiated notions o f collectivities. There is a set o f arguments in the literature 
concerned with some very specific pragmatic implications o f a global state. One o f these 
arguments is derived from a shared perception that there are high personal and collective 
costs to be paid for giving up political arrangements already established in favour o f ill 
defined and untested institutional frameworks.
A first version o f this argument, which gets its inspiration from Kant’s reflection 
on the need for a federation of free states in contrast with a single global authority, is 
discussed by authors such as Held, in his defence o f the compatibility between 
confederalism and democratic cosmopolitan order, and O ’Neill, in her discussion about 
territorially bounded states and the formation o f identities204 It pays attention to the 
impracticability o f a government exercising some public functions, such as the 
enforcement o f a lawful constitution, in a global environment no matter how resourceful 
this government proves to be. The implicit idea here emphasised is that there is an 
optimum level o f efficiency in the management of public affairs, one that can be more 
closely approached when the public authority is circumscribed to an environment where 
it is able to identify the members and co-ordinate their actions.205
Although there is according to O’Neill no sufficient evidence to back the claim 
that a supra-national government would be less efficient than particular polities in 
exercising and enforcing power or attending to circumstantial limited demands, the 
argument on managerial costs of a global state leads to the consideration o f an important 
point. The representatives o f a global state might be more authoritarian in order to
204 This argument was implied by Kant when defending a federation o f  free states and later on 
acknowledged by authors such as Held and Nardin. This last author proposes a normative account o f  the 
international system based on the existence o f  various poles o f  influence with similar power capabilities, 
which refers back to the notion o f  Concert o f  Europe in the 17th Century. See Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” in Hans Reiss (ed.) , Kant Political W riting, pp. 102-105; David Held, 
Dem ocracy and the Global Order: From the M odem  State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1995, page 229-233. and O. O ’N eill, Bounds o f  Justice. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), pp. 171-172.
205 A complementary version o f  this argument calls attention to the lack o f  w illingness o f  existing political 
communities to give up already well-established mechanisms to validate their authority. One form o f  
interpreting this lack o f  w illingness is to consider the social costs implied in the political com m unities’ 
surrender o f  their sovereignty. Looking from the perspective o f  the decision-m aking process, public 
representatives could have their manoeuvre power to shape the formulation and implementation o f  policies 
curtailed. David Held, Dem ocracy and the Global Order: From the M odem  State to Cosmopolitan  
Governance. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), pp. 229-230.
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achieve their goals. Historical evidence to support this point might be, for instance, the 
record o f empire states.206 Given the fact that it can represent a hindrance to individuals’ 
self-awareness through their independent use o f critical abilities in the public deliberation 
of a common way o f life, authoritarianism is an alternative to be, if possible, avoided.
A second version of a pragmatic argument about the possible implications o f a 
global state refers to the gradualism of individual’s social attachments, derived from 
Hume’s thoughts on morality. For Hume, individuals’ sentiment in favour o f justice 
between individuals is derived from natural benevolence coupled with self-interest.207 
Non-benevolence among individuals tends to increase once they are less in contact with 
one another and the mechanisms responsible for forging their sense o f identification 
gradually weakens. Applied to a global state, this reasoning leads us to think that the 
decrease o f connective feelings among its members could more drastically affect 
individuals’ moral formation in the sense that they would be less prone to develop trust 
among themselves and share the burdens o f acting fairly with one another.
The two cited arguments are worthy o f consideration when defending diversity of 
units forming an international society so far as they have implications for the 
development o f a moral agent. But they are, from my viewpoint, fundamentally limited. 
Their concerns are too pragmatically centred in the combat o f the malevolent effects o f a 
global state and therefore prone to the possible defence o f a variety o f social 
arrangements besides the political communities. They are far from discussing the 
singularities o f the states of an international society and from providing elements for 
constructing an argument on why differences in space and time (among historically 
constructed ethical states) should be considered o f key significance in the characterisation 
o f these units, with deep normative implications for the well-functioning o f international 
society.
In view o f these observations, John Stuart Mill’s analysis o f the effects o f 
diversity on the cultivation o f individualities provides a more revealing explanation for 
the significance o f historical contingencies. This is all the more relevant when 
considering the potential influence this analysis has in the current discussions about
206O. O ’N eill, Bounds o f  Justice, p. 173. For authoritarian procedures in empire states, see Eric Hobsbawn, 
The A ge o f  Empire 1875-1914. (London, Abacus, 1994), pp. 56-84.
207 J. L. M ackie, H um e’s Moral Theory. (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 114-117.
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multicultural societies undertaken, for example, by Kymlicka who claims that these 
societies are more able to revise its forms o f life and re-assert its fundamental political 
principles by incorporating alien impulses.208 For John Stuart Mill, only when coping 
with an adversary founded on the existing differences o f human interests and situations 
can the human race achieve high standards o f development.209 Following this reasoning, 
global institutional arrangements could lead to the suffocation o f innovative thinking so 
far as it facilitates the standardisation of tastes and behaviour among individuals through 
the homogenization o f the basic structures that define the social environment where these 
relations take place. Therefore, these arrangements must be avoided.
By indirectly emphasising the link between the development o f individualities 
and the singularity o f a social environment that is necessarily historically situated, John 
Stuart Mill signals the reasons for which in my own Neo-Hegelian interpretation 
geographically and timely differences are fundamental in individuals’ moral 
development. A social environment, and the way it is organised over time and across 
space, is the primordial locus where individuals can contextualise, and therefore have a 
clear grasp of, their basic capacity for thinking and acting towards otherness on a moral 
basis. A historically situated system of rights embodies a singular understanding o f a 
collective way of life, meaning common interpretations and evaluations about what is 
generally accepted as individuals’ leading good lives. These interpretations reflect shared 
experiences and a socialisation process that, while helping to define the singularity o f a 
particular public political culture, offer concrete meaning to individuals’ thinking 
capacities and actions. Therefore, they constitute a more coherent comprehension o f 
where they stand as distinct moral personalities.210 When extended to the macro-level of
208See W ill Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship.
209 John Stuart Mill even equates the amount o f  eccentricity in a society to the amount o f  genius, mental 
vigour, and moral courage necessary to bring innovation to it. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, edited by 
Stefan Collini, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 72-74.
210 Habermas’ analysis o f  the democratic State is in line with the argument here developed to a global 
perspective in which the construction o f  principles are derived from the effort o f  politically constituted 
individuals to establish a dialogue that aims at self-understanding. According to him, “through their 
socialization processes, however, the persons which a state is composed o f  at any given time also embody 
the cultural forms o f  life in which they have developed their identity-even if  they have in the meantime 
becom e disengaged from the traditions o f  their origins. Persons-or better, their personality structures-form 
the nodal points, as it were, in an ascriptive network o f  cultures and traditions, o f  intersubjectively shared 
contexts o f  life and experience. And this network also forms the horizon within which the citizens o f  the 
nation, w illingly or not, conduct the ethical-political discourses in which they attempt to reach agreement
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analysis, this argument on differences in the construction o f a system o f rights can, if 
accompanied by a presupposition of the partial openness o f these societies, contribute to 
the emergence o f a more critical debate about the kind o f social order most suitable for 
the formation of moral agents in general.
Differences in collective ways o f life are related to different interpretations of 
basic principles that establish the pre-requisites for the development o f moral agents and 
guide the formation to a historically situated system o f rights. There are two fundamental 
sources o f difference in the interpretation o f these principles. One is related to 
differences in the content of rights as exemplified by liberal societies. Another refers to 
the form o f principles, meaning the reasons given to justify rights. The first source 
comprehends different views on how values such as freedom and equality will be 
balanced towards each other and expressed in the form o f public policies. Countries such 
as Germany, Sweden, Finland and Norway give emphasis to the equalisation o f levels of 
welfare and social benefits received by the whole population while countries such as the 
UK and USA prefer to concentrate on a more robust view o f individuals’ freedom. The 
second source encompasses different interpretations o f the meaning and importance of 
the core values that inform general principles and validate the whole system o f rights. An 
illustration is offered by hierarchical societies such as the Islamic countries in the Middle 
East, which have a far more formal and restricted understanding o f the equality principle. 
That is so because o f their tendency to interpret individual rights through the 
hierarchically defined social roles individuals should perform in society.211
It is however important to add that a full grasp o f these individuals’ capacities 
cannot be obtained without these states being opened to the understanding of each others’ 
particular interpretations o f the moral foundations of their systems so as to construct a 
more regulated and stable international society. Therefore, an added characteristic o f  the 
exercise o f reciprocity guaranteed by state’s mechanisms is that it implies a notion of
on their self-understanding.” Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion o f  the Other. (Cambridge, M assachusetts, 
1998), p.218.
211 I should make clear that differences in the form o f  principles is sustainable so far as it does not deny a 
minimum level o f  fairness in the interactions among compatriots as well as between them and members o f  
other communities. By that, I mean mechanisms that allow individuals to form and express their own  
judgements about how to conduct their lives vis-a-vis one another, not jeopardising their ability to 
constitute them selves as moral agent.
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openness to otherness. This openness, as I will demonstrate below, is related to the 
different manners envisaged by state representatives to grasp these particular 
interpretations and to acknowledge them in the performance o f their common ethical role. 
These different manners are concomitantly expressed in the definition o f foreign 
influences in a state’s internal structure as well as in the terms o f interaction among 
actors taking part in the international deliberation o f just principles.
The above characteristics defining the exercise o f mutual recognition taking place 
through a state’s mechanisms were presented in theoretically general terms. Let me now 
briefly discuss some o f the elements that can actually form part o f an ethical state’s 
internal structure while trying to relate them with the challenges brought by an 
increasingly interdependent world. The provision o f an institutional framework where 
individuals can develop as moral agents implies states’ ability to care for the 
development o f two distinct but interconnected spheres o f social interaction and decision 
making.212 On the one hand, the state has to be able to support the existence o f a civil 
society distinct from itself and as lively and diverse as possible so that individuals can 
pursue their separate and particular interests having a grasp o f themselves as independent 
beings who have differently constituted interests and social attachments. It has in this 
sense to guarantee individuals’ freedom of expression, association and assembly by 
establishing reasonable criteria for the formation of a thriving but accountable media as 
well as o f associations marked by different purposes or issues, such as ethnic, religious, 
poverty, education and cultural issues.
On the other hand, the state has to be able to unify these separate and particular 
wills through individuals’ representation in a public process o f deliberation about the 
form and content o f a system o f rights. Moreover, it has to do so by instilling trust in its 
available institutions and procedures making individuals feel that their integrity as 
individually independent thinkers and participants in the dynamics of these distinct civil 
groups are preserved as well as their voices are heard and have all the same weight in this 
process o f public deliberation.213 In this sense, there should be a democratic system
212 M. Hardimon, H egel’s Social Philosophy: The Project o f  Reconciliation, pp. 210-211.
213 It involves trust as Hardimond defines it: “my substantial and particular interest is contained and 
preserved in the interests and end o f  another (the state), and in the latter relation to me as an individual.” 
Ibid.. p.213.
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based on the rule o f law, the separation o f powers as well as the formation o f a class of 
civil servants responsible for managing the state’s affairs in an efficient and impartial 
way. The state has also to make individuals acknowledge that their participation in 
public deliberation should not be based on the mere defence o f particular group interests. 
It should express their experience o f social integration in a broad sense, as citizens who 
produce conjointly with others a historical interpretation o f moral norms (defining a 
distinct way to critically assess the claims o f each other in the construction of a particular 
system o f rights that actually determines the limits of their liberty) and, therefore, 
construct a political cultural identity that helps significantly to define their attitudes as 
moral agents in various contexts.
To be genuinely meaningful, however, this experience o f social integration has, 
however, to be embedded in a historical context, as required in a Hegelian approach. A 
remarkable feature o f the way individuals conduct their lives nowadays is by forging 
more and more links with non-compatriots in an increasing interdependent world, leading 
eventually to the empowerment o f social groups, transfer o f technology and investments 
at a transnational level. These links, which express in great part an international 
expansion o f a notion o f civil society, affect individuals’ formation (development o f inner 
abilities, definition o f interests and attachments) as well as the way they perceive their 
political participation in a particular state. Rather than trying to deny these links, there is 
a need to recognise them, making them meaningful and useful in politico-ethical terms.
More specifically, civil organisations, voluntary agencies, interest groups, private 
companies, philanthropic foundations, universities and think tanks provide for a range o f 
services, from education and health care to the raising o f public awareness o f a cause. 
And this provision o f services has been increasingly assuming a multinational scope in 
terms o f applicability as illustrated by the works o f philanthropic foundations such as the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, an organisation such as Amnesty International 
raising public awareness o f torture or even the actions multinational enterprises take in 
exercising corporate responsibility. Given their limited interests and their ability to act 
effectively in defence o f these interests, such entities can substantially influence 
individuals’ lives, not only raising their basic standards o f living but also making them 
more aware o f how common initiatives can have a structural impact on society. Rather
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than choosing to depreciate the activities and the influence o f these entities, the states 
have to institutionally acknowledge their impact in individuals’ formation and 
incorporate them as inputs in the definition o f national legislation and policies as well as 
in the interpretation o f international regulative procedures, to enhance their ethical 
appeals and re-affirm themselves as central to citizens’ development.
In these terms, the Hegelian recommendation that individuals should make their 
political voices heard, through their active engagement in groups o f civil society and not 
merely in an atomistic way by making use o f a right to a universal suffrage (voting), is 
reinforced. Its strength should be viewed thus in connection with the potential ethical 
role states are to perform in individuals’ moral development in an increasingly globalized 
social environment.214 The influence o f foreigners in a society has to be regulated so as 
not to destroy the proper national political environment where ethical attitudes are 
instilled in individuals. It could be argued that until most recently, this regulation was 
mainly dependent on an internal debate among citizens o f a state about the definition o f 
criteria to regulate the participation o f non-compatriots in the construction o f a 
distinctively political culture. With the increasing pace o f the globalization process, 
regulation nonetheless begins to depend more and more on states’ ability to agree on the 
reasons why and on what terms they are prepared to recognise each other’s self­
determining capacities.
5.2) The Relationship among Ethical States
Relationships among states in an international society are fundamentally marked 
by their mutual ability to recognise each other as distinctly and independently unified 
collectivities with ends that are spatially and temporally dependent. Moreover, they are 
also based on the common understanding that to perform their ethical role in individuals’ 
moral development they should openly exchange viewpoints on their particular 
interpretations o f the founding principles defining the ethical content of their 
collectivities. This exchange allows them to have a more comprehensive grasp o f the
214 Ib id  pp. 222-223
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role they are to perform in individuals’ moral development and lead them to formulate 
international principles of justice responsible for upholding this development in an 
interdependent historical context.
Let me elaborate my arguments. The states have to be conceived as single, 
independent, sovereign bodies that though resting on individuals’ consent to attain final 
legitimacy, have their own dynamics and can act autonomously in accordance with this 
dynamics.215 They are provided with a certain individuality derived from their ability to 
embody a distinguishable collective way of life, guaranteeing individuals’ exercise of 
their autonomous capacities in the process o f defining a system o f rights while providing 
these individuals with a social context and a range o f shared experiences that give a 
common morally motivated meaning to their actions.216
To be conceived as autonomous entities that embody these distinctively collective 
ways o f life states need to be in a relation o f mutual recognition to each other. Following 
Hegel, states need one another both in a negative sense (as opposition) so they can 
distinguish themselves in their singularity and in a positive sense so they can have their 
individuality affirmed amid other ones. Putting it differently, states need to be 
autonomous to perform their morally constitutive role in individuals’ lives through the 
construction o f a historically situated system o f rights, but they can only attain this status 
when they are recognised by one another in their equal sovereign capacity.217
It is however important to make a remark here. The states’ need to conceive 
themselves in a relation of opposition could lead them to grievous disputes unresolved 
through peaceful means. War is an unavoidable feature o f an international system 
formed by sovereign states that through a process o f recognition come sometimes to 
affirm their distinction in opposition to one another by resorting to force. This being so, 
the outbreak o f war does not always have a bad connotation. As Hegel duly argues, it
215Ibid.. pp. 232.
216 Rawls makes the same point when referring to the process o f  socialization as a way o f  inculcating a 
notion o f  justice in the individuals. John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, chapter VIII on the sense o f  justice. 
See also Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion o f  the Other, p. 221. In defending cultural rights, Habermas says 
“the integrity o f  the individual legal person cannot be guaranteed without protecting the intersubjectively 
shared experiences and life contexts in which the person has been socialized and has formed his identity. 
The identity o f  the individual is interwoven with collective identities and can be stabilized only in a cultural 
network that cannot be appropriated as a private property any more than the mother tongue can be.”
217 Shlom o Avineri, H egel’s Theory o f  the M odem  State, p. 199 and M. Hardimond, H egel’s Social 
Philosophy: The Project o f  R econciliation, p.233.
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can also be seen as beneficial to the moral development o f individuals. It requires of 
individuals to strengthen their attachments to a specific polity, representing at the same 
time a test o f solidarity with fellow citizens and a proof that the values o f civil society are 
only relative to the common set o f values and norms defining a state.218 The possible 
effects o f war do not, however, warrant its outbreak. It only shows how best to 
understand the functioning o f states and to take advantage o f a fact o f international 
relations.219 The analogy to health and sickness made by Hegel and interpreted by 
Avineri serves to illustrate the point: “only when attacked by disease can one form a 
judgement of whether a particular body is healthy or not. War is not the health of a state 
-  in it a state’s health is put to the test.” 220
In view o f the above Hegelian arguments, I assume that the eventuality o f war 
rather than restraining states’ search for regulatory principles for their conduct, serves as 
a reminder o f the need for these principles given the mediating role ethical political 
communities are to perform in the development o f moral beings. States have a shared 
interest in establishing a common body o f norms and practices that makes their 
coexistence not only possible but also meaningful from the perspective o f fulfilling their 
ethical role. I mean that they are willing to provide for a safe and well-defined 
institutional environment through which their citizens are guaranteed not only the 
exercise o f their critically thinking capacities through a historically situated process of 
public deliberation on the form and content of a system of rights but also the possibility 
o f applying and exploring these moral basic capacities in their encounters with otherness 
in an increasingly complex world.
More specifically, states have an interest in establishing international principles of 
justice whose parameters are given by the ethical role they are to perform in individuals’ 
moral development both at the national and international level, seen here as 
interconnected spheres. The fundamental subject o f just principles becomes therefore the 
most basic claim any individual can make towards another taking into account the 
provision of essential conditions to empower them as morally fit interlocutors that can
218 See Shlom o Avineri, H egel’s Theory o f  the M odem  State, pp. 196-197.
219.Ibid.. pp. 196-197 and M. Hardimond, H egel’s Social Philosophy: The Project o f  Reconciliation. 
pp.230-236.
220 Shlom o Avineri, H egel’s Theory o f  the M odem  State, p. 199.
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exchange independent and critical viewpoints on the constitution o f a good life.221 One 
of the most basic claims individuals can make towards each other refers to their right to 
be citizens o f a self-determined political community (states), in which their exercise of 
freedom o f choice, assembly and expression vis-a-vis one another as well as their 
participation in public decisions on a fair basis, equally able to express their viewpoints 
and to make them valid in the process o f shaping specific policies (first generation 
rights), are guaranteed. Given that citizens’ enjoyment o f civic and political liberties 
depends on access to subsistence goods (second generation rights), the states should also 
be seen as the primary entity responsible for guaranteeing the socio-economic well-being 
o f their members.
Although I discuss the self-determination principle and its implications to the 
well-functioning international society in the next chapter, it is worth here emphasising a 
further point. Because o f the universal reach o f its ethical purpose but the historical 
limitation o f its realisation, the principle o f self-determination grounds relations among 
states so far as it is conceived in relation to other sets o f fundamental principles, 
including observance o f basic international human rights, non-intervention and the 
limitation in the use o f aggressive means by the states. Furthermore, it must be 
conceived in relation to a duty o f international assistance, based on the realisation that the 
state can only perform effectively its ethical role at the international level if its citizens 
are recognised in their moral capacities by all other states’ citizens and able to relate with 
them on the basis o f these capacities. It is in the interest o f more resourceful political 
communities to help less capable ones to provide for a distinctive social environment, 
where the citizens o f these last states can flourish as morally fit interlocutors.
As principles o f international justice need interpretation so as to become actual 
guidelines o f behaviour to the members o f an international society, I therefore assume 
that states are willing to deliberate on the content o f these principles. This deliberation 
about the content o f these principles has to be perceived as a historically situated
221 Rawls defines such individuals’ empowerment in terms o f  access to primary goods. J. Rawls, A Theory 
o f  Justice, p. 90. Though touching on the same issue, other authors preferred to explain individuals’ basic 
empowerment in different terms. Sen discusses the notion o f  capabilities, as I stressed in chapter 4, w hile  
Gewirth works with the concept o f  generic features o f  action. See SEN, A ., “Capability and W ell-B eing” 
in Martha Nussbaum & A. Sen, The Quality o f  L ife. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 46-49. 
A. Gewirth, “Ethical Universalism and Particularism” in The Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. LXX XV , N o. 6, 
June, 1988, p. 290.
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exercise, in which the parties, regarding themselves as equally situated interlocutors, 
express their particular and sometimes conflicting interpretations of the good life while 
being open to the understanding o f each others’ diverse viewpoints. Through this 
provision o f arguments and counter-arguments that are contingently dependent, the 
parties come to have a broader comprehension o f what is involved in the performance of 
their common ethical duties, whose foundation and scope o f application is essentially 
universal. In its turn, this broader comprehension makes the states more prone to agree 
on what concerns the morally justifiable liberties o f individuals worldwide as well as to 
define clear standards o f behaviour among these states, whose infringement justifies the 
use o f enforcement procedures, including the use of force.222
An implication o f this argument is that the polities should be willing to accept that 
the deliberation process will have a binding effect on them, no matter what its outcome. 
It would not be possible for them to see the deliberation process o f the content o f just 
principles merely as a form o f obtaining advantages, following the rules only when it is 
convenient in terms o f specific economic or social rewards for them. They have to 
perceive this process as one involving an effective and long-lasting commitment whose 
basic premises they can identify with and whose outcomes they are prepared to follow. 
In perceiving it as so, they should be willing to set mechanisms to guarantee compliance.
Having presented what I see as the fundamental terms o f  interaction among the 
ethical units o f an international society, let me now contextualise some o f these terms of 
interaction by briefly discussing the actual process of deliberation of just principles.223 
That will serve not only to illustrate some o f the above arguments but also to confront 
them with the challenges imposed by an increasingly interdependent reality and address 
the implications o f this confrontation for my ethical framework. The deliberation here 
described can take place in a forum such as the European Union or the United Nations 
(UN). The former is perhaps the most advanced and dense integration arrangement o f 
states nowadays. But the latter is the most comprehensive international organisation
222 This interpretation o f  the content o f  just principles is in line with Nardin’s understanding o f  
international justice. For him, justice w ill concern those parts o f  common morality that it is not improper to 
enforce by incorporating them in positive law. Terry Nardin, “Justice and Coercion” in R. Bellam y (ed.), 
International Society and its Critics. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.252-253.
223 A more detailed analysis o f  the deliberation o f  just principles and the possibilities o f  their enforcement 
w ill be presented in chapter 6.
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currently available founded on the universal membership o f sovereign states. Such an 
organisation can be perceived not only as a unique forum o f debate but also of 
elaboration o f norms and co-ordination o f actions among these states aiming at the 
construction o f an international system characterised by universality. In being perceived 
as such, the UN becomes the focus o f my discussion on the deliberation process o f just 
principles.
It is clear that an organization such as the UN, which involves such a diversity of 
members as well as scope o f activities, is bound to suffer from problems o f legitimacy 
and effectiveness. At least it is less able to achieve effective enforcement o f its policies 
than smaller organizations such as the EU. As it is illustrated by the UN 2000 
Millennium report and its follow-ups, member states are increasingly being called to act 
conjointly to minimize the adverse effects o f an economically interdependent order, but 
are still either reticent or unable to do so.224 States that hold a strong negotiating position 
in this organisation are afraid o f setting precedents that could mean the loss o f their 
discretionary power, as well as of supporting an organisation that suffers from an excess 
o f  bureaucratization, lack o f resources and diffusion o f power. They prefer to address 
some o f these effects by taking unilateral actions or highly limited multilateral actions. 
While states that are potentially beneficiaries of the actions implied in the minimization 
o f the adverse effects o f economic globalisation either do not have at their disposal the 
skills and resources to get actively involved in the debate or are obstructed from doing so 
because o f the way the power structure o f this organisation has been defined.
According to the framework here developed, these problems have however to be 
addressed in consonance with the need states have to reassess the ethical role they are due 
to perform. To function as ethical units, as potentially valid creators o f a distinct social 
environment where individuals can constitute themselves as self-conscious moral agents
224‘‘We the People: The role o f  the U nited N ations in the 21s' C entury , Report o f  the Secretary-General 
(K ofi Annan), United Nations, 2000; “Strengthen ing  o f  the U nited  Nations: an agenda fo r  change  ”, Report 
o f  the Secretary-General, United Nations, 9/9/2002; Resolution adopted by the General A ssem bly 55/2  
United Nations M illennium Declaration, United Nations, 20/2/2002; “Im plem enta tion  o f  the U nited  
N ations M illennium  D eclaration  ”, Report o f  the Secretary-General, 2/09/2003; “Sta tus o f  im plem entation  
o f  actions described  in the report o f  the Secretary-G enera l en titled  'S trengthening o f  the U nited  N ations : 
an agenda  fo r  fu r th e r  c h a n g e ’, Report o f  the Secretary-General, 5/09/2003; “In larger freedom : tow ards 
developm ent, security  a n d  hum an rights fo r  a lP \ Report o f  the Secretary-General, 21/3/2005.
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and relate with otherness on these terms, states need to be able to recognise themselves in 
their equally self-determining capacity and to translate this recognition into the actual 
deliberation o f regulatory procedures at the international level. Extreme inequalities of 
power that limit the argumentative capacity of the parties and impose patterns o f relations 
based on patronising attitudes, such as the tendency o f more developed states to attribute 
a backward rationality to developing countries in the definition o f issues related to 
morality and human rights, should be restrained. This kind o f attitude tends to underline 
a power politics perspective based on pre-established or simplistic rational criteria that 
shape the debate in terms o f an antithesis, between those that can be seen and trusted as 
coherent, well-developed social entities and the others that cannot.225 It ends up 
degrading less fitted states in their potentiality to become the unified vehicle o f moral 
self-consciousness for their members. Consequently, it renders these states less aware o f 
their responsibilities as the main provider o f a distinctively national environment in 
which moral agents can flourish, relating with otherness consistently on a fair basis as 
well as o f an internationally regulated environment where the integrity o f these moral 
agents is maintained.
In an increasingly interdependent world, the lack o f recognition o f states in their 
potentiality to become the unified vehicle o f moral self-consciousness for their members 
has broader consequences. It ultimately leads to the propagation o f actions associated 
with an uncivil society that denies, because o f its inability to understand and identify 
with, claims o f mutual freedom made by non-compatriots and the significance o f these 
claims in the construction o f an international order. Examples o f the propagation of these 
actions were given most recently by the string of terrorists’ attacks in USA on September 
11th 2001, in Indonesia on October 12th 2002, in Spain on March 11th 2004 and in 
England on July 7th 2005 and in Egypt July 23rd 2005, which threatened individuals’ 
integrity in their origins, no matter their citizenship.
The observations here made have however to be understood in relation to two 
sorts o f concern, leading to quite different implications for my theoretical scheme. One
225 See F. Dallymayr, “Conversation Across Boudaries: Political Theory and Global Diversity” in 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies. 2001, p.333-334. The same kind o f  argument sustain the 
notion o f  orientalism defended by Jack D onnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 
(London, Cornell Univesity Press, 1989), Part IV.
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thing is to assess how to empower less fitted members of an international society, who 
potentially share ethical principles based on liberal values but are unable to follow these 
principles because o f their lack o f political capabilities and/or economic resources to do 
so. Another thing is to define the extent to which it is possible to recognise states that, 
suffering or not from the lack o f political capabilities and/or economic resources, contest 
the liberal interpretations o f some fundamental ethical values.226
The first sort o f concern is mainly related to pragmatic measures to reinstate less 
fitted states in their capacity o f being independent vehicles o f their citizens’ moral­
consciousness and therefore an independent and active voice in the search for 
international principles o f justice. As the emphasis here is in these states’ ability to be 
recognised in their self-determining capacities, their government holds primary 
responsibility for finding the most suitable way to attain good governance (democracy, 
accountability, respect for human rights, citizenship) and formulate effective social 
policies, targeting critical issues such as poverty and education. Help from more 
developed countries has to come in the form o f coordinative initiatives to diminish the 
burdens brought on less developed countries by the process of interdependence, such as 
debt relief, market access and the envisagement o f programmes to increase private and 
foreign investments. It also has to be accompanied by strategies that take into 
consideration the fact that recognition can only be attained if these less fitted parties learn 
how to make effective their potential self-determining capacities. The UN Secretary- 
General’s recent pledges and the joint initiatives launched by countries such as Brazil, 
India and South Africa concerning the reform of the UN Security Council, so as to make 
it more legitimate and effective, obtain from this viewpoint real significance.227
As a follow up o f the measures, there should be a formal acknowledgement o f the 
role played by groups in international civil society in helping less fitted states to realise
226 In a Rawlsian framework, these societies are categorised as burdened and decent peoples. The first 
kind o f  peoples lacks “the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the 
material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered.” The latter kind o f  peoples is non-liberal 
societies that “meet certain specified conditions o f  political right and justice and lead its people to honour a 
reasonable and just law for the Society o f  Peoples”. See John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples. (London, 
Harvard University Press, 1999), respectively on page 106 and pages 59-60.
227 Concerning specifically the Secretary-General’s recent pledges on the reform o f  the Security Council, 
see "S treng then ing  o f  the U nited  Nations: an agenda fo r  change", Report o f  the Secretary-General, United 
Nations, 9/9/2002, p. 08.
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their ethical functions. As their activities more easily permeate social life in these states, 
these groups are in a position to help the government to identify key policy issues, to 
grasp their population’s perception about these issues as well as to assist in the 
implementation o f public decisions. Therefore, they should be increasingly represented in 
an international forum o f debate and deliberation about principles o f justice such as the 
UN. From this perspective, the UN Secretary-General’s call made in his 2002 report to 
improve modalities o f interactions between the UN’s system and civil society groups 
while preserving these groups’ consultative status in international meetings and 
conferences in order to strength human rights at the country level is a welcome step 
towards a more legitimate process o f decision making.228
The second sort o f concern has nonetheless broad normative implications for my 
theoretical scheme and here it will be dealt with in a separate section. It derives from the 
fact that the ethical arguments till now defended regarding states’ constitution and their 
relationship is clearly based on liberal values (freedom and equality). They do' not 
incorporate states that question to what extent freedom and equality are to be seen as 
“sine qua non” values for the development o f moral individuals. In being seen thus, they 
can be accused o f being too narrow in their scope o f application, mainly when thinking 
about the constitution o f the world today. Liberal and Islamic values, as well as their 
possible clashes, are being randomly interpreted and incorporated in the discourses of 
groups o f an uncivil international society today, as is the case with A1 Qaeda. In the face 
o f these possible accusations, it becomes fundamental to evaluate to what extent these 
states can be recognised as members o f international society in light o f the ethical 
framework here presented and therefore effective participant in the process of 
deliberating about international principles o f justice.
5.3) The Recognition of States Holding Different Understandings of Ethical Values
From the ethical framework here envisaged, disagreement on the basic ethical 
values o f freedom and equality could be accepted so far as it offers new elements in the
228 "S trengthening o f  the U nited  N ations: an agenda fo r  change  ”, Report o f  the Secretary-General, United 
Nations, 9/9/2002, pp. 24-25.
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process o f unveiling the means through which individuals could morally flourish. It is in 
respect to this condition that societies holding different notions o f ethical values could be 
recognised by an international society and included in the process o f deliberation of just 
principles. The object o f consideration is above all societies that hold comprehensive 
views o f the good, recognising for example individuals primarily as members o f a 
hierarchical community and then deriving their basic rights from the common value 
attributed to this hierarchical order. But these societies can still perform, even if not 
fully, the basic ethical functions suggested in the above section. They are able to protect 
the most basic economic and social human rights, respect the rule of law, consider some 
level o f fairness in the application o f laws and conduct public affairs by mutual 
consultation, paving the way to secure a minimum level o f independent critical thinking, 
equity and reciprocity for their citizens.229 Besides that, they can be seen as not willing to 
impose their comprehensive doctrines on other states by making use o f force or making 
use o f unlawful means to obtain what they want at the international level. This 
unwillingness to impose their views leaves them open to understand the function of 
reasonable disagreement in the construction o f international just order, though not 
necessarily on the strict terms proposed by liberal societies.
An example of my point about states holding different notions o f ethical values 
can be constructed in terms o f the recent historical developments o f Iranian society. 
Soon after the Islamic Revolution, there was a lively debate about which institutional 
concept o f an Islamic Republic should prevail in the 1979 Constitution. A consensus 
among intellectuals and some leading politicians eventually emerged. The guardianship 
o f the community (acting as the main Jurist in respect o f the Koran and the sunna -  the 
Koran as interpreted and enforced by the traditions of the Prophet) would be represented 
by a well-informed figure, accepted by the majority o f the population as the source of 
moral conduct. His authority would be balanced by a parliament and a president elected 
by universal suffrage as well as by the independence o f the legislative and judicial 
branches. This consensus however ended up being in real terms undermined by the 
radicalisation o f Khomeini’s religious position and his unwillingness to respect the
229 In spite o f  being more general, my characterisation o f  these societies is close to the one made by Rawls 
on decent hierarchical societies. John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, pp.
64-67.
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maxim that no formal intrusion of religious expertise could be accepted in how political 
affairs are conducted.230
The possibility o f thinking of a notion o f consensus in the above terms and 
attaching to it a modernist interpretation o f Islamic ethics, following the line emphasised 
by Hashmi in his interpretation o f international society, leads to my characterisation of 
ethical and yet non-liberal states. In this interpretation, the guardianship would act as a 
form o f supervisor o f the ethical framework provided by the Koran and the sunna, 
understood here as a unified moral code and religious source of the law. This moral code 
could be seen as establishing basic notions o f individual rights, equity and reciprocity 
according to the Koran’s understanding o f the mutual rights o f Muslins (“no one truly 
believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for him self’ and “the whole o f a 
Muslim for another Muslim is inviolable, his life, his property, and his honour”) and its 
reference to the believers as those who “conduct their affair by mutual consultation”.231 
Moreover, this moral code paves the way to the emergence of an international society 
consisting o f good believers as well as unbelievers each to be “brought by God”, 
founding it in the possibility o f individuals’ right moral judgement based on reason and 
not necessarily on faith.232 In this last understanding, reasonable disagreement among 
states o f the international societies and interactions on the basis o f that assumption could 
eventually be envisaged. The eventual contradictions, omissions or historical gaps present 
in this moral code would be settled among religious scholars mainly by appealing to 
reason and in connection with the inputs provided by a politically organised population.
I am aware that the formulation o f the argument in these terms leads to the kind 
o f charges brought against Rawls by authors such as Kuper and Caney on the possibilities 
o f other forms o f social arrangements, particularly related to Rawls’ description o f 
“decent societies” .233 The notion o f societies holding different conceptions o f ethical
230In what concerns the prevailing political perceptions o f  the actors involved in the draft o f  Iran’s 1979 
Constitution see C, D e Bellaigue, In the Rose Garden o f  the Martyrs: A M emoir o f  Iran. (London, Harper 
Perennial, 2005), pp.101-102.
231 S. H. Hashmi, “Islamic Ethics in International Society” in David Mapel & Terry Nardin (eds.,), 
International Society: D iverse Ethical Perspectives, pp.228-230.
232 Ibid., p. 220.
233Concerning R aw ls’ description o f  decent societies, see John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, pp. 66-68. 
Concerning the criticisms o f  Kuper and Caney, see A. Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond The Law  
o f  P eoples  to a Cosmopolitan Law o f  Persons” in Political Theory. V ol. 28, N o. 5, October 2000, pp. 648-
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values as here described implies in fact the allowance o f intolerant practices against the 
population (restriction o f knowledge, state control o f information, denial o f education, 
gender discrimination), impeding their moral development by restricting their 
autonomous exercise o f reason. The implication is that individuals’ moral claims at the 
international level could be taken less seriously in liberal societies.
My answer to these criticism is that there is a difference to be made between, on 
the one hand, states that, though sharing distinctive ethical values, contribute to 
individuals’ moral development even if in a restrained way and, on the other hand, states 
that are victims o f intolerant regimes, animated by the narrow interests o f a religious and 
political elite as in the case o f Iran. It is precisely on the need to envisage different 
ethical frameworks to individuals’ moral development, without ruling out the 
achievement o f meaningful interaction among the main units o f an international society, 
that my analysis is concentrated. I rely on the fine perception that a common ground for 
agreement among polities has not to be necessarily based on a similar take on the good.234 
Intelligibility, and with that the possibility o f meaningful interaction, can be achieved 
even when diversity o f opinion refers not only to a limited dissonance on the content of 
international just principles that guide their behaviour but also to the reasons why these 
general principles should be regarded as significant to individuals’ moral development.235 
While serving to underline this point, the argument here presented implicitly addresses 
the complexities o f the present international dimension. It would suggest that existing 
communities that hold controversial views on the notions o f individuality and social order 
should, within the limits o f possible interaction, be allowed to engage as active
653 and Simon Caney, “Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the Law o f  Peoples” in The Journal o f  
Political Philosophy. V ol. 10, N o. 1 ,2002 , pp. 99-104.
234 I am here making a point against extreme perfectionism, which considers only one best take on the 
good. On the definition, see T,Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 653 and A. R. Lacey, A Dictionary o f  Philosophy. (London, Routledge, 1996), 
p. 337. I com e back to this point in chapter 6.
235In this regard, it is worth referring to Berlin’s point against cultural relativism and in favour o f  plurality. 
For him individuals can find the values o f  other different and distant cultures unacceptable at first sight but 
“if  they open their minds sufficiently they can grasp how one might be a full human being, with whom one 
could communicate, and at the same time live in the light o f  values w idely different from o n e’s own, but 
which nevertheless one can see to be values, ends o f  life, by the realisation o f  which men could be 
fulfilled.” I. Berlin, The Proper Study o f  Mankind: An Anthology o f  Essays. (N ew  York, Straus and 
Giroux, 1997), p. 9.
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participants in the deliberation o f principles o f international justice to broaden the debate 
about the validity o f these principles and offer them more legitimacy and effectiveness.
Let me further elaborate my point and its implications for the construction o f an 
ethical framework. In line with the liberal position defended by Rawls in his analysis of 
“decent peoples”, I support the view that states that do not share liberal ethical values 
should be accepted as bona fide  members o f an international society. However, in 
contrast to Rawls, I do not see the case as one o f accepting them in this capacity till they 
abide by liberal values. To accept this condition is to misinterpret the kind of exercise of 
mutual recognition that should be taking place among ethical states. 236 To portray 
toleration in this way is to understand liberal values as the only ones that are reasonable 
and therefore the only ones that pave the way for a meaningful consensus at the 
international level. As Caney observes, disagreements between liberal societies and 
societies that are guided by different ethical values (decent peoples) would be treated as a 
given. They could eventually be softened when these last societies after being exposed to 
liberal values and institutions suffer changes.237 Reciprocity o f treatment at the 
international level would be based on a notion o f contempt and not on the mutual respect 
o f the parties aiming at the rational re-assessment o f the beliefs, and the presuppositions 
derived from them, by which their different societies abide.
Even if it can be proved that liberal values and institutions are better vehicles to 
form a motivated moral agency and states can agree on improving their human rights 
records on liberal terms, this notion o f reciprocity o f treatment based on states’ ability to 
position themselves as open enough to take their claims seriously and recognise them as 
similarly fit interlocutors remains essential to achieve that goal. That is so because the 
existence o f any ethical state (including one based on liberal values) and its ability to 
perform its basic role in individuals’ formation depend in the long run on deep 
considerations o f counter-arguments in the search for a universality that is historically 
constructed. In more pragmatic terms, it depends on the construction of international just
236A ccording to Rawls, “liberal people should have confidence in their convictions and suppose that a 
decent society, when offered the respect by liberal peoples, maybe more likely, over tim e, to recognize the 
advantages o f  liberal institutions and take steps toward becoming more liberal on its ow n.” John Rawls, 
The Law o f  Peoples. Harvard University Press, London, 1999, p. 62.
237 Simon Caney., “Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the Law o f  Peoples” in The Journal o f  Political 
Philosophy, p.107.
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principles that are directed towards the preservation o f its citizens’ integrity and eventual 
exploration o f their identities in an increasingly interdependent world. But to be 
successful, this construction depends on states’ broader comprehension, through their 
ability to be seriously open to each others claims, o f the different ethical frameworks 
(spatially and temporally situated interpretations of moral visions) that in fact help 
motivate individuals to act on the basis o f these principles.238 As I argue in the next 
section, this broader comprehension has to involve a certain openness to the claims o f 
others in the sense that states have not only to act on the basis o f reasonableness but also 
to be morally sensitive to capture what cannot be necessarily translated by a 
reasonableness structure that is historically constrained.
5.4) The Argument for Moral Sensibility
In Hegelian thought and much o f the contemporary neo-Hegelian literature on 
justice, including the analysis o f Rawls and Frost, the deliberation process o f 
international just principles constitutes only a means for individuals to maintain their 
integrity as moral agents. It is not considered whether the deliberation o f just principles 
represents in itself an opportunity for individuals to further exercise their moral 
capacities. My arguments on the need states have to approach difference in a more 
constructive way so as to grasp the foundational elements that help constitute moral 
agency and support these principles lead to a criticism o f this position. If it is to become 
effective in grasping these foundationally ethical elements, the process o f formulation o f 
just principles will have to be seen as an exercise in which state representatives and 
groups o f international civil society come to develop openness to otherness in a broader
238Taking into account Habermas’ framework, I could say that despite their generality and their 
encom passing need to refer to the individual as a moral agent unconstrained by specific needs and interests, 
human rights principles are closely related to the rules o f  argumentation that shape the public debate about 
the form and content o f  just principles in each community. Rather than regarding these historical 
constraints as problematic, we should understand them as a necessary component in the attempt to grasp 
non-biased international principles. It is taking into account a dialogue among individuals living in different 
social contexts, who are w illing to confront their partial apprehensions o f  how they should live, that these 
principles can be grasped. About the interpretation o f  principles o f  human rights see Jurgen Habermas, The 
Inclusion o f  the Other. Section IV.
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sense, combining reasonable arguments with a moral sensibility that could eventually 
capture what cannot be translated by reasonable thinking.
Rawls and Frost seem to assume beforehand that there is little to be learned from 
individuals’ participation in the deliberation process at the international level. They seem 
to agree that the main characteristics necessary to constitute a moral agent - the 
independence o f thought and the ability to act on the basis o f reciprocity - are fully 
developed inside national borders, up to the point that they can participate in the 
construction o f a common system o f law. There is no substantial reason to depart from 
the common liberal standards o f deliberation, which are taken to be the most persuasive 
for building consensus, but to reflect on them using reasonable claims on one another.239 
By accepting beforehand liberal standards of deliberation, they play down the possibility 
that the confrontation o f different notions o f collective lives can bring more reflection not 
only to the formulation o f principles but also to the individuals’ perception of themselves 
through the participation o f the state representatives and groups o f international society in 
this deliberation. By reflection, I mean that participants in the process o f deliberation are 
obliged to test further the validity of the different interpretations o f justice, together with 
their comprehension and attachment to communal ethical values, which are imprinted in 
the historically constructed systems o f rights. They look forward to a compromise that 
expresses a deeper understanding o f how to cope with the limits o f these particular 
interpretations while attempting to maintain individuals’ moral integrity no matter what 
their citizenship is.
Referring to an overlapping consensus in The Law of Peoples. Rawls says “the 
parties are not given a menu o f alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as 
they are in Political Liberalism, or in A Theory o f  Justice. Rather, the representatives o f 
well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages o f these principles o f equality 
among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives.”240 The 
same logic o f there being no need to depart from them is applied in the interactions
239 See Frost on citizenship rights and the society o f  democratic states, pp. 115-118.  Mervyn Frost, 
Constituting Human Rights: Global civil society and the society o f  democratic states; John Rawls, The Law 
o f  Peoples, pp. 35-37.
240 I am more specifically relating this point to the follow ing works: Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human 
Rights: Global civil society and the society o f  democratic states. Routledge, London, 2002; Jurgen 
Habermas, The Inclusion o f  the Other: John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples.
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between well-ordered and decent societies (non-liberal societies). As I pointed out in the 
above section, well-ordered societies should recognise a decent society as a bona fide  
member o f the Society o f Peoples because that would constitute a method for 
encouraging the changes a decent society needs to make to be accepted as a fit 
interlocutor in the international scenario.241 In this last interpretation, the acceptance of 
societies that somehow do not share similar interpretations o f just principles is regarded 
prominently as a method o f co-optation. This perception is echoed in Frost’s analysis 
when he specifies the reasons to accept non-liberal societies as equal members in the 
system o f states:
[M y recognition is not a ‘once o f f  gate-keeping act in which I allow you in or turn you away from 
som e bounded area (in this case the domain o f  those who play chess), but involves a commitment on my 
part to educate you into this practice. For your part you recognise me as one who can do this and you 
indicate your w illingness to learn in any number o f  w ays.]242
Such a way o f portraying the relations among states in terms o f the co-optation 
efforts made by liberal states towards non-liberal ones so as to derive inclusive principles 
o f international justice is too narrow-minded. It treats the international society as an 
arena where liberal values are imprinted and not necessarily as an entity whose well- 
functioning depends on a broader grasp, through the ability o f states’ representatives to 
exercise further their openness to the historically situated claims and the world’s 
perceptions o f one another, o f the fundamental ethical elements supporting its structure.
In doing so, it tends to understand the formulation o f international just principles 
as a discussion already framed by strictly established procedures o f argumentation that 
echo liberal ideals rather than evolving statements, derived from a consensus among 
different historically situated interpretations on the best conditions to care for the 
constitution o f  a moral agent at a certain time. In this last interpretation, the 
contradictions and inconsistencies arising from the process o f deliberation of these 
principles should be seen as a necessary part in an attempt to grasp a universality that is
241 For Rawls, toleration o f  difference is seen as an instrument o f  co-optation. See RAW LS, J, The Law o f  
Peoples, p. 62.
242 Mervn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global civil society and the society o f  democratic states, p. 
154.
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not defined by the best argument but by a deeper understanding o f these different 
interpretations. As the formulation o f the two main UN covenants, and their subsequent 
follow up in formal conventions and discussions that recognise the right o f self- 
determination of nations, the right o f women and the right to development, illustrate, 
these contradictions and inconsistencies cannot be completely overridden. But they can 
be limited by participants’ common effort to understand each others’ position in a way 
that is more sensitive to the anthropological particularities, which permeate their 
particular system o f rights while helping to define their identities, and to derive changes 
from this deeper understanding.
Let me elaborate further my criticisms and my own view on the need to base the 
process o f deliberation o f justice principles on a notion of openness to otherness, which 
includes the possibility o f participants relating to each other in terms o f both reasonable 
thinking and moral sensibility. I would say that there are three problems in the way 
contemporary authors, such as the ones cited above, approach international deliberation. 
First, it overlooks the point that reasons given to validate a viewpoint (international 
principles in this case) are context sensitive and therefore can always be fallible. The 
individuals’ reflective capacities embodied in ethical entities (states) are necessarily 
limited by the proper historically situated conditions through which they are developed. 
Any single view presented by state representatives expresses just a partial view of just 
principles. In this sense, the persistence of doubt has to be regarded as an integral part of 
discourse building, the process o f deliberation. As there should be a justification o f these 
principles, there should always be possibilities o f contesting the validity of this 
justification, its presuppositions and the various forms o f developing them. 
Consequently, the non-liberal interpretations of basic principles should not be discarded a 
priori because short o f the reasonable criteria brought forward by liberal societies. It 
should always be considered as potential counter-arguments that have their 
comprehension limited by the use o f alternative variants to interpret reality.
Second, it seems that from these liberal interpretations the international 
deliberation is focused on the presentation o f what is the best argument -  in the constant, 
if  I may say so, unilateral attempt o f developed liberal states’ representatives to state their 
values and interests. They tend to see others, above all representative o f states that differ
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in terms o f values, interests, political organisation and economic development, as people 
whom they have to surpass - to observe what is faulty in their arguments so as to re-state 
the points made in a more persuasive way. I would say that this process o f deliberation is 
valid as a learning process so far as it focuses on individuals’ ability to be explicit, 
logical, clear reasoning, and finding way outs in the argumentation. But I also believe 
that this learning process tends to be limited because it focuses on a particular 
understanding o f the active role some interlocutors are supposed to perform - to present 
better arguments so as to control the direction o f the conversation. Here, the deliberation 
can be understood more as a competition than an exchange o f viewpoints, in which 
individuals representing different lifeworlds are really open to each other’s claims. At 
this case, it would not represent an opportunity to question different common identities.
Third, for the above interpretations the deliberation process is dictated by the 
notion o f the reasonableness o f an argument and not, as I want to suggest, centred in this 
notion while open to other forms o f interaction. This viewpoint is problematic not 
because it shows the desirability o f reaching universal assent that can have a binding 
effect on interlocutors with different historical backgrounds through reasonable 
argumentation but because it stresses that this is the only possibility o f communication 
that is worth pursuing. It does not pay attention to the fact that to perceive otherness the 
individuals involved in the process o f deliberation have to be willing to know not only 
how the rationality incorporated in the process is structured but also what is not captured 
by these argumentative forms o f communication. What I want to stress is the fact that 
there should be awareness by the main interlocutors o f the international society about the 
limits o f rational forms o f argumentation in the understanding o f human interactions and 
how these limits affect the proposal o f principles to regulate these interactions. To try to 
grasp the various elements used or left out o f the argumentative process o f deliberation is 
as important as to defend a reasonableness criterion as the main parameter to establish 
meaningful interaction with one another. It is through this constant effort o f allying 
reasonable claims with a broader comprehension o f the deliberation process that 
representative o f states and active groups o f international civil society best develop a 
sense o f otherness and secure the existence and possible comprehension o f counter­
arguments.
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Though this last point has been particularly addressed by Habermas, I think it can 
also be extended to cover the understanding o f the deliberation o f international just 
principles in a forum such as the UN where the states and representatives of an 
international civil society are largely represented.243 For Habermas, the justification of 
norms is based on a discourse situation (discourse ethics) where individuals fairly 
disposed towards one another try to agree on a set o f rules that embody an interest 
common to all affected. The process of agreement is seen as a process o f argumentation 
in which individuals try to rationally motivate each other, relying on the binding effect of 
the offer. And language is regarded as an instrument to deliver these rational arguments. 
But there is something odd in this picture, which is related to the way Habermas takes the 
language structure for granted. If the way we apprehend meaning is culturally driven 
(and I believe Habermas conceals it in the description o f lifeworlds as an integral part of 
development o f individualities), the way we select words and construct sentences should 
say as much about ourselves as the message we are trying to convey. And by pushing the 
argument further, the way participants in a process o f international deliberation introduce 
themselves, make allusions and refer to other forms o f narratives is as important as the 
assimilation o f rational arguments in the comprehension o f otherness. In this sense, it is 
worth quoting Dallmayr when summarising C o d e ’s criticism o f Habermas:
[For Coole, the important point is to overcom e the binary dualisms o f  inside and outside, 
reason and non-reason. The alterity suppressed by the discursive model -  and valorised by postmodern 
‘deconstruction’ -  is not som e ‘mystical or primordial’ unreason, as Habermas suggests, but rather ‘the 
fault-lines and ruptures, the differences, which structure language itself. A prominent mode o f  such 
differential language is modem  art and aesthetics, culminating in a ‘radical aesthetic o f  everyday life ’; a 
domain where Habermasian discourse remains particularly weak or inadequate. Again, it is important here 
not to erect aesthetics into ‘a model o f  an alternative, harmonious subjectivity or politics’ but rather to it as 
a ‘mode o f  subversive/creative intervention -  one that operates on prediscursive levels’. In socio-political 
terms, Coole stipulates as a minimal requirement that communicative reason and discursive democracy be 
supplemented by ‘an appreciation o f  the prediscursive and non discursive levels on which power and
243 In reference to this point, I am making use o f  the view s defended by Dallymar and Gaita. R. Gaita, A 
Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice. (London, Routledge, 2000), pp. 37, 85. 
And F. Dallymar, “Conversation Across Boundaries” in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies. 
2001, p. 343. D. Coole, “Habermas and the Question o f  Alterity” in P. D ’Entreves & S. Benhabib (eds.), 
Habermas and the Unfinished Project o f  Modernity. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996), p. 225.
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alterity circulate’, such that postmodern strategies or ‘decodings’ can be seen as a crucial dimension o f  
emancipatory politics.]244
The critical points of the debate on ethics here underlined serve to pave 
the way to a comprehension o f  the international deliberation as an opportunity individuals 
have, through their political representatives and groups o f international society, to 
exercise further their moral capacities in an environment marked by the exacerbation of 
cultural differences, which are imprinted in the construction o f particular systems o f laws. 
This complexity brings difficulties to the process (slowness, problems in definition of 
terms), but at the same time forces these individuals to find ways of understanding and 
persuading each other, and in many ways to adjust their particular forms o f reasoning, so 
as to build consensus. Therefore, their participation in the process can become a 
transformational experience, in which they have not only to go beyond the mere use o f 
the particular reasoning derived from a national debate but also to explore other forms o f 
interaction, o f capturing the essence of otherness to find moral terms of coexistence.
In my view, the formulation of just principles does not just demand from the 
participants the establishment o f an overlapping consensus on the basis o f a reasonable 
criterion, which is largely derived from liberal societies. It also demands from them to go 
beyond this minimum and make the process a dynamic exercise in which as 
representatives o f citizens o f different political communities (liberals and non-liberals 
understood in their different levels o f socio-economic development) they come to explore 
in a new way their different sense o f identities. Participants have to make an effort to 
understand the construction o f moral norms at the international level both as an exercise 
o f autonomous reasoning aiming at reciprocity o f action and as a way o f working through 
their sensibility so as to increase their perception o f the other or, more precisely, the 
message this other is trying to convey.
I mean by working through their moral sensibility the ability participants have to 
listen to other claims in the following way. First, it comprehends participants’ ability to 
be mutually decentred, not taking into account their individual ability to win an argument
244 F. Dallymar, “Conversation Across Boundaries: Political Theory and Global Diversity” in Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies. 2001, pp. 343-344.
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but to understand the different viewpoint the other has. Second, it means that the 
participant has to focus on what message the other wants to pass. In this sense, the 
individual has to be prepared, if necessary, to give up momentarily their particular way o f 
reasoning, to look from inside the social roles the other lives by and to let their intuitions 
guide their actions.245 Third, the participant has to respect the inalienable dignity o f the 
interlocutor, owed to him as a human being, no matter how much his way of reasoning is 
questionable.246 Fourth, he has to be aware o f their limited capacity o f apprehending and 
applying knowledge. Particularly, they should be lucid about how historical 
circumstances surrounding them influence the construction o f who they are and the 
perception they have o f the distant other.
Such an interpretation o f the international dimension is, as I mentioned before, a 
speculative exercise about what the international dimension can add to the expression o f 
individualities. In my view, the advantage of states forming part o f this sphere is not so 
much related to the further development o f their citizens’ ability to think but rather to the 
effort they are supposed to make, as citizens o f different political communities, to 
understand how thinking can be diversely structured. .247 In this effort, they have to 
become sensitive to the different ways individuals come to express themselves as singular 
collectivities and can thereby come eventually to embrace in a more affirmative way an 
international moral code based on reciprocity o f treatment among equally positioned free 
ethical collectivities.
5.5) Concluding Remarks
My characterisation of the international society is based on the claim that the 
states need to be recognised in their self-determining ability to be the ethical locus where
245 See R. Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice. (London, Routledge, 
2002), p. 59.
246 This issue is particularly addressed by Gaita when referring to the need to explore “a sense o f  
individual” . See R. Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice. (London, 
Routledge, 2002).
247 It does not reflect p e r  se  another sphere o f  moral learning. The moral agent is already characterised as a 
thinking agent when going to the international sphere, capable o f  understanding and follow ing norms on 
the basis o f  a moral code.
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individuals can, as active participants in the construction o f historically situated systems 
o f right, develop themselves as morally fit agents. In light o f this characterisation, the 
plurality o f states offers a spectrum of possible ethical experiments at a time, which can 
deepen our common understanding o f this development and help us to envisage 
mechanisms to carry on this development in an increasingly interdependent world.
In more pragmatic terms, I argued that to become o f any concrete significance to 
the well-functioning o f an international society today, the formulation o f principles of 
justice has to be perceived by the states as a common effort to reflect on the different and 
changing understandings o f the needs o f a moral individual as they are expressed in their 
spatially and temporally defined system o f rights, to construct a consensus on these needs 
as well as to back this consensus with effective political measures. In function of its 
dynamic nature, this exercise o f reflection and consensus building has to be based on a 
notion o f openness to otherness. The actual participants o f this process (state 
representatives and groups o f international society) have to be prepared to interact on the 
basis o f reasonableness while not forgetting that the structure o f reasonableness is also 
historically dependent, and much linked to liberal values and how currently developed 
societies incorporate these values in their structure. They also have in this sense to 
exercise their moral sensibility, their ability to capture the message the other cannot 
convey solely through the use o f reasonable arguments.
Overall, the discussion here undertaken was limited to the construction o f an 
ethical framework to understand the structure and dynamics o f an international society as 
well as to derive principles o f justice capable o f sustaining this society. There were only 
indirect, and mostly insufficient, references to the content of these principles and to the 
methods o f enforcing them. In the next chapter, I will turn my attention to this particular 
issue.
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CHAPTER 6: On International Obligations
The previous chapter discussed the basic structure o f an international society, the 
states and their foundational interactions given the ethical role they are to perform in 
individuals’ moral development. The formulation o f international just principles was 
only partially addressed, as the expected outcome of these interactions. It is my intention 
in the following pages to analyse in a more detailed way the core principles of 
international justice, understood as the most basic demands ethical states, constituting the 
main actors o f an international society, can reasonably present to each other and from 
which mutual obligations can be derived.
In line with the main claims presented in chapter 5, I argue that the self- 
determination principle is the founding principle of the international society. It should 
not only be recognized as such but provided for. The most basic demand ethical states 
can make towards each other is related to their right to be recognised in their distinctive 
capacity o f being the collective vehicle o f the moral self-consciousness o f their citizens. 
Moreover, it is related to their right to openly relate to each other in this capacity so as to 
have a more comprehensible view o f the moral foundations o f their roles as well as the 
mechanisms to secure the realisation of these moral foundations in a diverse 
environment. Because it is fundamental to states with an interest in carrying out their 
ethical functions to relate to each other as fit interlocutors in an open exchange o f 
viewpoints, self-determination is an entitlement that political communities not only 
formally hold against each other but also conjointly become responsible for making it 
effective worldwide.
More specifically, self-determination, which is here seen as a right individuals 
enjoy as members of a community, is endowed with both an individual and collective 
dimension. On the one hand, it is derived from individuals’ moral need to present 
themselves in relations o f mutual recognition, independently participating in the 
construction o f a historically situated system o f rights. It is in this sense limited to the 
observance o f the rights individuals have to present themselves as politically and socio-
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economically fit agents in the participation of this construction. On the other hand, self- 
determination refers to individuals’ need to recognise themselves as a group with a 
common and historically constructed sense o f identity, within which they ground their 
attitudes as a moral agent. Ethical states, as being the guarantor o f basic individualistic 
rights and the embodiment o f this distinctively collective way o f life, are provided with a 
certain autonomy and can act on this basis to make moral claims on international society. 
These moral claims however have to account for the fact that states’ autonomy has to be 
internationally recognised and its ethical meaning further explored in an open exchange 
of viewpoints about the construction o f their historically situated system o f rights.
Nevertheless, this understanding o f a principle o f self-determination is faced with 
three fundamental sorts o f problems, whose analysis has implications for my ethical 
framework. First, some states are not necessarily interested in recognising other states’ 
ability to act autonomously and in establishing meaningful interactions with these other 
states so as to unveil the moral foundation of their particular system o f rights. Second, 
many states are not able or willing to provide for basic individual human rights that 
underpin the claim to self-determination. Third, states do not necessarily feature a 
homogeneous notion o f collectivity or an inclusive understanding o f multinational 
society, in which different ethnic collectivities can exist within a state’s structure and find 
themselves identified with it. Such an observation leads me to question the extent to 
which the state can still be said to act autonomously in the name o f its citizens as well as 
to what extent the claims of self-determination made by specific collectivities, which do 
not completely identify with the way of life embodied by a state, can be in itself justified.
It is straightforward to note that each of these problems arises from a historically 
based notion o f ethical diversity as explained in my interpretation o f a neo-Hegelian 
framework, one in which states and individuals are necessarily constrained by space and 
time in their actions. I argue that these sorts of problems should be coped with by a duty 
o f assistance and, in some extreme cases, a duty o f intervention. These duties are 
legitimately founded on international community’s intrinsic interest in upholding a 
principle o f self-determination to secure the ethical role it is supposed to perform in 
individuals’ moral development. A defence o f these duties cannot however be completed 
without considering the kind o f institutional mechanism international society actually
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needs to possess so as to fulfil these duties. Although these mechanisms are already 
embodied in the UN system, I argue that they need to be critically re-appraised in terms 
o f the ethical framework here defended so as to attain more legitimacy and effectiveness.
The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part briefly explores the 
reasons why a self-determination principle should be seen as foundational to an 
international society whose main members are states. I explore the two dimensions o f the 
notion o f self-determination as a right individuals hold conjointly as active participants o f 
a collectivity. The second part contains an analysis o f the main sort o f constraints posed 
by reality in the fulfilment o f this self-determination principle. As a consequence, I come 
to explore the reasons why duties o f assistance and eventually intervention could be 
imposed on members o f an international society, given their interest in interacting with 
each other in a self-determined way. The third part explores the kind o f mechanisms an 
international society needs to put in place so that assistance and intervention are regarded 
as justifiable and effective from an ethical viewpoint. Finally, I present some concluding 
remarks.
6.1) The Principle of Self-Determination and its Limits
The founding principle of an international society is the principle o f  self- 
determination o f its ethical units. The states have to be perceived as freely able to 
determine their political status and pursue the social, economic and cultural aims that 
render possible the lives o f their citizens qua moral agents. They should be equally 
recognised in their independent capability o f defining a distinct collective way o f life to 
the benefit o f the individuals, whose moral capacities are realised both in their relations 
o f mutual recognition in the definition of a historically situated system o f rights and in 
the exchange o f ethical viewpoints carried out primarily by their state representatives, 
which pave the way to a normative international environment.
The self-determination principle, as it is here understood, derives from 
individuals’ right to be part o f a collectivity (state) responsible for allowing them to 
exercise their capacities for moral thinking and to relate to each other on this basis. In so 
being, it is part o f a broader philosophical-ethical construct that is different from current
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political-legalist interpretations of a right to self-determination - as they are generally 
expressed in international instruments such as the UN Charter, the Political and Civil 
Rights Covenant, the deliberations after the De-colonization Committee during the 60’s 
and more recently the UN Declaration o f the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples. This 
differentiation is specially profound in what concerns its dynamic and yet interconnected 
understanding of the individual and collective moral dimensions o f this right. As my 
arguments will show, this differentiation would serve to make more precise the criteria 
for understanding the moral foundation o f these actual rights and to suggest institutional 
improvements in line with my framework to fulfil them in a more effective way.
As a philosophical construct, the principle o f self-determination is attached to 
well-defined elements o f conditionality. Internally, the self-determination principle is, on 
the one hand, conditional on states’ observance o f basic human rights principles that 
guarantee their citizens’ integrity as autonomous thinkers and ground the exercise o f 
mutual recognition these citizens are supposed to be part of. It is limited, more 
specifically, to states’ ability to guarantee to their citizens the enjoyment of first 
(political-civic) and second (socio-economic and cultural) generation rights. Concerning 
first generation rights, individuals should be able, for example, to form an independent 
viewpoint, voice their beliefs and opinions without suffering discrimination (freedom of 
expression and assembly) and to be guaranteed a fair trial. They should also be able to 
participate on an equally free basis in the political decisions that ground the existence of a 
community and have an impact on their lives. Concerning second generation rights, the 
individuals should be entitled to the means to secure their subsistence (food, health care, 
regulated forms o f work) as well as to define a socio-cultural life o f their own (access to 
education, to ways o f forming a family and to be part o f cultural engagements in a 
community).
It is however important to note that first and second generation rights, though 
usually treated as distinctive categories, are to be understood as closely interdependent 
and indispensable in individuals’ exercise o f mutual recognition taking place inside an 
ethical state.248 Economic rights, by guaranteeing individuals’ access to the bare means 
o f subsistence and setting the necessary conditions that enable them to attain economic
248 A common example is the universal recognition o f  these rights in two distinct UN Covenants.
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self-sufficiency, constitute a pre-requisite for citizens o f a state to present themselves as 
viable interlocutors. Basic legal, civil and socio-cultural rights guarantee the ability of 
these citizens to constitute themselves as independently valid sources of claims and yet 
active members o f groups o f a civil society, without suffering unjustified interference 
from a state’s structure. Political rights allow these citizens to influence on an equal basis 
the fundamental rules and structures defining a society, making them able to identify 
themselves not anymore as distinctly interested groups o f a civil society but as a broader 
unified collectivity.249
On the other hand, a self-determination principle is not reducible to states’ ability 
to offer mechanisms through which their citizens can enjoy the above individualistic sets 
of rights. Since citizens should, along with the full enjoyment o f their individualistic 
rights, be able to identify themselves as a unified will in the actual construction o f a 
temporally and spatially defined system o f rights, this principle should also be understood 
in relation to states’ ability to embed a distinctive common political culture. A state has 
also to be seen as the personification o f a collective interpretation of rights and duties, 
which offer its citizens a common sense o f identity that help them to contextualise their 
actions and to make these actions meaningful from the perspective of how they ought to 
conduct their lives as moral agents.
Externally, states have to act so as to recognise each other in their distinct and 
independent ability to provide for a structured social environment where moral 
individuals can flourish. This recognition however does not merely translate into respect 
for differences in collective ways o f life. It also, and most importantly when taking into 
account the ethical framework here developed, becomes a means by which states’ pursue 
their broader interest o f independently exchanging ethical viewpoints on the moral 
foundation o f their historically situated system of rights and constructing international 
norms in view o f this exchange. Aware o f their limitation, derived from their temporal 
and spatial constraints in being the ethical locus o f individuals’ moral development, the 
states look forward to relate to each other in a way that renders possible to their citizens
249 On the affinities betweens rights that can transcend the conventional dichotomy o f  political-civic rights 
and socio-econom ic and cultural rights, it is worth seeing Jack D onnelly, Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice. p,27.
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the enhanced exercise o f their moral capacities in an open and regulated international 
environment.
These elements o f conditionality apply to the understanding o f a notion o f states’ 
autonomy -  and its status as a moral entity in international relations. So far as states act 
in respect o f the internal and external elements of conditionality that underpin their 
ethical existence, they can be regarded as distinctively collective entities, holders of 
certain rights and duties in the international society. They have the right to demand 
respect for their independent way o f constituting themselves as a political community. 
They are not supposed to interfere in the internal affairs o f one another, making use of 
aggressive or patronising attitudes that either degrade or deny their autonomy to take 
collective decisions. They have the right to demand non-interference in the collective 
affairs o f one another. Moreover, they have the right to be treated fairly, as equally free 
members capable o f taking decisions and agreeing on resolutions that affect the 
functioning o f an international society. By the same token, they have the obligation to 
respect international agreements and diplomatic resolutions agreed on the basis o f this 
fairness.
The above conditions to states’ exercise o f autonomy are nonetheless far from 
being achieved in reality. The historical adversities states face have fundamental 
implications for the understanding o f moral duties according to my ethical framework. 
To analyse these implications, I divide in three main categories the reasons why the states 
are presently deprived o f fully exercising their autonomy. First, a state is prevented by 
members o f an international society from exercising its capacity for acting autonomously 
because o f its outlaw behaviour at the international level. Second, a state has its 
autonomous capacity undermined by either its inability or unwillingness to uphold the 
most basic individual rights, related to their citizens’ integrity as independent moral 
agents. Third, a state’s capacity for acting autonomously is questioned because, whereas 
it formally upholds individualist rights, it fails to embody a distinctive understanding o f 
collectivity which all their citizens can clearly identify with.
The first category is the most straightforward one. It involves outlaw states that 
forcefully negate the existence o f an international society based on ethical purposes. 
Typically, these states try to impose their own comprehensive view o f the good by
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making use o f aggressive means. Examples o f these states are Germany with its 
expansionist behaviour during the two Worlds Wars and, more recently, Iraq in its 
attempt to annex the territory where Kuwait’s main oil reserves are situated. In both 
cases, the states were dominated by totalitarian regimes that rely on a strong ideology and 
the charismatic figure o f a leader to manipulate their citizens’ opinions and to make these 
citizens support confrontational actions against members o f an international society.
Comparatively, the second category involves a greater level o f complexity since it 
refers to deficient states where individuals’ enjoyment o f socio-economic rights and/or 
political and civic rights are being jeopardised. Concerning individuals’ restraint in the 
enjoyment o f socio-economic rights, there are three issues worthy o f consideration. First, 
these restraints can be derived from a state’s deficiency o f natural resources. They result 
from an adversity that is closely related to the arbitrary way territories were in the first 
instance explored by indigenous people and further re-distributed in the light o f a 
historical process marked by conquests, empire building and de-colonization. It is worth 
pointing out however that states suffering from such adversity are prepared to react in 
different ways. For example, despite the scarcity of natural resources, Japan was clearly 
able to transform itself into a successful industrial economy by relying in part on well- 
targeted public policies after the Second World War. Second, there are cases marked by 
a state’s inability to use with a certain level o f effectiveness the natural and/or human 
resources it has. An illustration is provided by countries such as Brazil, with vast 
amounts o f natural resources and a young labour force. Third, many states are unable to 
cope with the effects o f an interdependence process. Underdevelopment has to be seen 
not merely as a fact attributable to domestic constraints and weaknesses but also as a 
structural phenomenon linked to the form international economic relations and an 
international division o f labour assume today.250
Concerning state’s inability to uphold political and civic rights, two cases are o f 
particular interest. First, there is the case o f authoritarian states that suppress political 
and civic rights while maintaining a certain level of socio-economic standards for their 
citizens. An example of this kind o f behaviour is offered by Latin American
250M. Bedjaoui, “The Right to D evelopm ent” in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievem ents and 
Prospects. (Paris: UNESCO, 1991), p. 1181.
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authoritarian regimes in the 1970’s, which purposely restrained the political and civil 
rights o f citizens and defended a closed market in the name o f economic growth.251 A 
different example is offered by Iran after the Islamic Revolution o f 1979. Since then, the 
regime has been able to maintain a certain level o f socio-economic standards for its 
population while tightly controlling the judicial system, restraining intellectual and 
artistic activities and promoting gender discrimination.252 Second, there is the case of 
states that are plagued with corruption in their political system, inefficiency in their 
bureaucracy and weak mechanisms responsible for enforcing the rule o f law. In critical 
cases such as Liberia and Somalia, where these conditions are aggravated by socio­
economic factors, the situation can easily slide into civil war, eventually leading to 
anarchy.
The third category relates to the fact that the autonomy o f the state is questioned 
not because it fails to fulfil the above cited individualist rights but because it fails to 
guarantee to all their citizens the collective right to identify themselves with the 
construction o f a distinctive collective way o f life. In great part, this problem is caused 
by an old process o f colonisation, which showed no regard to indigenous peoples’ rights, 
and more recently by the mal-formation o f multinational states after the peak period o f 
decolonization 1960-1970. In this period, colonial boundaries were accepted as 
authoritative, without any proper concern for ethnic-linguistic differences and for 
obtaining the consent o f the people affected,253 Two cases are particularly worth 
analysing here. First, there is the case of discriminatory states in which a minority group 
suffers discrimination (unfair treatment) by the majority o f the population. Political 
arrangements, despite securing to the overall population the enjoyment of citizenship 
rights, still cannot make effective the voice o f a minority in the constitution of a
251 Concerning dictatorships in Latin American during the 1970’s, I am particularly referring to the military 
regimes in Brazil from Castello Branco to Figueiredo’s presidencies and in Chile with Pinochet.
252 It is necessary to point out that the democratic innovations demanded by the reform movement, 
represented by President Mohammad Khatami, from the 9 0 ’s have increased the public awareness o f  the 
significance o f  individuals’ liberties and wider political representation. Such public involvement has 
nonetheless been suffering setbacks given the pressures put on the Legislative and Judicial system s by more 
conservative clerics. See A. Ashrafa & A. Banuazizi, “Iran’s Tortuous Path Toward “Islamic Liberalism”, 
International Journal o f  Politics. Culture and Society. Vol. 15, N o.2, Winter 2001.
253Y. N. K ly & D. Kly (eds.), In Pursuit o f  the Right to Self-Determination: Collected Papers & 
Proceedings o f  the First International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United Nations. 
(Geneva, Clarity Press, 2000), Preface, p. 07.
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distinctive way o f life. As Charvet describes it, “the agreement on particular reasons still 
reflect solely or disproportionably the way o f thinking and values o f a majority 
culture.”254 Illustrations o f this sort o f discrimination is provided by the suffering of 
indigenous people in Australia and the Kurds in Turkey. Second, the case o f a national 
minority group that despite living in a just ethical state still feels the need to express their 
distinct commonality. Examples o f this group are provided by the Quebecois in Canada 
or the Scottish in the United Kingdom. The distinctive cultural affinities o f the members 
of these groups have a significant impact on the way they perceive and participate in 
public deliberations.
The different reasons here presented to explain why the states undermine the 
realisation o f its ethical potentiality when confronted with the actual dynamics o f a 
historical process have, fundamental implications for my theoretical framework. They 
necessarily lead me to account for whether and on the basis o f which conditions the 
members o f an international community can legitimately present another set o f moral 
claims to each other. More precisely, do more fit states have an obligation to provide 
assistance to less ones? Do they also have an obligation to intervene, by making use of 
force or indirect mechanisms such as socio-economic sanctions, in states where 
assistance is not an option because o f either the gravity o f the domestic socio-political 
situation or the international outlaw behaviour o f their authorities? In case members o f 
an international community do have these kinds o f obligations, how are they supposed to 
fulfil them? In response to these sort o f questions, I come to argue for complementary 
principles o f justice in the next section.
Before proceeding, it is however important to note that these questions are prone 
to arise in a historically situated account o f the international ethical process. In contrast 
to the other theories o f international justice addressed in this thesis, my framework should 
be able to address these issues not as imperfections, counter-facts or exceptions o f the 
theory, but rather as intrinsic features o f an ethical process. In these terms, the 
complementary principles of justice defended in the next section should not be seen as 
principles established on ad hoc basis, in the sense that the international community
254 John Charvet., “What is Nationality, and Is There a Moral Right to National Self-Determination?” in 
Simon Caney, D . George & Peter Jones (eds.), National Rights. International Obligations, p. 66.
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resorts to them when is faced with a non-ideal situation. They should be seen as bearing 
an inherently logical and ethical relation to the core o f an international system o f justice. 
In other words, they have a functional status and purpose that is bom together with a 
notion o f an international system o f justice, whose realisation is based on historical 
processes, and should therefore be regarded as ethical duties in harmony with the 
founding principle o f self-determination.
6,2) The Need for Complementary Principles of Justice: The Duties of Assistance 
and Intervention
Reasons to ground states’ duty to assist or intervene have to be thought in 
connection with the ethical considerations that found a self-determination principle as 
well as with the specificities of a historical process that limit the realisation o f this 
principle worldwide and eventually give rise to claims for securing the means to its 
upholding. Considering an ethical framework, states’ fulfilment o f their ethical role is 
partially dependent on their ability to mutually recognise each other as independent 
vehicles o f moral self-consciousness and openly exchange viewpoints on the basis o f this 
recognition. Given that, they do have a general interest in upholding a self-determination 
principle worldwide but this interest has still to give way to a duty o f assistance and 
intervention in the form o f potentially reasonable demands members o f an international 
society are entitled to present towards each other when facing adversities in fulfilling 
their self-determining functions. A reasonable demand would, according to this 
framework, be based on the claim that the adverse conditions that actually affect some 
states’ autonomy have to be perceived as part of a historically interdependent process in 
which all members o f an international society are involved and through which their 
realisation as ethical units are made possible. State’s duties to assist or intervene would 
therefore be based on the claim that the adversities suffered by some states are in part 
derived from the dynamics of a historical process that all states have continuously taken 
part in. They are also based on the claim that these adversities, by affecting the capacity 
of particular states to form morally fit citizens, can have a potentially substantial effect on 
the functioning o f all members o f an international society qua ethical units. It is however
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important to underline that differences in the kind of adversities faced by states give rise 
to different interpretations about the fulfilling o f these international obligations to assist 
and intervene.
Let me emphasise the essential characteristics o f my argument by contrasting it 
with communitarian and nationalist interpretations of a self-determination principle and 
o f the kind o f international obligations it imposes on the members o f international 
society. As I pointed out in chapter three, communitarians and theorists o f nationalism 
give emphasis to a non-interventionist principle o f justice to the detriment o f a more 
engaged understanding o f the responsibility members o f an international community have 
in providing for the means to secure states’ self-determining capacities worldwide. The 
emphasis on the discretionary ability a sovereign state has to provide for a distinctive 
environment in which morally motivated personalities can develop leads to a notion of 
international principles centred on non-interventionist principles.255 Other principles of 
justice, such as the observance by the states o f international standards o f human rights for 
their population, are formulated as a by-product of this formal interpretation o f the non­
interventionist doctrine. An agreement on international standards o f human rights on this 
view is above all to be perceived as an agreement among states recognising fair national 
practices so they do not suffer undue interference. It is not necessarily viewed as a 
common commitment founded on a moral obligation they have as members o f 
international society, which in part requires of them the abdication o f their discretionary 
power in favour o f concerted actions to make these practices effective worldwide.
According to my ethical framework, this particularist understanding o f the basic 
content o f international just principles leads to fundamental flaws. By wrongly pre­
supposing that the polity can be regarded as the ultimate instance o f social interactions 
that defines individuals’ identity as a moral agent, it simplifies the interests o f state qua 
ethical units. It particularly overlooks the fact that states are historically situated 
constructions that, while primarily responsible for individuals’ development of their basic 
capacities, are part o f a broader dynamics that help them realise their ethical nature.
255 This minimalist view , implying a thin and non-engaged view  o f  just principles, can be agreed by the 
diverse lifeworld perspectives without demanding from them an evaluation o f  the reasons why they become 
fundamental or a common effort to validate them. To a certain extent, the particularists (communitarians 
and nationalists) tend to reflect this v iew  when defending the subjective value o f  nation and community to 
the development o f  individuals. See chapter 2 on this point.
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They need to interact with each other in a self-determining and yet open way not only to 
define the limits o f their authority but also to fully grasp the possibilities o f securing their 
citizens’ moral integrity and the capacity of these citizens to relate with otherness in a 
meaningful way in a context today marked by interdependence.
If a state’s ethical realisation is carried on in light o f interactions it develops with 
its citizens as well as with the other main units o f international society at a particular 
time, the adversities affecting some o f these units’ ability to act autonomously is a state’s 
particular concern. These adversities that affect some o f the main units o f international 
society have to be understood as part of a historical process that all states helped and 
continuously help defining either by taking actively decisions or passively accepting the 
development o f events. This argument does not however serve to minimize, by blaming 
the dynamics o f a historical process, the wrong decisions taken by the representatives of 
these states. It serves above all to remind us that a state’s political autonomy is not 
exercised in a historical vacuum. It is exercised and ethically realised when immersed 
and challenged by a reality. If  today this reality is marked by an increasing process o f 
interdependence that can offer humanity a large spectrum of ethical collective 
experiments through which states can better grasp their roles in individuals’ moral 
formation, it seems inappropriate to argue that the polities (state) are morally 
condemnable only when they are inflicting direct or indirect harm to each other, 
understood as a threat to their sovereignty or the way their citizens choose to live their 
lives as a collectivity. It would be equally condemnable when they fail to act conjointly 
to alleviate the socio-political conditions that impair states’ ability to act as vehicles of 
individuals’ moral self-consciousness and to present themselves as fit interlocutors in the 
organisation o f international society. It is also equally condemnable when failing to act 
promptly to condemn the abusive and discriminatory practices o f certain states against 
their own citizens as well as the citizens o f other states. In these terms, principles that 
respond to adversities o f a historical process, such as principles o f assistance and 
intervention, are to be seen as consistently complementary to a self-determination 
principle, because they are intrinsically required for its actual realisation.
The argument in favour o f complementary principles of assistance and 
intervention however needs qualification. A duty to assist or intervene has to be
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interpreted in face o f the kind o f adversities confronted by the affected state as well as 
the kind o f responses to these adversities that are favoured by members o f the 
international community, whose main objective is to constitute a stable environment 
where ethically fit collective entities can relate to each other in an open and constructive 
way so as to guarantee their citizens’ moral development. Only from this viewpoint, 
outlaw, deficient or discriminatory states, as defined in the last section, can be the 
justifiable recipients o f the right to assistance or objects o f soft or forceful intervention 
from the members o f an international society.
In face o f these considerations, let me now qualify the complementary principles 
o f justice. The undue interference o f an outlaw state in the affairs o f a member o f 
international society is not admissible because it forcefully denies the collective right of 
the attacked states’ citizens to act in a self-determining way. It purposefully makes use of 
force to impose their comprehensive view o f the good and reject the notion that 
international interactions should be, to the benefit of individuals’ moral development, the 
expression o f reciprocity among self-determining and equally situated collective ethical 
entities. Two concerns should therefore guide the interpretation o f the rights o f the 
attacked state and the duties o f the international community. First, there is a need to 
restore the original status o f the state that suffered the unjustifiable attack. Second, there 
is a need to make the outlaw state to understand and respect the fundamental values that 
sustain international society by being exposed to the practices o f ethical states. It is 
through this exposure that the outlaw state could eventually transform itself, becoming 
able to participate in international society and abide by its rules.
Considering these points, the attacked state has the right to defend itself and to 
demand assistance from the other members of international society when doing so. Its 
actions however have to be ethically driven and accountable to members o f the 
international community. Since its objectives are both to restore its self-determining 
status and to persuade the outlaw state to participate in the practices o f an ethically driven 
international society, the attacked state should primarily make an effort to re-establish a 
diplomatic dialogue with representatives o f the outlaw state with the help o f international 
society. Once this option fails, it has the right to take more drastic measures, demanding 
from the international community the application o f political and socio-economic
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sanctions against the outlaw state and then declaring war against the outlaw state. The 
declaration o f war can solely be made in self-defence. Moreover, it requires from the 
attacked states, as Rawls specifies, “to foreshadow during a war the kind o f peace they 
aim for and the kind o f relations they seek.” 256 In line with its ethical commitments 
during the war, the attacked state has to make a distinction o f treatment between leaders 
and officials, soldiers and population, minimizing the costs for this last category, as well 
as making peace proposals that are reasonably acceptable and do not have the intention o f 
denigrating the enemy. Furthermore, it has to prioritise the use o f  consensually formed 
international mechanisms to oversee the use o f force and the rebuilding o f national 
institutions in the outlaw state.
In comparison with outlaw states, one could argue that deficient states’ inability 
or lack o f means to provide for basic individualist rights (socio-economic and civic- 
political rights) do not necessarily represent a threat to the well-functioning o f 
international society that requires a prompt and decisive reaction from members o f 
international society. This kind o f argument however has to be balanced by the ethical 
view here defended that in a context marked by the indistinctness o f political borders, 
citizens who are not invested with the necessary means (rights) to take autonomous part 
in a reciprocity exercise among compatriots leads to their being unfit moral agents at the 
international level, unable to understand the significance o f the construction o f far- 
reaching international just principles and identify with them. Their inability to have their 
basic rights fulfilled can more easily lead them to resort to their membership in groups o f 
an unregulated civil society so as to cover their primary needs and to develop social roles. 
As this membership does not necessarily provide for members’ ability to interact with 
each other and non-members in a morally meaningful way (respecting individuals’ equal 
right to autonomy), it can pave the way to violent acts, such as the recent string o f 
terrorist attacks referred to in the last chapter, that jeopardise individuals’ integrity no 
matter where they live.
The need to restore the state as the collective vehicle o f moral self-consciousness 
by making it able to guarantee to its population the effective exercise o f basic rights is 
therefore the basic reason giving rise to an international society’s duty to assist. Given
256 John Rawls, Law o f  Peoples, p.96.
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this need, a duty to assist has to be interpreted and fulfilled taking into account the fact 
that is up to the representatives o f this state together with their citizens to make a 
prognosis o f its problems and to define strategies to tackle them. Assistance has to be 
based on a consensus given by this deficient state and has to be translated into co­
operative initiatives at the national and international level that make it possible for this 
state to exercise its autonomous capacities. For example, it would require the 
establishment o f industrial partnerships or technological cooperation with more 
developed countries to develop the incipient economy o f this state as well as cooperative 
endeavours in education and health matters. It would also require the active involvement 
o f the deficient state in decisions taken by supra-national institutions - such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, concerning the allocation o f funding and development of projects at 
the national level.
In addition to these considerations, it is important to note that the development o f 
a deficient state has been curtailed not merely by its own wrong doings but by adversities 
that were derived from a process of inequitable international economic relations that all 
members o f international society take part in. In this last interpretation, deficient states 
are to be seen as potentially holders o f the right to development against the international 
community. It is a right these states hold to the benefit o f their overall population who 
have the development o f their moral capacities in great part imperilled by the constraints 
imposed by this inequitable international economic system on the economic development 
of the societies they are members of. To fulfil this right, the international society should 
envisage conjoint initiatives, such as the Doha round o f negotiations at the WTO dealing 
with unfair economic subsidies and trade barriers, which liberate these deficient states 
from current arrangements which unjustly restrain their economic development.257
In this category o f deficient states, it is worth presenting some additional 
considerations on cases marked by problems linked much more to abusive political 
practices than to a lack o f resources or a state’s representatives’ managerial skills. As I 
pointed in the last section, members of political elites tend to use the state machine to 
curtail the civic-political liberties of the population and to impose a closed economic
257 M. Bedjaoui, “The Right to D evelopm ent” in M. Bedjaoui. (ed.), International Law: Achievem ents and 
Prospects, p. 1180.
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regime. Although these closed societies do not represent a direct threat to the 
international community, the level o f deprivation suffered by the population in terms of 
civic-political rights do affect their constitution as autonomous moral agents and can in 
the long run undermine the well-functioning o f international society. The existence of 
these regimes not only contradicts the founding values o f international society but also 
brings the tangible risk that, once these societies are more exposed to an interdependent 
process, its population will lack the fundamental means to deal with otherness in a 
morally meaningful way. In view o f these considerations, the international community 
does have a duty to press for changes in these regimes. Once these deficient states deny 
the possibility o f changes, international society has the right to make use of soft 
intervention mechanisms, including the empowerment o f groups o f civil society 
(providing critical scrutiny o f a state’s activity) and the use o f tactics to name and shame 
the practices o f the regime.
In parallel, it is necessary to consider the case of failing states such as Liberia and 
Somalia during the 90’s, whose institutions are so weakly formed and maintained that the 
state is on the brink o f anarchy, without a legitimate or clearly identifiable government. 
In these cases, the lack of state mechanisms helping the moral formation o f citizens can 
easily give rise to violent civil wars that can directly affect the performance o f ethical 
functions in neighbouring states, paving the way to regional political instability. 
Considering the practical impossibility o f having the consent o f these countries’ 
governments about the forms o f receiving assistance, humanitarian intervention becomes 
the primary duty o f the international community as exemplified in UN resolution 794 
providing for the deployment in Somalia o f a UN force.258 But the fulfilling o f this duty 
should not represent an end in itself according to the ethical framework here presented. It 
should represent the first step in the direction of bringing the different parts o f society to 
a negotiation table so as to discuss the terms of re-building an autonomous state’s 
institutions.
Apart from the categories o f outlaw and deficient states, there is the category o f 
discriminatory states that do not fully recognise the rights o f a minority o f the population
2^8 Concerning the case o f  Somalia and the argument for humanitarian intervention inside the UN, see C. 
Greenwood, “Is there a right o f  humanitarian Intervention?”, The World Today. February 1993, pp. 37-38.
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to identify with the construction o f the common political culture. As they cannot 
effectively make their voices heard in the construction o f a system o f rights given the 
power o f a dominant minority for that matter as in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, they feel 
that they cannot really identify with the ethical principles and the kind o f collective 
responsibilities they impose. Even if they can eventually come to understand these 
ethical principles, they cannot see the actual significance o f abiding by these 
responsibilities in their daily lives, in the actual interactions they establish with otherness. 
In this case, the discriminatory state has an ethical duty to re-evaluate its political 
practices in the light o f a negotiation process with the minority, whose objective is to re­
instate the right o f this minority to fully enjoy the collective dimension o f a right o f self- 
determination. In its turn, the international community has the duty to oversee the 
fairness o f this process o f negotiation. This duty is derived from the fact that a failure o f 
the government in fulfilling a duty to undertake negotiations and pursue them on 
reasonable grounds, respecting constitutional principles, may undermine its claim to be 
legitimately recognised as the collective vehicle o f moral self-consciousness o f its 
citizens at the international level. Once this failure is shown to be unavoidable, the 
international community has the duty to recognise the minority’s right to secede.259
An exception to the above category, which I pointed out in the last section, is the 
case o f a minority population that though not suffering from the above kind o f 
discrimination, still feels the need to express their commonality. As in the case o f 
Quebecois, they feel that there are no sufficient mechanisms at the state level through 
which they can express and make effective their distinctive political views. But they 
cannot claim that they are having their fundamental right to be an active part in the 
definition o f a collective way o f life undermined by discriminatorily socio-political 
practices of the state. In this case, secession does not become a right that the 
international community has an obligation to help upholding from an ethical viewpoint. 
It can only be accepted on the basis o f pragmatic concerns, when a group o f citizens’
259 It is important to stress that my defence o f  the right to secede here is based fundamentally on normative 
considerations and taking into account a generally cohesive and outspoken minority. In the case o f  a 
minority that is spread over the national territory or yet unable to articulate in an effective and cohesive 
way its demands, as happens with the first generation o f  immigrants, the right to secede is severely 
restrained by their circumstantial inability to form and press a claim against the majority.
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insistence in expressing their distinctiveness challenges the fundamental constitutional 
principles of the state, undermining its existence.
As I showed above, international society’s duty to assist and to intervene in 
extreme cases so as to uphold a self-determination principle worldwide necessarily 
involves qualification, based on the different kind of adversities faced by affected states 
as well the responses that should be favoured in view o f the potential ethical role they are 
due to perform. This qualification led me to an assessment of derivative claims 
potentially made by the affected states, such as the rights to development, and to an 
exemplification o f the concerted actions members o f international society need to take to 
fulfil these claims. In the next section, it is my intention to illustrate my main arguments 
in favour o f  intervention and assistance by contrasting them with the kind o f justification, 
and further actions, defended by members of the international community for the Iraq 
war.
6.3) Illustration: The Iraq War
The analysis o f the Iraq war serves to illustrate the above arguments on the 
content o f principles o f justice. If understood in the larger context o f the pre-conditions 
that led to the 2003 invasion by coalition forces and the efforts o f re-building the country 
afterwards, the Iraq war reveals the kind o f challenges the international community faces 
in terms o f enforcing a self-determination principle today. It was Iraq’s outlaw 
behaviour, controversially associated with its insistence in rebuilding military capabilities 
(Weapons o f Mass Destruction -  WMD) after the invasion o f Kuwait, which primarily 
led to international intervention and assistance. But the Iraqi government’s unwillingness 
to respect and provide for the basic human rights o f its population, both in their 
individualist (socio-economic and civic-political rights) and collective (e.g. 
discrimination against Kurds) dimensions were also taken into account in the equation.
O f particular interest here is to analyse how the international community, by the 
conjoint initiatives o f the members o f UN or by the restrained multilateral initiatives 
taken by part o f its members, has overseen the rebuilding o f Iraq as a self-determined 
state. I argue that the way intervention and assistance efforts were justified and carried
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out drastically contributed to imperil Iraq’s potential to become an independent member 
o f the IC, ethically responsible for its actions. This happened not strictly because 
intervention and assistance were shaped by power politics considerations. States’ ability 
and willingness to use their military, economic and political capabilities to influence one 
another is a necessary feature o f international relations. This happens above all because 
the international community failed, and in fact continues failing, to acknowledge that 
intervention and assistance are concepts derived from a historically dynamic view of 
international relations in which all states have necessarily to present themselves as self- 
determined units for the sake o f their ethical realisation.
Although it was justified by the international community on the basis o f Iraq’s 
aggressive behaviour, the last intervention was carried out without effectively accounting 
for Iraqis’ enjoyment o f their individualistic and collective rights as members o f a 
political community. Even when human rights issues were considered after an 
intervention sponsored by coalition forces, they strongly translated a unilateral, if not 
patronizing, perception o f liberal values that did, and continue to do, no favour to the 
rebuilding o f a state as a differentiated collective vehicle o f moral self-consciousness to 
its citizens. In trying to replicate part o f their own system o f values in another state, the 
US and its allies ended by denying the fact that they are at the same time the subject and 
object of a broad historical process.
At the same time that the US and its allies are able to influence the dynamism of 
this historical process by the leading position they enjoy in the international scenario, 
they are not able to dictate its course nowadays. Given the effect o f an increasing 
economic interdependence in the movement o f goods, services and individuals, they need 
to reflect on the limitations o f their historically situated ethical systems so as to have a 
better grasp o f how to construct a comprehensive international order where their citizens 
can actively function as moral agents. But the US and its allies cannot properly do so 
without considering other states in their autonomous and differentiated capacity o f being 
the collective vehicle o f moral self-consciousness to their citizens and effectively 
recognising them in this capacity in the actual construction and interpretation of 
principles o f justice. To overlook this point is to jeopardise the very construction of this 
order.
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Let me be more precise about the argument by recalling the facts and interpreting 
from my viewpoint the justifications given by members o f the international community 
for the kind o f initiatives favoured by them. The 2003 invasion o f Iraq comes after US 
failure in building a consensus among SC members to pass a resolution supporting 
military actions against Iraq, in order to make it comply with previous resolutions on 
disarmament, human rights, terrorism, Kuwait prisoners o f war and allow UN inspectors 
to return to Iraq after their removal in 1998. SC passed resolution 1441 on October 2003 
demanding Iraq comply with previous resolutions but not allowing the use o f force after 
understanding that Iraq didn’t pose a threat to the international community. Despite the 
UN unwillingness to co-operate with inspector, there was no definitive evidence that Iraq 
was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. In rejection o f this view, US formed 
the “Coalition o f the Willing”. Initially with 49 countries, the coalition was sustained by 
US determination to enforce previous SC resolutions against Iraq as well as to advance 
strategic objectives against their war on terrorism after the attacks o f September 11th.
From an ethical viewpoint, the UN position should have been questioned not so 
much by its traditional interpretation o f the use o f chapter VII o f UN Charter to prohibit 
an invasion but by failing to perform its role in the development of events leading to this 
position. As being subject to the procedures stated in a comprehensive international 
agreement previously defined by sovereign states, intervention was justifiably perceived 
by the UN as something to be used as a last resort, once all the other means o f persuasion 
have been consistently exhausted. It avoids its abuse for circumstantial reasons. But on 
three important occasions it could be argued that the UN failed to carry out its activities 
in a responsible and effective way. First, reports of human rights violations after Saddam 
came to power were constantly documented by non governmental organisations - such as 
Human Rights Watch, the International Federation o f Human Rights League and the 
Coalition for Justice in Iraq .260 Despite passing resolutions formally denouncing these 
abuses, the UN failed to use all the mechanisms at its disposal to press the Iraq 
government to improve human rights’ records. The UN failed to make extensive use o f 
strategies, such as naming and shaming the government’s more controversial directives or
260 jn 19g8, Human Rights Watch denounced the attacks against the Kurdish population. It released a joint 
report with International Federation o f  Human Rights League in 2000 on human rights violation, 
particularly against women and children.
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supporting via financial or technical support the activities o f local NGOs’ responsible for 
basic health and educational services. In doing so, the UN reinforced the position of 
some o f the leading member states, who were reluctant to get rid o f a government seen as 
important to cope with the potential threats of an Islamic revolution coming from Iran. 
Second, trade sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Kuwait war severely affected the civil 
population. The Oil for Food programme responsible for minimizing the effects of these 
sanctions on a civil population was done in view o f the perception that some member 
states had about security without any substantial concern about the basic conditions 
necessary to empower the Iraqis economically or politically. All sales allowing Iraq to 
sell oil to generate funds to cover for basic services to its citizens were extensively 
monitored by UN staff and constantly blocked by the SC members, particularly the US. 
With its decision to treat all infrastructure as being o f dual use (military concerns), the 
US ended blocking in large extent the fundamental goods and services required by a 
modem economy.261 Third, resolutions concerning the inspections o f Iraq’s military 
capabilities after the Kuwait war were partially undermined by the perception o f Iraq 
government that these inspections were been infiltrated with spies for purposes other than 
determining if Iraq possessed WMDs.262
UN inability to act more responsibly so as to uphold human rights in Iraq is 
symptomatic o f the problems within its structure. At first sight, this inability seems to be 
derived from the long lasting problem associated with the lack o f consensus among its 
members who tend to act on the basis o f their own strategic concerns of short and 
medium terms while overlooking the best ways to attain its objective o f a more secure 
international environment in the long turn. But looking closer, this UN inability 
underlines a failure o f perception about the best ways to re-define and perform their 
members’ roles qua states in a more dynamic environment, where the volatility o f threats 
tend to be higher as the result o f the increasing proximity o f citizens with different, and 
sometimes conflicting, political formation and socio-economic background as well as o f 
the intensity o f their relationship. Following the arguments presented in chapter five, the
261 J. Gordon, “Accountability and Global Governance: The Case o f  Iraq”, Ethics & International Affairs. 
Vol. 20, March 2004, p.04.
262This v iew  was particularly voiced by the media. See w w w .new s.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/m iddle east/301168.stm  
and www.guardian.co.uk/theissues/article/0.6512,794275.00.html .
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international community has a duty to uphold a principle o f self-determination not merely 
in the sense o f containing a state’s aggressive behaviour but also in terms o f assisting this 
state to exercise its potentially ethical functions both at the national and international 
levels. In Iraq’s case, it would have implied the capacity o f UN and its member states to 
work with Iraq’s government to improve its human rights’ records not only so that the 
Iraqi population would became socio-economically empowered but also able to enjoy 
basic individuals’ rights and to express their collective identity in an independent way, 
contributing to the definition o f a distinctive system o f rights. Moreover, it would have 
implied the empowerment o f the Iraqi population so that they were able to recognise 
themselves as holders o f this collectively constructed identity in the international forums 
of discussion and decisions.
The involvement o f the US and its allies in the Iraq war captures in a more acute 
way the current misunderstandings concerning the definition o f a self-determination 
principle and the need to enforce it. The US rationale for the invasion was based on the 
quest for enforcing previous UN sanctions in view of the faltering co-operative initiatives 
of a tyrannical regime and its priority concern to deal with what was perceived as a new 
threat - internationally spread terrorist activities managed by groups (ex. A1 Qaeda) who 
have links with Iraq and neighbour countries. What made US claims particularly strong 
was its widely publicized intention to link military actions with efforts to re-construct the 
country on the basis o f a democratic regime so as to deal with this new threat.
The argument used by the US and its allies, concerning the distinctive nature of 
the threat and the inability o f available international mechanisms to deal with it 
effectively, could arguably count as lending support for the invasion. But it certainly 
does not justify the invasion. The argument that the US was acting on the basis o f 
benevolent purposes - getting rid o f a tyrannical regime and enforcing international 
human rights, while promoting military actions - was fallible because it gave the US the 
upper hand in interpreting and enforcing the content o f universal principles that define an 
international order. By using this kind o f argument, the US ended by rendering obsolete
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the proper idea that international norms are the fruit o f consensual decisions made by 
members o f the international community and for the sake o f its existence.263
Considering the ethical approach here developed, this view is particularly 
problematic because it assumes that the polity, in this case the US, is the ultimate 
instance o f social interactions that define individuals’ identity as moral agents in an 
increasingly interdependent environment. It overlooks the fact that the US, even with its 
unmatchable amount o f military plus socio-economic power, is a situated socio-political 
construct that is necessarily part o f and increasingly dependent on a broader historical 
dynamics to realise its ethical potential. In a world marked by people’s greater mobility 
and exposure to different social values, it is unlikely that the US can construct an 
effective international agenda o f action without an open and critical understanding o f the 
different ethical collective perceptions that governs the present system o f rights and 
therefore morally drive individuals’ actions. It is this deeper comprehension of the world 
and critical assessment o f the historically limited ethical view that presently direct its 
policies at the national and international level that can eventually enable the US to 
perform its leading role in defining international norms, which can be identified by both 
compatriots and non-compatriots and serve as a guide to their behaviour in an 
interdependent world.
Regardless o f the magnitude o f its present political, economic and military 
capabilities, the US needs to recognise other states as autonomous interlocutors, potential 
sources o f distinctive and yet valid collective moral claims in the actual construction o f 
international institutions and practices. It is in this construction that states can become 
part o f a comprehensive dialogue permeated by exchanges, which allow them to perceive 
their differences in terms o f ethical views and how these differences can shape their 
national policies in face o f an increasingly dynamic historical process. They can more 
easily develop respect and trust among themselves as well as serve as vehicles for their
263 This point is also stressed by Nardin in his response to an article defending US intervention in Iraq on 
humanitarian grounds. According to him, “ ...th e grand rationale shifts the focus o f  debate from protecting 
human rights within a decentralized international system to replacing that system with one that is centrally 
managed by the United States. An American understanding o f  universal principles defines the new system  
and American power enforces it. Instead o f  the balance o f  power constrained by international law, we have 
the exercise o f  hegem onic power unconstrained by international law .” Terry Nardin, “Humanitarian 
Imperialism: Response to ‘Ending Tyranny in Iraq’” in Ethics and International Affairs. September 2005, 
Vol. 19, Issue 2, p. 24.
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citizens’ identification with the principles that provide sustainability to an international 
order. It follows as an implication o f the argument that the definition o f moral principles, 
more particularly the interpretation o f a self-determination principle and the 
establishment o f methods to enforce it, should be derived from the consensus of the 
international community’s members relating to each other in an autonomous way. 
Moreover, it has to be focused on the empowerment o f the affected state so that other 
members could interact with it in an ethical way.
The US failure to understand a duty o f intervention and assistance as part o f a 
broad framework that is constructed through consensual decisions o f members o f the 
international community and could only be actually fulfilled in respect to these decisions 
paves the way to forms o f action that have severe implications for the functioning o f 
international society nowadays. Without being attached to a consensual framework, the 
US is more prone to act on unethical grounds, on the basis o f uncompromising attitudes, 
the use o f double standards and the defence of its narrow national interests in its 
international incursions. By helping to build a perception in the affected state that 
international mechanisms and institutions are merely instruments of an invader for its 
own short-term benefits and not for the restitution o f the affected state as the collective 
vehicle o f moral self-consciousness o f its citizens and a fit member o f the society of 
states, these strategies end by undermining the proper functioning o f international 
society.
Some o f the procedures favoured by the US after the initial period of intervention 
in Iraq illustrate the point. First, despite its initial discourse about the need to coordinate 
humanitarian intervention with military activities and initiatives to support this 
coordination, the US failed to secure an environment where NGOs responsible for 
providing relief to the civil population’s suffering could safely operate in Iraq .264 Even 
when NGOs managed to operate, their work was jeopardised by the misleading 
association established between the USA and humanitarian activities. In the eyes o f the 
population, NGOs’ activities were viewed as merely instruments of US foreign policy 
and therefore not to be trusted. Second, the rebuilding o f Iraq on an independent basis
264 N . D e Torrente, “Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on Iraq War” in Harvard Human 
Rights Journal. V ol. 17, Spring 2004.
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was particularly tarnished by the US decision to overlook Security Council Resolution 
1483, mandating that Iraq’s oil sales, as well as other funds, “ be used in a transparent 
manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic 
reconstruction and repair o f Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament o f Iraq, 
and for the costs o f Iraq civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the 
people of Iraq.” US Department of Defence issued in 2004 a formal ruling overturning 
this decision and emphasising that Iraqi funds could only be spent for contracts with 
companies o f  the US, its allies and Iraq. In fact, as it was shown by Gordon, the great 
majority o f these contracts went to US companies, a few to the allies’ companies and 
only occasionally to Iraqi companies, reinforcing Iraqi’s view that intervention and 
assistance are mainly instruments o f power politics.265 Third, it could be said that the 
inability of US to make use o f effective and reliable mechanisms to punish the gross 
violations o f human rights committed by US forces against prisoners o f war (e.g. Abu 
Ghraib) reinforced not only among the members o f international community but also 
among Iraqi the perception that the US tends to act on the basis o f double standards. 
Arguably, these violations contributed to deepen the population’s mistrust o f foreign 
intervention as well to reinforce the civil population’s disposition to be fractious and 
subject to violent outbursts.
The overall implication of the above analysis is that the supposed lack o f efficient 
international mechanisms to deal with threats imposed by an increasingly interdependent 
world cannot per se justify the unilateral or restrained multilateral use o f force. For the 
sake o f international society, there is rather an urgent need to re-structure these 
mechanisms on the basis o f a new form o f consensus established among its members. In 
the next section, I present a brief account o f the kind o f institutional mechanisms 
international society should actually back so that claims supporting duties of assistance 
and intervention from the ethical viewpoint here defended can be further subject to 
interpretation as well as legitimate and effective enforcement.
In the analysis o f institutional mechanisms, it will become clearer that 
complementary principles o f justice further project at the institutional level the
265 J. Gordon., “Accountability and Global Governance: The Case o f  Iraq”, Ethics & International Affairs. 
Vol. 20, March 2004, p. 8
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underpinning values o f openness to otherness and moral sensibility of my ethical 
framework, as they were defined in chapter 5. Although these values are presupposed in 
the definition of the principle o f self-determination, they are more pronouncedly exposed 
in the way members o f international society should define international mechanisms so as 
to interpret and fulfill duties o f assistance and intervention.
6.4) The Building up of Institutional Mechanisms to Uphold International Principles 
of Justice
It could be said that the UN system currently embodies the core o f institutional 
mechanisms responsible for the actual interpretation and enforcement o f the content of 
the international self-determination principle.266 Although initiatives have been launched 
by UN staff and members to reform these mechanisms, making them more legitimate and 
effective, they prove to be too restrained. By clinging to a non-dynamic view of 
international relations, they overlook the fact that these mechanisms should be 
increasingly regarded as a conjoint initiative of states, translating their disposition to 
build a universal consensus through openness to each others’ historically situated ethical 
viewpoints for the sake o f their citizens’ moral realization. Following this reasoning, the 
effectiveness o f these institutional mechanisms will much depend on their ability to 
translate a notion o f partnership o f initiatives between best and worst fit members o f 
international society struggling to construct an international environment where these 
ethical exchanges can actually take place. On the one hand, this partnership will require 
that members of international society participate in co-operative initiatives with states 
clearly affected by adversities so as to better grasp the affected state’s needs and help 
them to fulfil their own potentiality to act autonomously. On the other hand, it will 
require that, during the process o f co-operation, these members review the partial views
266 At present, the U N  system can be said to embody the core o f  these institutional mechanisms in the form 
o f  resolutions, recommendations and other deliberations arranged under the supervision o f  the Security 
Council (responsible for upholding security and peace), the Econom ic and Social Council (responsible for 
promoting international econom ic and social cooperation and developm ent) and the Human Rights Council 
(established since last February to replace the Commission on Human Rights and responsible for analysing 
and advising on human rights issues worldwide).
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they hold about the essentials necessary for individuals’ moral development and the most 
adequate methods to attain this development.
To clarify my point, let me critically analyse some o f the reforms currently 
proposed by UN staff and member states. On the issue o f legitimacy particular attention 
has been given to the need to broaden the spectrum o f representation o f the Security 
Council. This body is considered the most unrepresentative o f the UN system while 
being the most influential given its power to pass or veto resolutions to uphold rights o f 
intervention under chapter VII, concerning situations involving “threats to peace, 
breaches o f the peace or acts o f aggression” . Until now, discussions on the reform of the 
Security Council have, as shown by the claims of the G4 (Germany, Japan, India and 
Brazil) and o f African countries (e.g. South Africa and Nigeria) to acquire permanent 
seats and veto powers in the SC, prioritized the inclusion o f new members on the basis o f 
a better geo-political and strategic representation o f the international community as well 
as o f the ability o f these new members to commit themselves to human rights and to 
financially support activities o f the UN system.
These suggestions o f reform are still based on a non-dynamic view of 
international relations, which are not fully able to cope with an environment characterised 
by a greater mobility o f population and exposure to different social values. In this 
environment, considerations about traditionally perceived states’ characteristics, such as 
size o f population, geographical importance, ability to conform to values and practices 
currently defined by liberal societies, are per se insufficient if not accompanied by the 
ability o f old and new members to serve as congregators o f similar understandings o f the 
moral fundamentals underlying national system of rights. It is this last ability, together 
with member states’ willingness to relate to each other on similar conditions (being 
holders o f equal procedural powers in this particular case), that can more effectively 
allow states to have a broader grasp o f their historical limitations and the possibilities of 
defining international values and valid practices today. In light o f  these observations, I 
would say that the UN needs above all to broaden the spectrum o f representation in its 
main bodies accounting for the different possible ethical collective experiences present in 
the world today. Member states have to be perceived as leading figures in a region in 
terms o f embodying a particular interpretation o f moral principles that can be said to
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characterise distinctive but yet closely related systems o f rights. They also have to be 
willing to build a dialogue aiming at exchanging ethical viewpoints, which lead to the 
self-assessment o f national and international institutional practices.
A further implication o f the points here made is that the UN and member states 
should also be prepared to re-evaluate the actual functioning o f its main bodies on the 
basis o f the fulfilment of states’ right to self-determination in its interconnected 
individualistic and collective dimensions, as I have suggested. In practical terms, 
initiatives proposed by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his 2002 report, such as 
streamlining procedures o f UN current bodies, focusing on the key functions that define 
these bodies, establishing a tighter kind o f co-operation among them as well as working 
in partnership with NGO’s and regional organisations, have to be balanced by initiatives 
leading to a comprehensive analysis o f the different historically situated possibilities of 
interpreting and fulfilling the individualistic and collective dimensions o f a right to self- 
determination.267 Bodies such as ECOSOC and the Human Rights Council should focus 
on a continuing identification o f particularities in the actual functioning of systems of 
rights as well as o f points o f similarities and complementary characteristics among these 
systems, paving the way to the establishment o f general criteria that would help to 
examine the claims o f states whose ability to act autonomously is undermined in face of 
adversities. These initiatives would then serve as inputs to the debate on international law 
at the General Assembly and to decisions that should be taken by the Security Council, 
more specifically forewarning of claims that are seen as a danger to international peace 
and security.
Furthermore, innovations should be envisaged in what concerns UN and states 
representatives’ perceptions o f the groundwork needed to fulfil a state’s right to self- 
determination. Following an ethical framework, the fulfilment of this right has to be 
perceived as a process. It relates to a state’s ability to perform ethical functions, such as 
the exchange o f viewpoints on the foundation o f international moral principles, which are 
necessarily continuous in time and dependent on a notion o f openness to otherness. 
Therefore, work on the ground has to be guided by the concept of partnership between
267 “Strengthening o f  the United Nations: an agenda for change”. Report o f  the Secretary-General. United 
Nations. 9/9/2002.
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affected states and the international community (carried by independent observers, 
experts, states’ representatives), in which latter treats the former as holder o f a potential 
autonomous capacity and does its best to interact on the basis of reciprocity o f treatment. 
This reciprocity will then help to build a sense o f trust among the parties leading them to 
develop a dialogue about not only the best methods to secure human rights standards in 
the affected state but also about the terms that validate these human rights standards in 
general.
On the one hand, this partnership has to be conceived as a long-term strategy in 
which UN representatives and personnel undertake to work together with the affected 
state in schemes o f technical support in specific areas to improve their human rights 
standards, such as the organisation o f a representative electoral system, the discussion of 
methods to render Legislative procedures more effective or a Judiciary more accountable. 
These schemes o f co-operation have nonetheless to be defined in a way that respects the 
affected state’s need to exercise its autonomy. In this sense, UN representatives and 
personnel should openly interact, combining reasonableness with the exercise o f moral 
sensibility, with state representatives and groups o f civil society so as to grasp the 
politico-anthropological features that define the system o f rights o f these societies and 
give this system its unique character. On the other hand, this partnership has also to be 
conceived by UN representatives and personnel as an opportunity for them to review the 
historical limit o f the ethical frameworks on the basis o f which they formulate their 
activities. In this particular sense, co-operation should not merely relate to the 
commitment o f an affected state to international human rights standards. It should also 
be seen as an instrument for the review current international practices and interpretations 
of rights.
6.5) Concluding Remarks
The principle o f self-determination o f states, as here understood in its 
individualistic and collective dimensions to individuals’ moral development, is the 
founding principle o f international society. Its actual realisation however faces obstacles
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derived from the different kind o f adversities states confront in the daily attempt to 
perform their ethical role. Though these adversities affect states differently, they are all 
part of an increasingly interdependent context that international society as a whole helps 
to construct while serving as scenario to the kind o f open interactions its members need 
so as to become fully aware o f the essential elements involved in the performance of their 
ethical functions. In the light of these observations, it is possible to argue for 
complementary principles o f justice, related to international society’s duties to assist and, 
even in extreme cases, to intervene so as to minimise the effects o f these adversities.
The argument for complementary principles o f justice is not however complete 
without thinking about the necessary mechanisms leading to the actual enforcement o f 
the duties to assist and intervene. While these mechanisms can be said to be in their 
essence part o f the current UN structure, they still need to be re-evaluated so as to attain 
more legitimacy and effectiveness. In an increasingly interdependent world, this re- 
evaluation has to be based on a balance between considerations about state members’ 
power politics in the short term and the need for a more dynamic and open understanding 
of the interactions among these state members in the long run, aiming at a broader grasp 
of how different ethical viewpoints can provide insights into the formation o f fit moral 
agents and, as a result, to the construction o f a more stable international order. Following 
this reasoning, mechanisms should be thought of respecting states’ autonomy, reciprocity 
of treatment among them, openness to each others’ claims and the exercise of a 
reasonableness informed with moral sensibility.
I am perfectly aware that many critics would point to the formalism of the 
propositions of reform here made and the actual tendency o f power politics to dominate 
the direction o f these efforts and impose comprehensive views o f the world. I should 
however emphasise that what has been suggested is an analysis o f the possibilities for 
states to change their perceptions about what constitutes a regulated and safe international 
environment. On the one hand, I stress the normative meaning o f concerted actions 
aiming to secure the polities’ self-determination worldwide. I particularly call attention 
to the importance of these actions in the constitution o f responsible citizens who can 
relate with compatriots and non-compatriots in a morally meaningful way. On the other 
hand, I encompass an account o f the functional aspect o f this proposition. It is a
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proposition regarding the kind of institutional mechanism international society should 
actually back in order that its members can more successfully exercise the basic ethical 
functions that would allow them to more successfully deal with the challenges o f an 
increasingly interdependent world.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1) Summary of the Argument
The critical analysis o f the contemporary debate on justice undertaken in the first 
part o f this thesis has served to identify and qualify the kind o f constitutive relations 
between the individual and the state as well as among states that account for a 
functioning moral agent in an interdependent world. As I argued in chapter one, Rawls’ 
works serve as a starting point to this investigation, first, because his earlier works 
ground the dichotomy o f viewpoints between cosmopolitans and communitarians, which 
characterises this debate. By assuming individuals’ universal rationality and relaxing the 
circumstances o f justice delineated by Rawls in the OP to account for open systems o f 
co-operation, cosmopolitans, such as Beitz and Pogge, are able to derive universally valid 
norms o f behaviour for individuals no matter where they live. Communitarians, in their 
turn, reject the Rawlsian attempt to construct an OP to justify principles o f  justice on the 
basis that it wrongly focuses on procedures - an individual who exists prior to his ends. 
For them, justice is intrinsically constructed by values individuals share while performing 
social roles inside a particular political community. Second, and more importantly from 
the perspective o f this thesis, Rawls’ later works embody attempts to reconcile the 
challenges offered by cosmopolitans and communitarians when arguing for a politically 
situated notion o f individuals, as citizens o f liberal societies. In particular, 1 contend that 
all these attempts imply but do not fully explore the notion o f a moral agent and the 
ethical role the state can play in individuals’ moral constitution both nationally and 
internationally.
As I discussed in chapters two and three, cosmopolitans, communitarians and 
theorists o f nationalism fail to offer a convincing account o f moral agents who can 
consistently function in an environment where they are more intensely confronted with 
differences in cultural values, socio-economic development and legal-political
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arrangements. For they portray an asymmetrical view o f the constitutive relations 
between individuals and historically situated political communities. As a consequence, 
they simplify the dynamics o f an international environment and its potential impact on an 
individual’s moral realisation. On the one hand, cosmopolitans such as Beitz, Pogge and 
Barry neglect how the individual becomes morally motivated by the constitutive links he 
establishes with a situated political community through the exercise o f citizenship. While 
deriving international just principles from a universal rationality supposedly shared by 
moral agents, they end up overlooking the historical limitations that shape individuals’ 
grasp of these principles and make these principles largely identifiable as norms of 
conduct. On the other hand, communitarians (e.g. Walzer and MacIntyre) and 
nationalists (e.g. Miller and Tamir) overemphasise the constitutive role o f the political 
community in forming a morally motivated moral agent to the detriment of an 
individual’s impartial thinking. They undermine the construction o f workable 
international principles o f justice by allowing the states to be excessively discretionary in 
the definition and maintenance o f a collective sense o f identity amongst citizens.
In the second part o f the thesis, I argued that a Neo-Hegelian perspective, as it 
was extensively discussed by Avineri, is in a better position to offer the set o f ideas key 
to this reconciliation. First, it understands the formation and functioning o f moral agents 
as the fruit o f social interactions in a particular socio-historical context. As I explained in 
chapter four, it is as citizens participating in the definition o f a system o f rights that 
individuals develop independent critical thinking while perceiving themselves as part o f a 
social whole, which shape their collective sense o f identity and helps them to be morally 
motivated to act on the basis o f common norms. Second, it comprehends the states as 
ideal constructs embedding ethical processes bom out o f social interactions that are 
realised both at national and international levels through recognition o f the parties’ own 
historically constituted autonomy.
On the basis o f these two main set of ideas, I constructed my own ethical 
framework to account for a functioning moral agent in a challenging and diverse 
international environment. In chapter five, I argued that states can still be considered 
socially constituted necessities arranged over space and time for two main reasons. First, 
they still have the potential to provide for legitimate and enforceable institutional
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mechanisms through which individuals can relate to each other in a specific way 
(reciprocity o f treatment based on equal freedom) while constructing a historically 
situated system o f rights. By performing this role, the state becomes the primary ethical 
locus where legitimate principles of justice are constructed. Second, the society o f states 
can be interpreted as being not only the ethical locus where states recognise each other in 
their autonomous capacity to be the collective vehicle o f moral self-consciousness for 
their citizens but also the ethical locus where their particular (historically limited) 
interpretations o f a system o f rights can be cross-examined, leading eventually to the 
construction o f principles of justice that would be scrutinized by a progressively universal 
consensus.
In order that the system of states be considered such an ethical locus, its members 
have nonetheless to be able to relate to each other in a specific way in the actual 
definition o f international principles o f justice. The relationship has to be marked by 
inclusiveness in the sense that it encompasses not only states that have already reached a 
high level o f economic and political autonomy and share a liberal understanding of 
ethical values but also states whose autonomy is currently being jeopardised by facing 
adversities and/or contest liberal ethical values. Moreover, it has to be marked by the 
parties’ willingness to build a consensus on the basis o f their continued attempt to 
consider each other in their potentiality to be the collective expression o f a different 
ethical viewpoint, as embedded in their historically situated systems o f rights. They have 
to be open to each others’ viewpoint in a way that leads, on one hand, to the 
understanding o f the distinctive characteristics o f each others’ systems o f rights; on the 
other hand, it leads to the parties’ ability to critically re-assess, on the basis o f this 
broader understanding, the public policies that shape the particular content o f their 
systems o f rights and influence the construction of international norms in a context o f 
increasing interdependence. In these exchanges, the ability o f states’ representatives to 
make use o f a revitalized notion o f reasonableness becomes o f fundamental importance. 
It allows them to use a moral sensibility to explore what a historically limited (and mostly 
liberal) notion o f reasonableness cannot convey in the dialogue they establish with each 
other.
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The above conceptualization o f states’ interactions was applied to the actual 
formulation o f just international principles. In chapter six, I particularly argued that self- 
determination is an entitlement that political communities not only hold against each 
other but also conjointly become responsible for making it effective worldwide if they are 
to perform their ethical roles in individuals’ moral development. As a result, a principle 
o f self-determination has to be understood together with duties o f international assistance 
and intervention -  to help less fitted states to cope with adversities that undermine the 
exercise o f their autonomous capabilities and therefore put at risk the well-functioning of 
an international society. To illustrate the applicability o f my ethical framework, I analyse 
the perceptions o f the international community’s members on the need for intervention 
and assistance in Iraq. As a consequence of this analysis, I argued that leading liberal 
societies need to tame their inclination to make prompt use o f their overwhelming 
military, economic and political capabilities to contain a state’s outlaw behaviour. Their 
ability to provide for the well-functioning o f international society nowadays depends less 
on the use o f these capabilities than on a comparative and critical appraisal o f the main 
characteristics o f systems o f rights, which translate states’ ethical personality and 
contribute to their citizens’ moral constitution. This appraisal however cannot effectively 
be made without considering the actual formulation and enforceability o f international 
principles, including the one related to intervention and assistance, as a necessary 
outcome o f international consensus among members o f international society enjoying 
diverse ethical views and levels of autonomy. In view o f these observations, I finally 
discussed the kind o f fundamental changes that should be brought to the structure of 
international mechanisms, such as the UN system, to make them more effective and 
legitimate.
7.2) Implications of the Argument
My ethical framework questions the basis on which liberalism should be 
the core framework to shape international practices and institutions nowadays. As I 
argue, in an increasingly interdependent world the universal grounding o f international 
principles o f justice (legitimacy and applicability) are to be derived from open exchanges
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o f ethical viewpoints among autonomous states, which are aware o f their limited 
participation in the broader dynamics o f a historical process. Present institutions and 
practices responsible for the functioning o f international society, such as the UN and the 
set o f international norms and directives that are formulated and interpreted by its bodies, 
are still strongly grounded on liberal values and ideals of their founding members. In a 
context featured by the growing ability o f individuals, either as members o f an 
international civil society or citizens o f a state, to appeal to forms o f argumentation and 
activities that refer to different, and sometimes opposing, understandings o f moral values, 
the liberal outlook is being more and more questioned. Clearly these liberal views, 
despite being grounded in a potential universal rationality, are necessarily a product of 
limited historical interactions. They are partial and per se insufficient to ground 
workable international norms o f conduct, which individuals can follow no matter where 
they live.
In this context it is not enough that liberal societies tolerate states that, though 
encompassing different interpretations o f a good life, are yet capable o f sharing a 
reasonableness based on a strong perception o f the value o f equal freedom. It does not 
suffice either that these liberal societies act in the sense o f persuading other states, which 
question more profoundly the current importance attributed to these values in the 
constitution o f a moral agent, to embrace their liberal ideals in the long run. For their 
claims to be regarded as legitimate, liberal societies must be prepared to openly exchange 
viewpoints about the different ethical perceptions that ground their particular systems o f 
rights with societies that, though questioning liberal values, are still guided by a notion o f 
fairness and reciprocity o f treatment in their public affairs. More particularly, I suggested 
that liberal societies should be prepared to assume the historical particularity o f their 
ethical perceptions and to re-evaluate these perceptions on the basis o f an effort they 
make to grasp the singularities o f others’ ethical viewpoint and to consider the challenges 
they impose on their own.
My theoretical account of interactions among states on the basis o f a historical 
process that demands by its own nature openness to otherness represents an attempt to 
make sense o f the challenges facing liberalism today. Individuals and states’ increasing 
exposure to different understandings o f ethical values, such as the ones incorporated by
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Islamic societies, does not represent in itself obstacles to liberal ideals. It serves as 
means to scrutinise the limits o f these ideals in the construction o f morally motivated 
agents, who are capable o f consistently relating to each other in a more complex 
international environment. In this sense, I am not endorsing the viewpoint that moral 
values should be circumscribed to cultural boundaries and that no universal standard 
exists to assess an ethical proposition. Here it is an account o f  a functioning moral 
agency from the perspective o f the constitutive role exercised by the political community 
and international interactions in a historical context where liberal ideals are perceived as 
preponderant and can be defended as such in terms o f the conditions they make available 
to independent critical thinking. But it is also an account that realises that, whatever the 
merits o f liberalism, its universal ground has to be forged in respect to a historical 
dynamics marked by the diversity o f states’ ethical viewpoints. Attempts to build a 
consensus through a comprehensive dialogue among states should be seen as a sine qua 
non element to the realisation o f such a liberal universal ideal.
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